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CHAPTER I

THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

INTRODUCTION

There is a growing trend throughout the country for parents to educate
their children at home. Although the reasons are varied, most of these parents claim
their interest in home education is based on religious views. The issue from both
the legal and the educational point of view is whether the state's interest in assuring
that children are provided a minimum level of formal education is more compelling
than the parents' fundamental right to make choices regarding the manner in which
their children are educated. The concern of all of the fifty states in the interest of the
children is presented in their compulsory attendance statutes. More succinctly, the
central question raised is this: Is the compulsory attendance requirement met by
home education and, if so, under what conditions?
In this research the terms "home instruction," "home education," and
"hdtne study" are used to describe the educational experience parents provide to
their own children in their home and under their own direction.
Following are examples of accomplished people who were schooled at
home:
1

2

Inventors:

Thomas Edison,
Alexander Graham Bell,
Orvill and Wilbur Wright

Artists and Writers:

Andrew Wyeth, Pearl Buck,
Agatha Christie, Mark Twain

Industrialists:

Andrew Carnegie,
Cyrus McCormick

Scientists:

John Burroughs,
Fredrick Terman

Entertainers:

Charlie Chaplin, Noel Coward,
Brooke Shields

Diplomats:

Patrick Henry,
Benjamin Franklin

Explorers:

George Rogers Clark,
Robert Peary

Presidents:

George Washington,
James Madison,
John Quincy Adams,
Andrew Jackson,
Abraham Lincoln,
Woodrow Wilson,
William Harrison,
Franklin Roosevelt

3
Military Leaders:

George Patton,
Douglas MacArthur

Supreme Court Justices:

Sandra O'Connerl

Since the early 1970's the press has often featured articles on students
entering Harvard and Yale after eleven and twelve years of being educated at
home.2 Newspaper articles throughout the country present to the public case
studies of children whose parents have made the decision that home instruction is
the best choice for their families. The prevalence of the situation is difficult to
measure, but estimates are as low as ten thousand to as high as one million children
who are currently receiving instruction from their parents at home.3 Parents fear
being identified because of the possible legal implications and consequences.
Legal ramifications vary from state to state. Each state enacts its own
compulsory attendance laws, and each is responsible for establishing the statutory
requirements for educating its own student population. Twenty-six states have
specific statutory language dealing with home education.4 There are five states with
no statutory language referring specifically to home education or direction from the
I Raymond Moore, The School at Home, 84-7 MOODY MONTHLY,(March 1984): 19;
James Stronge and Mildred Moser, "Home Schooling: A Trend for the Future, ILLINOIS
PRINCIPAL, 8 (May 1987); JOHN WHITEHEAD AND WENDELL R. BIRD, HOME EDUCATION
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES 23-24 (Westchester, II: Crossway Books, division of Good
News Publishers, 1984).
2WHITEHEAD AND BIRD, supra note 1, at 17.
3JOHN NASBITT, MEGATRENDS 144 (New York: Warner Books 1982).
4 Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, Wyoming. Alaska's explicit language refers to correspondence programs as part of the
public school system.
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court, leaving the schools and parents to make choices that may be resolved by the
courts. 5
In many states both school administrators and parents are confused about
the rights and responsibilities of each group. Parents interested in home instruction
seek information about how to provide this opportunity to their children. School
administrators are unclear about their responsibility to meet the compulsory
attendance statutes. Too often this gap in the law creates a hostile relationship
between parents and school administrators.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Historically education of children has been a matter of personal discretion.
Indeed our legal and social structure is based on the English common law where
Lord Blackstone wrote that parents have both a right and an obligation to direct the
intellectual and moral upbringing of their children. 6 "It is the duty of the parents,"
he asserts "to give their children an education suitable to their station in life. "7
Since the Civil War states have begun to legislate compulsory attendance.
Since the late Nineteenth Century enforcement of compulsory attendance
laws has taken place. One strong impetus has been to "Americanize" the large
number of immigrants entering the country. Several court cases supported the
5Alabama, Kansas, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oklahoma.
6J.W. EHRLICH, EHRLICH'S BLACKSTONE PART ONE: RIGHTS OF PERSONS RIGHTS
OF THINGS 89-91 (New York: Capricorn Books, 1959).

7Id

5

constitutionality of compulsory schooling on the grounds of "welfare of the minor"
and on the basis that education safeguards the welfare of the community and the
safety of the state. 8
The decisions of the higher level courts in each state have served as the
guide for opinions given in other courts regarding home instruction. The courts
have attempted to balance the parents' rights with the interest of the state. The state
courts make their decisions based on their state statutes; yet the fundamental
principle of law is that the federal constitutional law must be observed in all cases.
This is true despite the fact that the Supreme Court has made it clear that education
is, in the final analysis, a function of the state. In San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez the Court held that education is not a fundamental right
provided by the United States Constitution, but educating children is a legitimate
state function to be carried out in compliance with constitutional safeguards.9
Today parents throughout the country are educating their children at home
for religious, philosophical, and personal reasons. The courts will continue to deal
with the inevitable conflicts between the compulsory attendance laws first
developed in the 1800's and the inherent parental rights protected by the
Constitution and the state statutes. Proponents of home instruction disclose the
underlying issue as that of "(W]hether there is room for diversity in American

8Thomas Carrere, Legal Aspects of Home Instruction, paper presented at the Annual
Conference of the Southern Regional Council on Educational Administration 2 (Knoxville:
November 1983).
9san Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
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room to define what a child's education is to be?"lO Courts in each state have made
decisions based upon the specific regulatory and statutory provisions of that state,
especially as these provisions relate to compulsory attendance statutes.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this research is to examine home instruction from a
national perspective. This examination includes an analysis of the applicable
statutory and case law, including pertinent data gathered from representative states.
The results of the research are directed to states such as Illinois where there is
confusion among parents and school administrators regarding their rights and
responsibilities in the area of home instruction.

NEED FOR THE STUDY

Several law review articles have been written regarding the analysis of
home instruction statutes and case law. These studies provide an excellent basis for
this research but do not provide the direct linkage to specific legislative guidelines
for a state such as Illinois that does not have statutory language explicitly
establishing regulations for home instruction.

In these states judges--not

legislators--develop the legal precedent over several cases as to the public policy
regarding home instruction. There has been no identified research looking at home

l°E. Alice Law Beshoner, Home Education in America: Parental Rights Reasserted, 49-2
UMKC LAW REVIEW 205 (1980).

7
instruction from the national perspective and then relating it to the process a specific
state may use in developing statutory law and the attendant policies, rules, and
regulations. In 1980 the compulsory attendance statutes of thirty states provided no
language about home schooling. During the legislative sessions of 1987 and 1988
thirteen states have amended their laws governing home education.11 Updated data
regarding these amended statutes must be obtained and analyzed as related to case
law. It is important to determine what legislative action has followed court action.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The First Research Objective is to review and analyze the compulsory
education/home instruction statutes and rules and regulations in all fifty states with
particular scrutiny to the means by which these laws recognize and permit home
instruction. Data for this analysis are gathered from several sources:
--The statutes and regulations themselves with an examination of the
legislative history in appropriate cases,
--Surveys submitted to the chief school officers in each state, and
--Interviews with educators at the university level and in state departments
of education as well as representatives of professional organizations.
The Second Research Objective is to review and analyze the relevant
judicial decisions of the federal courts and the higher state courts over the past
twenty-five years and the Supreme Court cases since the early Twentieth Century.
llArkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, West Virginia.
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This analysis describes trends and identifies those issues which are most often
addressed by the courts' attention:
--Inherent parental rights regarding education,
--Interest of the state regarding education,
--Religious freedom (United States Constitution, first amendment),
--Requirements of non-vagueness in criminal statutes (United States
Constitution, fourteenth amendment),
--Burden of proof,
--Equivalency of home instruction, and
--Qualifications of instructor.
The cases are then examined in the context of the statutes and rules and
regulations in the respective states to determine what if any legislative action
follows the court action.
The Third Research Objective is to trace in seven specific states, through
further interviews, the development of home instruction legislation. Specific
attention in these case studies is directed to the political or lobbying efforts, if any,
that influence such legislation and to identify the most desirable elements of model
legislation and/or administrative procedures.

PROCEDURES

This study is primarily descriptive in nature using appropriate qualitative
methods to obtain data. Methodological triangulation, "the use of multiple methods
to study a single problem or program," has been used to gain information from

9
legal sources including data from those involved in regulating home instruction.12
The three methods are survey, interview, and legal research. This methodology
identifies what is currently occurring, past practice, and tabular data. In addition
descriptive information has been obtained from several states to validate the data
and identify the underlying cause for legislative or regulatory change.
The compulsory education and/or home instruction statutes in the fifty
states have been researched, compiled, and categorized. This information has been
obtained from a survey sent to the fifty chief state school officers. The content
validity of the survey was obtained by submitting the draft of the survey to eleven
educators for their input (Appendix C). This group includes state department of
education personnel who have worked with home education or nonpublic schools,
university personnel, public school personnel, and contacts at professional
organizations. As a result of their input a final survey was developed and
distributed to the chief state school officers in the fifty states, Guam, and Puerto
Rico to get specific information regarding the status of home instruction in their
jurisdictions.13 A letter from the Chief State School officer in Illinois has been
included with the survey to support the need for the study (Appendix C). The
charts and narratives identified in the review of the literature have been used for
input, but the information has been verified by direct examination of the statutes and
accompanying laws.

12MJCHAEL QUINN PATTON, QUALITATIVE EVALUATION METHODS 109 (Beverly
Hills, Sage Publications, 1980).
13Guam and Puerto Rico were not in the final research because of the lack of supportive
documentation.
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Legal research tools have been used to uncover appropriate cases which
interpreted statutory language concerning the state's responsibility for education and
the parents' rights concerning their children's education. Court decisions involving
home instruction, as well as the compulsory education statutes and administrative
rules and regulations from the states, have been analyzed, compared, and
contrasted. Illinois court decisions will receive particular attention to determine if
an Illinois "public policy" is identifiable.
Follow-up telephone interviews have been conducted with designated
personnel in seven state education departments.14 The purpose of the interviews is
to validate the data already collected and to find information regarding the political
forces that have affected the legislative process. The criteria used in identifying
these seven states includes:
a. Significant developments in the past ten years,
b. Geographic diversity,
c. Availability of historical materials, and
d. Availability of current data.
As a result of the research, the most desirable elements of model
legislation and/or administrative procedures have been identified. It is the intent that
this effort will aid local districts, state agencies, and lawmakers to develop policies
and laws about home instruction.

14rowa, Minnesota, Montana, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin.
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DEFINIDON OF TERMS

Against public policy--When the law refuses to enforce or recognize
certain classes of acts on the grounds that they have a mischievous tendency, so as
to be injurious to the interests of the state, apart from illegality or immorality.15
Burden of proof--In the law of evidence, the necessity or duty of
affirmatively providing a fact or facts in a dispute on an issue raised between parties
in a cause. 16
Compelling state interest--the interest of the state which over balances a
person's religious interest.17
Compulsory education--Mandatory instruction as required by law.
Due process--The course of legal proceedings carried out regularly and in
accordance with established rules and principles.18 The fifth amendment provides
for due process by the Federal government and the fourteenth amendment provides
for due process by the state governments.
Egual protection-The right provided by the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution which specifically prohibits a state from denying, "[T]o
any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws."
15HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 603 (St. Paul: West

Publishing Co., 1983).
16HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 178 (St. Paul: West

Publishing Co., 1979).
17KERN ALEXANDER AND M. DAVID ALEXANDER, THE LAW OF SCHOOL,
STUDENTS AND TEACHERS 23 (St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1984).
l81ct. at 352.
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Eguivalent education--Same value, effect, importance, and worth, but not
necessarily the same form.
Establishment clause--The first amendment provision that Congress shall
make no law respecting establishment of religion.
First amendment rights--The prohibition of states from passing laws
which deny free exercise of religion.19
Home instruction--The educational experience parents provides to their
own children in their home and under their own direction.
Home instruction laws--Statutes enacted by the respective state
legislatures and rules and regulations promulgated by the state boards of education.
Monitor--To keep watch over; supervise. 20
Non-school alternatives--Learning arrangements which are not
implemented in a physical facility commonly called "school."21
Private schools--A school that is established, conducted, and primarily
supported by a nongovernmental agency.22
Public policy--The principle of the law which holds that no subject can
lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the
public good. The term "policy" as applied to a statute, regulation, rule of law,
19Joseph C. Beckman, Legal Challenges to Compulsory Education, SCHOOL LAW
UPDATE 260 (1985).
20WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 848 (Springfield, Mass., G. & C.
Merriam Co. 1975).
21LAWRENCE KOTIN and WILLIAM AIKMAN, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF
COMPULSORY ATTENDANCE 110 (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press Corp. 1980).
22rd. at 916.
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course of action, or the like, refers to its probable effect, tendency, or object,
considered with reference to the social or political well-being of the state.23
Rational basis test--An appellate court will not second guess the legislature
as to the wisdom or rationality of a particular statute if there is a rational basis for its
enactment. It has been said that the protection of the public from unwise or
improvident statutes is to be found at the voting polls or by referendum, not in
court. 24
Regulate--To control or direct according to a rule.25
School--An organization that provides instruction.26
Three prong test--The determination of whether a state law violates the
establishment clause by asking: 1) if the purpose is secular in nature; 2) if the
primary effect neither enhances nor inhibits religion; or 3) if it will foster excessive
entanglement with religion.27
Vagueness doctrine--The requirement that a criminal statute be sufficiently
definite to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of the behavior which is
prohibited. Under this principle a law which does not fairly inform a person of
what is commanded or prohibited is unconstitutional as violative of due process.28

23BLACK, supra note 15, at 603.

24Jd. at 655.
251ct. at 1096.
261d. at 1034.
27Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
28BLACK, supra note 15, at 803.
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LIMITATIO NS

1. Only decisions of the state appellate and supreme courts and United
States District, Appellate, and Supreme Court jurisdictions are included in the
study.
2. Only cases germane to home instruction and the state's role in
education, particularly home education and/or private schools have been studied.
Excluded will be cases involving private schools in which the issue has no direct
relationship to home instruction.
3. The study does not evaluate the academic effectiveness of home
instruction.
4. Only general information regarding home instruction have been
obtained. There are no case studies of individual families.

ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

Chapter I includes an introduction to the problem, the historical
perspective, the need for the study, the specific research questions, and
clarifications of the problem through the establishment of limitations and
definitions. In addition Chapter I establishes the methodology utilized to investigate
the study.
Chapter II includes a compilation of the review of relevant literature that is
divided into dissertations, legal writings and journals, and review of writings
regarding litigatien.
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Chapter III presents the responses to the three research objectives
including the unique characteristics of the fifty states regarding the authority for
home instruction. The data has been obtained by researching the pertinent statutes
and cases and also through a survey and interviews. A comprehensive response
has been completed in the form of an analysis of the court decisions and statutes
organized by the categories of types of statutory law regarding home instruction.
Within each category specific issues and cases have been analyzed as related to the
statutes and rules and regulations. Pertinent Supreme Court decisions are also
presented.
Chapter IV presents the summary, conclusions, and recommendations of
the most desirable elements of model legislation and/or administrative procedures.
In addition recommendations for future study are presented.

CHAPTER II

REVlEW OF THE RESEARCH AND LITERATURE

Legal researchers and other interested authors have studied the legal
aspects of home instruction from a state and national perspective. While this
research reviewed these papers, it sought to go further by providing legislative
recommendations that could be included in state statutes or rules and regulations.
Two law review articles on the subject analyzed the statutes of the fifty states and
related that research to one specific state's legal situation.29 This research,
however, reviewed, in addition to legal and educational writings, court cases and all
current legislation relating to home instruction and compulsory attendance,
proceeding then to relate the results of the research to Illinois.

DISSERTATIONS

The available research literature in the form of doctoral dissertations
included descriptive data of curricula and methods used in home schools,3°case
29 Gerald Lotzer, Texas Home Schooling: An Unresolved Conflict Between Parents and
Educators 39 BAYLOR LAW REV. 469 (1987); Kara T. Burgess, The Constitutionality of Home
Education 55 UMKC LAW REV. 55-61 (1986).
30Beverly Ann Sollenberger, Case Studies of Four Families Engaged in Home Education
(Dissertation, Ball State University, 1985).

16
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studies reporting on attitudes of school administrators,31 case studies of home
schooling families, 32 profiles of home school families,33 and a comparative study
of home schoolers and a group of children traditionally educated, to identify
differences in social/ emotional areas and academic achievement.34 One study
looked at the activities of the national home school movement since 1970.35
The only dissertation closely related to this study was one finished in 1976.
Walker analyzed alternatives and exemptions to compulsory attendance provided by
statutory and case law throughout the United States. Walker expressed concern
over the true meaning of schooling. The Walker study determined, on a state-bystate basis, the provisions of the compulsory attendance laws in 1976. Since that
time thirty states have revised their compulsory attendance statutes. Walker's hope
for the future was that "[T]he emphasis would shift from required attendance at a
certain school, meeting given standards, to a desired product: educated youth. "36

31 Michael Lindley, The Home Schooling Movement in the State of Indiana as Perceived
by Public School Superintendents (Dissertation, Ball State University, 1985).
32Norma Jean Feeman-Linden, An Investigation of Alternative Education: Home
Schooling (Dissertation, East Texas State University, 1987).
33Gunnar Arvid Gustavsen, Selected Characteristics of Home Schools and Parents Who
Operate Them (Dissertation, Andrews University, 1981).
34Mona Maarse-Delahooke, Home Educated Children's Social/ Emotional Adjustment and
Academic Achievement: A Comparative Study (Dissertation, California School of Professional
Psychology, 1987).
35Michael Shepard, The Home Schooling Movement: An Emerging Conflict In American
Education (Dissertation, East Texas State University, 1987).
36Barry Dean Walker, Sr., Compulsory School Attendance: Alternatives and Exemptions
Provided by Statutory and Case Law in Each of the Fifty States p. 270 (Dissertation, University of
Cincinnati, 1976).
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Walker's research was a comprehensive analysis of all compulsory attendance
statutes and the exemption provided by those statutes.
Because of the dearth of recent doctoral literature, it was critical to seek
other sources. Therefore, law review articles, journal publications, and surveys
were reviewed.

LEGAL WRITINGS AND JOURNAL ARTICLES

The legal writings and journal articles are presented in terms of the
historical perspective of home instruction and the relationship to the compulsory
attendance statutes. Although the percentage of students educated at home is small,
concern among educators and interested parents is great regarding each group's
rights and responsibility regarding home instruction. Each group has a valid
interest--and an important responsibility. States such as Illinois that do not have
statutory language explicitly establishing reasonable regulations for home
instruction have been hotbeds for litigation.

Over several cases judges--not

legislators--have developed the legal precedent that is expensive, time consuming,
and unnecessarily bitter.3 7 School administrators are understandably confused and
parents are frustrated by the lack in many states of statutory definitions and

37JAMES W. TOBAK AND PERRY A.ZIRKEL, Home Instruction: An Analysis of Case
Law. 8 UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW, 57 (Fall 1982), ERIC S. MONDSCHEIN AND
GAIL PAULUS SORENSON, Home Instruction in Lieu of Compulsory Attendance: Statutory and
Constitutional Issues, SCHOOL LAW UPDATE 260 (1982); Gerald Lotzer, supra note 29.
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guidelines.38 Judges, in turn, have pointed their fingers at legislators' failure to
establish regulations on home instruction.
Beckham identifies the results of these concerns:
Legal challenges to state compulsory attendance laws have
emphasized four interrelated constitutional claims.

Under

provisions of the free exercise clause of the first amendment,
parents have challenged the state's authority to require public
school attendance in lieu of home instruction and private
religious organizations have refused to comply with state
regulation of nonpublic schools. Alternatively parents and
religious organizations have asserted violations of the
establishment clause of the first amendment in attacking state
regulations of private religious school operations. In those cases
in which state compulsory attendance requirements impose
criminal penalties for nonconformance, challenges based upon a
denial of fifth and fourteenth amendments due process have been
addressed. Finally, parents have asserted a right to direct the
education of the child under various constitutional theories
implicating privacy, equal protection, and due process
guarantees.39
Statutory enactment is no guarantee that legal ambiguities and litigation will
be avoided, as substantiated in New Hampshire. According to Stocklin-Enright,
New Hampshire's compulsory education statute is the most strict in the country. 4 0
38Joseph C. Beckman, Legal Challenges to Compulsory Education, SCHOOL LAW
UPDATE 271 (1985).

39rct. at 260.
40Brendan Stocklin-Enright, New Hampshire's Home Schooling Quandary, 2 VERMONT
LAW REVIEW 265 (1983).
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Based upon the author's interpretation of the statute, there are only two choices for
the student: public or private school. Home instruction has been discarded because
of the burdensome expense of supervision. Ironically in 1980 the state educational
agency developed Rules and Procedures pertaining to home education which called
for proof of "a manifest educational hardship." Stocklin-Enright has questioned the
statutory authority for the State Board of Education to develop these Rules and
Procedures, noting:
The senators who approved section 193:3 would have been very
surprised if they had been told that their "clarifying amendment"
authorized a major change in educational policy.

From a

clarification of the section 193:3 power to reassign children within
the public school system, the Board has wrenched the power to
start a home schooling program. The language of the section and
its legislative history speak against such a novel and unintended
interpretation.

Home schooling may be desirable, but so is

legality and adherence to the rule of law.41
The uncertainty of the parents' constitutional role has been raised once
again in an analysis of New Hampshire's statute, case law, and regulations. The
legislators, working with parents and other educators, are the ones to remove the
contradictions in the "administrative and legal commands."42
Before 1987 Illinois was one of the seventeen states having no statutory
provisions for home instruction.43

However, some of these states, including

41Jd at 278.

42Jd. at 299.

43Patricia Lines, An Overview of Home Instruction, 68-7 KAPPAN, 510-518 (March
1987).
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Illinois, have recognized the validity of home instruction by virtue of court
decisions which define such instruction as a form of private school.44
The constitutional issues involving religious liberty, separation of powers,
and equal protection and balancing of the states' interest against parental rights have
been the focus of several scholarly research articles. Burgess45 identifies the
ground swell of interest in home education in the state legislatures and expresses
concern regarding statutory language "passing constitutional muster."46 She also
raised the issue of statutory authority for home education being unconstitutionally
vague as it is in Missouri. The plaintiffs in the Missouri case, Ellis v. O'Hara,41
argued that the state statutes were unconstitutionally vague and that "neither
regulations nor guidelines have been promulgated to assist in the interpretation of
this language. "48 The court agreed, finding that the parents were not given an
adequate definition of "substantially equivalent" and that the legislature did not
provide minimal guidelines for law enforcement. The court concluded that the
statute did not comply with due process requirements and was unconstitutionally
vague.49 The court stayed the effective date of the order until the close of the
legislative session in 1986 to allow the Missouri legislature to enact new statutory

44Indiana, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oklahoma.
45Burgess, supra note 29, at 83.
4 6rd. at 69.

47612 F. Supp. 379 (D.C. Mo. 1985).

48rct. at 380.
49rct. at 381.
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language. A new statute with more concise language was adopted with the effective
date of June 19, 1986. 50

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

To have a clear understanding of home instruction, it was necessary to
consider the origin of compulsory attendance laws and the early court cases
involving parental rights for determining how their children should be educated. In
1642 the Colony of Massachusetts Bay enacted the first compulsory attendance
laws.51 "This statute required all parents and masters to provide an education both
in a trade and in the elements of reading to all children under their care. "52 In 1648
the Act was amended to lay the foundation for local taxation to provide support for
schools. 53
The Massachusetts' compulsory literacy law of the 1640's has led to the
development of the principles of today's American educational system which are
identified in the comprehensive report of compulsory education statutes by Kotin
and Aikman:

SOMO. ANN. STAT.§ 167 031-167.071 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
51LA WRENCE KOTIN and WILLIAM AIKMAN, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF
COMPULSORY ATTENDANCE 11 (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press Corp. 1980).

521d
53 Id. at 13.
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1. The education of children is essential to the proper
functioning of the state.
2. The obligation to furnish this education rests primarily upon
the parents.
3. The state has a right to enforce this obligation.
4. The state has a right to determine the type and extent of
education.
5. Localities may raise funds by a general tax to support such
education.54
After a flurry of enactment of compulsory attendance laws, interest
declined, and by the end of the 19th century these laws were repealed or not
enforced.

The colonists were preoccupied with the Indian wars, economic

problems, and religious debates. In 1852 Massachusetts was once again the leader.
The State enacted new general compulsory attendance legislation, "[R]equiring
persons having any children under their control who were between the ages of eight
and fourteen to send such children to school for twelve weeks annually, six weeks
of which had to be consecutive."55
The child labor laws in the early 1900's strengthened attendance laws.56
By 1918 all the states had enacted statutes calling for parents to send their children
to school or risk being penalized by imprisonment or fines. The justification for
these laws was found in the states' police power to provide for general welfare.57
54Id. at 19.
55Jd. at 25.
56Thomas Carrere, Legal Aspects of Home Instruction, paper presented at the Annual
Conference of the Southern Regional Council on Educational Administration 18 (Knoxville:
November 1983).
57Mondeschein and Sorenson, supra note 36, at 259.
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However, after the Brown v. Board of Education58 decision in which the
board was found in violation of its duty to desegregate its schools, Mississippi,
South Carolina, and Louisiana repealed their compulsory attendance laws and
Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Texas exempted children whose
parents objected to the child attending an integrated school. New York, Georgia,
and Virginia also made changes in their compulsory attendance statutes during the
late 1950's and early 1960's which "could conceivably be used as a means whereby
to avoid sending a child to racially integrated schools. "59

At the time of this research, every state has some form of compulsory
attendance statute establishing the standards for attendance.ro

COMPULSORYATTENDANCESTATUTES

The report prepared by Kotin and Aikman, discussed above, not only
provided a comprehensive analysis of the compulsory attendance laws and their
development but also analyzed the relationship between the child labor laws and
compulsory attendance.61
The Education Commission of the States, Issuegram, cites the American
Civil Liberties Union's position supporting home instruction, which states:

58srown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954).

59walker, supra note 36, at 58.
6°'foBAK AND ZIRKEL, supra note 37, at 13-14; Walker, supra note 36, at 33-35.
61Kotin and Aikem, supra note at 51.
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We believe that in the interest of parental right to choose an
alternative to public education, home instruction with
safeguards, such as approval of curriculum testing of the child,
should be extended to all jurisdictions because the state's interest
in assuring minimum levels of education does not extend to
control of the means by which that interest is realized. 62
The same article raises policy questions which should be considered as
changes in compulsory education laws are contemplated. These issues include:
1. Should compulsory attendance laws carry criminal sanctions
against parents honestly acting in the best interests of their
children?
2. Should regulation of home instruction be left to local law
enforcement agencies--or should legislatures provide some
rules and give state or local school boards authority in this
area?

3. Are children instructed at home receiving what they need for
good citizenship and self-sufficiency?
4. Are these children unacceptably insulated from the
mainstream of society, or do they have adequate
opportunities for gaining social skills and a broader
knowledge of society? If social isolation is a problem, what
are the best ways to correct it?
5. If home instruction is allowed, to what extent should states
provide support?
6. If local officials provide support, should states permit them
to count home-tutored children in their enrollment figures?63
62Patricia Lines, Home Instruction, ESC ISSUEGRAM, Education Commission of the
States, Denver (August 1984).
631d. at 6.
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Kotin and Aikman's comprehensive writings regarding compulsory
attendance reviewed the significant debate over the quality and viability of public
education. The authors suggested that the repeal of compulsory attendance laws
could result only if there was a public policy shift in the public financing of
elementary and secondary education. 64
The Home School Legal Defense Association has summarized--but not
analyzed--applicable state statutes. The following note on the cover page of the
Defense Association's publication sets forth the intent of the summary:
This chart is not intended to be, and does not constitute, the
giving of legal advice.

Since many states have unclear

compulsory education statutes, the courts vary on their
interpretation of those statutes. Therefore, there is no guarantee
the state will accept all options for compliance listed under each
state. This analysis is not intended to substitute for individual
reliance on privately retained legal counsel. 65
A publication of the Education Commission of the States also included a
chart of the various state statutory provisions.66 The Rutherford Institute had,
according to the preface of the publication, "undertaken an exhaustive examination
of home education situations in the fifty states. "67

64KOTIN and AIKMAN, supra note 51, at 326.
65CHRISTOPHER KLICKA, HOME SCHOOL STATUTE CHART OF 50 STATES
(Washington, D.C.: Home School Legal Defense Association, August, 1986).
66Education Commission of the States, Compulsory Education Laws and Their Impact on
Public and Private Education-With Suggested Statutory Language, March 1985.
67HOME EDUCATION REPORTER, Rutherford Institute, 1985.
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Tobak and Zirkel included a tabular overview of the state statutes and
attendant policies/regulations concerning home instruction. The primary source of
the data was information obtained before 1980 by the New Hampshire State
Department of Education. At that time fourteen states provided no exception for
home instruction beyond the possibility of offering it as a private school, fifteen
explicitly provided an exception for home instruction, and twenty-one states had an
implied exception to public or private schooling based either on broad equivalency
language or on narrower, marginal language. 68
In 1986, Deckar began to survey the states and prepared, in chart format

annually, the compilation of the data supplied by the states regarding specific
information about home education.69 His STAIB BY STAIB HOME SCHOOLING
MANUAL included requirements that must be met in each state to fulfill the
compulsory education statutes.
Kotin and Aikman also provided a tabular description of "Primary
Learning Arrangements Which Meet the Attendance Requirements of the
Compulsory Attendance Statutes."

They indicated that the intent of the chart

published in 1980 was to "address the distinction between permitted school and
non-school learning arrangements. "70 Their information provided still another
source for analysis of the statutes.

68Tobak and Zike!, supra note 37, at 6-12.
69STEVEN DECKAR, 1986 FIRST EDffiON HOME SCHOOLING LAWS: STATE BY
STATE HOME SCHOOL MANUAL (DeKalb, II. 1986).

70KOTIN and AIKMAN, supra note 51, at 345.
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REVIEW OF ARTICLES RELATING TO LffiGATION
During the past ten years, law review articles and legal journals have
included writings about litigation of home instruction cases. Generally, these
writings provide (1) comprehensive overview of litigation; (2) categorization of
cases and review of the case law; (3) analysis of constitutional issues; (4) impact of
political forces; (5) analysis of case law in a specific state; and (6) identification of
trends.

COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW OF LIDGATION

Tobak and Zirkel's analysis of the statutes and case law presents an
extensive view of the issues surrounding home instruction and ends by
recommending a burden shifting approach.71 This approach involved first placing
the burden on the state to show non-attendance and then on the parents to prove the
educational equivalence of the home study program. They emphasized that:
[T]he balanced approach takes into account both the state's
interest in education and the parent's freedom to choose. In
addition, and perhaps most importantly, it permitted a greater
focus on the best interests of the individual child.72
Any solution such as this must be determined by the one legal entity that
can provide both specificity and the power of enforcement--the state legislature.73
71 Tobak and Zirkel, supra note 37, at 6-10.
721d. at 59-60.
73carrere, supra note 56, at 18.
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IMPACT OF POLIDCAL FORCES

Tobak and Zirkel recommended that states should consider providing a
limited statutory exception for home instruction while furnishing the proper due
process procedural protection.74 History disclosed the political forces which have
influenced the direction home instruction has taken in individual states. And, partly
because of a fear of political implications, change has been slow. Carrere pointed
to the influence of political forces when attempts were made to strengthen the

compulsory attendance laws in Georgia. 75 That examination prompted this current
research to analyze the political influences in other states and the resulting
legislation.

ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

The United States Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the issue
of home instruction.

Yet, its decisions in Pierce16 Yoder, 77 Meyer18 and

74Tobak and Zirkel, supra note 37, at 59.
75carrere, supra note 56, at 12.

16Pierce v. Society of Sister, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
11wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
18Meyer v. Nebraska; 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

30

Farrington19 dealing with the states' authority in other areas of education shed light
on the home instruction issue in terms of Constitutional guarantees of religious
freedom, due process, and liberty interest. 80
In the 1923 Meyer decision, the Supreme Court struck down a Nebraska

statute which prohibited the teaching of a modem language other than English in
elementary schools.8 1 This was the first successful challenge of a state's power to
regulate education.
Two years later the Court, using the precedent of Meyer, decided in Pierce

v. Society of Sisters that an Oregon statute recognizing only public education was
ruled unconstitutional as unreasonably interfering with parents' rights.82 Pierce
protected the property interest of the private school.
Shortly thereafter the Supreme Court heard Farrington v. Tokushige
which involved a Hawaii statute placing severe regulations on private schools.83
The Justices acknowledged the right of the state to regulate private schools but held
that such regulation cannot be so excessive as to effectively eliminate such schools
or the purposes for which they exist. On this reasoning the Hawaii statute was
invalidated because it unreasonably sought to "assimilate and indoctrinate a large
alien population and to promote Americanism. "84
79Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927).

8°'fobak and Zirkel, supra note 60, at 14-16.
81Meyer v. Nebraska; 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
82Pierce v. Society of Sister, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
83Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927).

84rd
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Stocklin-Enright stated in her research, "The Meyer-Pierce-Farrington
decisions not only set limits to the state's discretionary power but also established
that the state is a part of the parent/child educational decision."85 In Wisconsin v.

y oder, 86 the Supreme Court applied the protection of the free exercise clause of the
first amendment in determining that the parents' religious interests outweighed the
state's interest in the education of high school aged Amish children. The Court was
cautious to limit the decision to the facts of the case. The parents were convicted of
violating the compulsory attendance statute by refusing to send their children to
school after eighth grade. Tobak and Zirkel's summary of the decision identified
four criteria established by the judges in making the decision in favor of the parents'

constitutional right:

1. The parent's interest must be religious, not philosophical.
2. The religious interest must be long-standing and sincerely held
3. The continued secular education would pose a real--not merely
perceived--threat to the religious interest.

4. The disruption in the children's education should not seriously impair
the child's future nor threaten the public order in any significant
way.87

85Brendan Stocklin-Enright, The Constitutionality of Home Education: The Role of the
Parent, the State and the Child, 18 WILLAMITI'E LAW REVIEW 576 (1982).
86Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).

87Tobak and Zirkel, supra note 37, at 44.
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Lotzer in his BAYLOR LAW REVIEW COMMENT discusses the need and
ways in which to balance the interests of the state, parent, and child. 88 A
VERMONT LAW REVIEW article summarizes the four Supreme Court cases but
admittedly cannot find a meaningful pattern:
Commentators may differ over the full ramifications of these
cases, but most would agree that one principle derived from
them is that the state has the power to compel the parent to send
his or her child to some school, not necessarily public, and that
the state can subject the school to reasonable regulation.

The

consensus falls apart, however, when an attempt is made to
define "school." [T]his section will attempt to answer the central
question: Where does parental power end and state power begin
in education? It is assumed, and hereafter will be argued, that
no definitive constitutional answer to this question exists at
present.89
Burgess prompted by the decision in Ellis v. O'Hara90 wrote of
unconstitutionally vague statutes.91 She analyzed the statutes addressing home
education which she found problematic in passing "constitutional muster," focusing
particularly on requirements of teacher certification and student testing.92

88Lotzer, supra note 29, at 417.
89stocklin-Enright, supra note 39, at 281.

90£llis v. O'Hara, 612 F. Supp. 379 (D.C. Mo. 1985).

91 Burgess, supra note 29, at 83.
92Jd. at 69.
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CONFLICT OF RIGHTS

Lupa, professor of law at Boston University School of Law, objecting to
the focus of most home school litigation, that of the conflict of parent rights and
state interest, states, "This view of the matter is objectionable because it reduces
children to pawns in a struggle between their parents and the state and thereby
devalues children's interests, both constitutional and otherwise."93

IMPLICATIONS OF SPECIFIC DECISIONS

Dillahunty's, legal consul for the Ohio State Board of Education, remarks to
the Council of State Education Attorneys in October of 1987 discussed the effect of
a recent decision. Ohio's supreme court in the 1987 case State v. Schmidt94
determined that the statute, accepting an approved home instruction program as an
exemption from the compulsory attendance requirements, was not
unconstitutionally vague.95

The approval discretion vested in the school

superintendent was not an improper delegation of authority. Dillahunty noted that
since the State v. Schmidt decision was given, at least three other cases on home
schooling had been heard. She stated in her presentation that parents were lobbying

931ra C. Lupa, Home Education, Religious Liberty, and the Separation of Power,
MASSACHUSE'ITS LAW REVIEW SPECIAL CONSTITU-TIONAL ISSUE 48 (Fall 1987).

94state v. Schmidt, 505 N.E.2d 627 (Ohio 1987).
95ctaudia J. Dillahunty, attorney Ohio State Board of Education. Remarks, October 9,
1987, Council of State Education Attorneys.
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for guidance from the State Board of Education and for more authority in decisions
regarding their children's education. Dillahunty indicated that Schmidt might not be
the final word regarding home education in Ohio, but instead it might prompt the
development of administrative rules and possibly the enactment of new legislation.

The Special Report: Home Study96 states, "[C]ase decisions are disparate,
frequently being decided on interpretations of state law. "97 For example, the
seemingly incompatible decisions in Levisen,98 Grigg,99 Sal1.')'er,lOO and M.M.101
pointed to the danger in viewing home education from a national perspective to
make accurate generalization. The Grigg,102 Sal1.')'er103 and M.M.104 decisions did
not consider the home instruction programs to be private schools; however, the
Levisen court agreed with the parents that their home instruction program for their

daughter was an appropriate exception to Illinois' compulsory attendance statutes as
it was considered a private school. Levisen was cited but differentiated in later

96Cheryl Karstaedt and Richard Walker, The Special Report: Home Study prepared for the
National Association of State Boards of Education provides a short synopsis of pertinent cases and
a bibliography for attorneys representing clients involved in home instruction litigation.
971c1. at 7.

98People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950).
99Grigg v. the Commonwealth of Virginia, 224 Va. 356, 297 S.E.2d 799 (1982).
100/nterest of Sawyer, 234 Kan. 436, 672 P.2d 1093 (1983).
101State v. MM. and S.E. 407 So. 2d 987 (Fla. App. 1981).
102Grigg v. the Commonwealth of Virginia 224 Va. 356, 297 S.E.2d 799 (1982).
103/nterest of Sawyer, 234 Kan. 436, 672 P.2d 1093 (1983).
104state v. M.M. and S.E., 407 So. 2d 987 (Fla. App. 1981).
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cases.105 The report raises the question: What if these later cases were decided
before Levisen? Would Levisen, in reliance upon them, have then been decided
differently? And, if so, was it right that such an important question be decided on
the chronology of the individual court cases?
The Special Report summarizes the concern:
While it may seem obvious, it is important to remember that the
home study cases, which reach the litigation stage, have as
opposing parties, individuals and organizations who do not only
have differing legal viewpoints but have basic philosophical
differences. On one hand, are local or state school officials
whose legal duty is to see that all children within the state receive
an education. It is axiomatic that the state has an interest in an
educated citizenry whose individuals are self-sufficient and can
exercise their rights in a free society. To these ends, state
legislatures enact compulsory attendance laws.106
In these writings Mondschein and Sorenson assert:

The states where statutes explicitly provide for home education
or instruction have witnessed little or no litigation on the issue.
In states which do not expressly permit instruction at home, state

courts have been involved in determining whether home
education would be permissible under the compulsory
attendance statutes." 107

105297 S.E.2d at 801. The Virginia court rejected the precedent because the Illinois
statute lacked a comparable reference to home education as was in the Virginia statute.
106Karstaedt. supra note 96, at 1.
107Mondschein and Sorenson, supra note 37, at 261.
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IDENTIFICATION OF TRENDS

Lines, a policy analyst for the United States Department of Education,
predicts that the new wave of court cases will not be to decide whether home
schooling should be permitted but rather to determine the extent to which states
may regulate home instruction.108
States adopting more permissive home school legislation have increased
each year.109 Since 1985 Arkansas, Minnesota, New Mexico, Maine, Michigan,
North Carolina, Iowa, Oregon, Washington, Wyoming, South Carolina, Colorado,
New York, Hawaii, Vermont, West Virginia, Missouri, Florida, Tennessee,
Maryland, and Pennsylvania have modified their laws to make them more favorable
to home schoolers.110 On the last day of the 1988 session, the Iowa General
Assembly established a deferred prosecution procedure for any parent who
registered under§ 299.4 of the statute, a measure for compromise between the
active home school lobbyist and the public education supporters. This may show
the trend of removing certification or licensing requirements for home schoolers
from the statutes in the remaining states.111
108Lines, supra note 43, at 510-15.
l®Lotzer, supra note 29, at 472; Klicka, supra note 64; EDUCATION WEEK articles May
4, 1988, June 1, 1988, Sept 30, 1987; Lines, supra note 43, at 514.

11 OThe revisions have been either through the home school statutes or rules and
regulations of the state department of education.
111 With the present deferred prosecution in Iowa, only Michigan and North Dakota
prosecute if this certification requirement was not met
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McHugh in an article in The Christian Educator provides his perception
regarding the requirements of the home instruction laws:
Laws that call for home schoolers to file an annual letter of
intent, maintain simple attendance records, and teach the
common branches of learning are truly "reasonable" because
they do not require private schools to mimic the goals and stands
of one of the poorest educational systems in the civilized world-the American public schools.112

WRITINGS SPECIFIC TO ILLINOIS

In Illinois there is no statutory authority for home education. A 1950
supreme court case, People v. Levisen, considers home education as a type of
private school. The court indicates that "[T]he number of persons do not make the
place where instruction is imparted any less or more a school, ... ,113 Levisen is
considered to have set a precedent for Illinois as a haven for parents wishing to
educate their children at home.
Kotin and Aikman described the impact of the Levisen decision as the
"[L]andmark decision in Illinois provided the fullest judicial articulation to date
regarding home instruction as compliance with compulsory attendance laws." Their
analysis showed that the decision elaborated on the early State v. Peterman114
112Michael McHugh, Home Sclwol Achievement Test Requirements: Are We On the
Right Track? THE CHRISTIAN EDUCATOR 2 (1986).
113404 Ill. 574 (1950).

114State v. Peterman, 32 Ind. App. 665, 70 N.E. 50 (1904).
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decision yet did not provide guidance regarding the "quality and character" required
of home instruction.1 15 Peterman ruled that a teacher employed by the parent to
teach his or her child all subjects taught in public schools during regular school
hours was acceptable.
Stronge and Moser state in their 1987 article in Illinois Principal that
parents are required to submit a statement of assurance for parent-taught home
instruction.116

An opinion from Illinois State Board of Education's legal

department contradicting this states:
There is no statutory requirement for either parent or educational
service region superinten-dent to use the assurance statement
form. However, the relative success of the use of the assurance
statement will undoubtedly be evaluated on the basis of the
extent which it is being used plus other criteria.

If the

educational service region has proof that the child is not
receiving an education, the educational service region can, of
course, begin truancy proceedings against the parents.117
The concern identified in this research was that without clear cut written
regulations or statutory authority available to school administrators and the public,
any information was accepted as truth.

115 KOTIN AND AIKMAN, supra note 51, at 10-14.

116James Stronge and Mildred Moser, Home Schooling: A Trend for the Future,
ILLINOIS PRINCIPAL 13 (May 1987).
l l 7Letter from Sally B. Pancrazio, Manager Research and Statistics Section, Illinois
State Board of Education, July 25, 1984.
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A series of news articles in the fall of 1987, describing action by the
Regional Superintendent of Cook County, heightened the confusion regarding
home education in Illinois.

The articles described the crackdown on home

schoolers and the intent of filing for truancy because "the gray court ruling is not
enough; that a law is needed to set down specific guidelines."118 An article in the

Chicago Tribune describing this episode stated a legislative task force was being
established to study the issue and possible new legislation.119
Assistant Legal Advisor for the State Board of Education of Illinois has
clarified the legal limits of the office of the Regional Superintendent of Schools for
monitoring compliance with the compulsory attendance laws:
In so doing, the regional superintendent may expect that the
parents who seek to educate their children at home establish that
they are providing an instruction that is at least commensurate
with the standards of the public schools. The parents may be
expected to document the subjects taught, which must include
branches of learning taught in the public school, the time frame

in which instruction will be offered, and the competency of the
parent or other instructor(s).

It is not necessary that the

instructor have a teacher's certificate. The parents may also be
expected to establish by written examinations or by some other
method that the child's level of achievement is comparable to that
of his/her peers of corresponding age and grade level.120
118Ellen Schmid, Targeted as Truants, Daily Herald, December 6, 1987.
119George Papajohn, Parents Put Martwick Under Fire, Chicago Tribune, Monday,
January 25, 1988, at 1-2.
12°R.obin Cona, legal consul, Illinois State Board of Education legal opinion in form of
letter, December 14, 1987.
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The home school lobby in Illinois was very strong, as was evidenced
during the legislative session of 1987. During this session Senate Bill No. 1202121
was introduced. The bill required that every child of school age be registered in a
public, private, or parochial school or, in cases of home instruction, with the
regional superintendent of schools. The lobbying interest of parents and nonpublic
religious schools was so strong that the bill did not leave legislative committee. A
task force compromised of public and private school representatives was
established to study the feasibility of a pupil accounting system in lliinois.
In 1975 policies and guidelines for registering and recognizing nonpublic

schools in Illinois were adopted. These policies and guidelines were advisory in
nature and to this date provide the only guidance regarding the relationship of the
State Board of Education and the nonpublic schools. This lack of guidance forces
public school administrators in Illinois when confronted by a child being educated
at home or in a private school either to (1) file truancy proceedings which might
entail lengthy and expensive litigation, (2) cooperate with the families to ensure the
students receive a quality education, or (3) ignore the situation completely.

SUMMARY OF LITERATURE

A historical perspective of litigation and development of statutes regarding
home instruction was available in the literature, particularly the law review articles.
Many authors examined litigation in individual states and related the determination
121senate Bill No. 1202, 85th General Assemby, State of Illinois, Introduced April 10,
1987 by Senator Maitland.
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of the courts to the changes in the state laws regarding home instruction. Most of
the literature looked at home instruction from a religious perspective. Very little
was found regarding parents educating their children at home for non-religious
reasons.
The literature showed that the home instruction movement is not one to be
ignored and that parents believe they should be deeply involved in the education and
development of their children. Without the guidance of the United States Supreme
Court, each state must establish its own standards to provide public school
administrators with the necessary direction to fulfill their legal responsibility, which
is meeting the attendance law requirements while acknowledging the parents'
concern for their children's education.

CHAPTER III

PRESENTATION OF DATA

There is little uniformity among the fifty states as to the legal requirements
by which parents may educate their children at home. Although every state has a
statute providing for compulsory education, these statutes are by no means
uniform. Furthermore, the courts from state to state have applied these statutes
inconsistently--even where the statutes are similar.
It was this crazy-quilt of inconsistencies and ambiguities that prompted

this research. Three research objectives guided this study.
The First Research Objective was to review and analyze the compulsory
education/home instruction statutes and rules and regulations in all fifty states with
particular scrutiny to the means by which these laws recognized and permitted home
instruction. Data for this analysis were gathered from several sources:
--The statutes and regulations themselves, together with an examination of
the legislative history in appropriate cases,
--Surveys submitted to the chief school officers in each state, and
--Interviews with educators at the university level and in state departments
of education as well as representatives of professional organizations.
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The Second Research Objective was to review and analyze the relevant
judicial decisions of the federal courts and the higher state courts over the past
twenty-five years and the Supreme Court cases since the early Twentieth Century.
This analysis described trends and identified those issues which were most often
addressed by the courts' attention:
--Inherent parental rights regarding education,
--Interest of the state regarding education,
--Religious freedom (United States Constitution, first amendment),
--Requirements of non-vagueness in criminal statutes, (United States
Constitution, fourteenth amendment),
--Burden of proof,
--Equivalency of home instruction, and
--Qualifications of instructor.
The cases were then examined in the context of the statutes and rules and
regulations in the respective states to determine what, if any, legislative action
followed the court action.
The Third Research Objective was to trace in seven specific states,
through further interviews, the development of home instruction legislation.
Specific attention was directed to the political or lobbying efforts that influenced
such legislation and to identify the most desirable elements of model legislation
and/or administrative procedures.
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RESEARCH OBJECTIVE ONE

The First Research Objective serves the purpose of analyzing compulsory
education/home instruction statutes and rules and regulations in all fifty states with
particular scrutiny to the means by which these laws recognize and permit home
instruction.

A VENUES FOR HOME INSTRUCTION

The fifty states are grouped into four major categories with respect to their
particular recognition of home instruction as a permissible alternative to public
school attendance.122 These four categories are:
A. "Explicit Language Statute" States--States having statutes which
explicitly permit home instruction,
B. "Equivalency Language Statute" States--States having statutes which
simply require attendance in public schools "or their equivalent,"
C. "Qualifies as Private School" States--States having statutes which do
not explicitly mention home instruction, but did permit private school
122Admittedly, such categorization runs the unavoidable risk of over-simplification.
There are, to be sure, subcategories and "cusp" situations which will be discussed below.
Information for these groupings is based on data obtained from surveys of state agencies as well as
from the language of the statutes. Some overlapping of categories is inevitable. An example is
Oregon, which is placed in the category of explicit language, where the statute referred to term
"equivalent instruction" by a parent or tutor. The two states with rules and regulations and silent
statutes do provide explicit requirements for home instruction; yet these rules and regulations do
not have for this research the same political impact as statutory language provided through
legislation. Consequently, for this research these two states are placed in the grouping of silent
states.
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attendance, and their courts or state boards of education construed "private
schools" to include home instruction, and
D. "Silent Language Statute" States--States having no statutory language
at all beyond a bare compulsory attendance law, leaving the permissibility
of home instruction--and guidelines for it--entirely to the courts, attorney
generals, or the state rules and regulations.
Table I summarizes the state groupings which are used for the analysis of
the correlation of the court cases and the laws in this objective. In addition the table
indicates the year of the most most recent enactment or amendment to the statute.
Between the period of 1980 until 1988, changes have been made in the statutes or
the rules and regulations in thirty-one states. Twelve of these changes were made
in 1987 and 1988. Twenty-six states are explicit language states with statutory
authority for home instruction; seven states consider home instruction a form of
private schools; twelve states consider home instruction appropriate if it is
equivalent to public schools; and in five states there is no statutory authority or case
law to provide for home instruction. Although the statutes in these five states are
silent regarding home instruction or equivalency, in two of the states, rules and
regulations have been promulgated to establish procedures to be used by the
appropriate agency in determining if a home instruction program is an acceptable
exemption to the specific compulsory education requirement. 123 In three of these
states in which the statufes are silent, there is no direction from the legislature or the

123New Hampshire, Nebraska. Other states have rules and regulations but the authority
to develop these was specified in the statutes (i.e. Maryland and New York).

TABLE 1
CATEGORIES OF HOME INSTRUCTION AUTHORITY
Exolicit Lani:ual!e

State

Private

Eguivalencv

Silent
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Year•

y

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Deleware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinios
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kenruckv
Louisana
Maine
Marv land
Massachuenes
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississinni
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hamoshire
New Jersev
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Orel!. on
Pennsvlvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
I ennesse
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Vmmua
Washington
West V1rnirua
Wisconsin
Wvommg

y

y

1982
1987

y
y
y

lQRR

y
y

y

1985
1984
1988

y
y
y

y
y
y

y
y

1987
1984

y

lQRO

y
y

1988
1987

y
y

y
y

y
y
y
y

y

y
y

1986
1987
1YX2
1986
1983
1984
1984
1984
1985

y

l 'JISIS

y

1988

y

y
y

y

1976
1985
f988"
1984
1988

y

y
y
y
y

1~

y
y

1Y~7

y

1987
1984
1985
1YX7
1983

y
y
y

y
y

Totals

26

l 'JIS~

7

12

5
• year of most recent change
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state board of education regarding the monitoring or requirements of home
instruction programs.124
For a complete understanding of home instruction requirements in each
state, one must analyze the compulsory attendance and home instruction statutes
enacted by the respective state legislatures as well as rules and regulations adopted
by the state boards of education. The statutory references to these laws are
available in the appendices of this research.

STANDARDS FOR HOME INSTRUCTION AND COMPULSORY
ATIENDANCE

Authority to monitor and regulate compulsory attendance and home
instruction varies among the fifty states. The survey verifies that at least thirtyseven states have identified such a regulatory authority. Statutes are the source for
this authority in thirty-three states, regulations in fifteen states, and in two other
states the authority is from other sources such as case law. There is overlapping
monitoring authority in twelve states. Table II summarizes the data obtained from
the survey regarding the source and the authority used by the states to govern home
instruction as described above. Table ill indicates that the state boards of education
in twenty states are responsible for monitoring compulsory attendance; in ten states
the state boards of education monitor home instruction.

124Kansas, Alabama, Oklahoma.
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TABLE U
SOURCE OF REGULATORY AUTHORITY
Statute

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
Calltorrua
Colorado
Connecticut
JJeleware
Florida
ueorgia
Hawau
Idaho
Illinios
uxuana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisana
Maine
Maryland
Massachuettes
Michigan
~

Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampsnire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
vruo
UKlahoma

vregon
l:'ermsytvarua
Rhode Island
South uirolina
;:)()IJllJ

Rules

"
""

""

'I

'I

"
""
""

"

"

"

Other

"

"

"

"

"
"
""

"

~

'I

'/

"

""

""

"
"

"
'I

"

"

"

""

'l

LJBJ(Ola

·1ermesse
Texas

"

Utah

'I

Vermont
Virginia
wasrungton
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyorrung

""

Totals

"
"
'I
'I

33

15

2

TABLE III
STATE AGENCY MONITORING
State
Yes
Alabama
Alaska
Ariwna
Arkansas
( alifomia
Colorado
Connecticut
Deleware
Florida
Geon!ia
Hawaii
Idaho
I!linios
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentuckv
Louisana
Maine
Marv land
Massachuettes
Michi!!an
Minnesota
Mississiuoi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hamoshrre
New Jersev
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsvlvania
Rhode island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennesse
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Vir11inia
Washinl!ton
West Vir11inia
Wisconsin
Wvoming

Home Instruction
No

v

"

"
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Non-Public
Yes

"

"v
v
v

"
"
v

v
v

""
"'
,

"v
"
"
"
""

'

v

""v

v

"
v

"
"

"
'
'

"

,

,

"v
"
"
"

"
"

'
'
'

10

30

'

',

'

'

"

v

v
,
,

"""
"
""

_,'
'

'

v

No

20

"
"
"
"

"
"

""

20
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ELEMENTS OF HOME INSTRUCTION LAWS

Home instruction laws in some states are limited in language and in
requirements, yet in some states the laws are quite explicit. Table N illustrates the
common elements of these laws derived from statutes and/or rules and regulations.
At the time of this research, only two states require and enforce the statute that
home instruction teachers be certified according to the specific state laws.125
Another state, Iowa, has established a deferred prosecution procedure related to
certification and other requirements for home instruction for the 1988-89 school
year. In one state if the student is identified as special education, certification is
required. Two states require a private tutor to be certified, and two other states
including Michigan provide options to the certification requirement. In twenty-six
states there are specific qualifications required of parents or tutors who provide
home instruction in lieu of public school attendance. The qualification requirement
is met by proficiency exams, high school graduation or its equivalent, or by
undefined compen-tencies.
In addition to certification, the other elements included in some or all of
these statutes or regulations are:
--required days or hours of attendance,
--requirement to submit plans for approval,
--declaration of intent to provide home instruction,
--required subjects and materials,
125Michigan, North Dakota.

ELEMENTS OF HOME INSTRUCTION AUTHORITY
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--evaluation requirements including testing and/or progress reports,
--availability of due process procedures,
--fire, health, life safety requirements,
--reporting of attendance, and
--immunization requirements.
Most states require some type of notification by the parents of the intent to
teach their children at home. Reference to number of hours or days of instruction is
indicated in the requirements of many states. Specific subjects, similar to those
required of the public schools, are also indicated in the requirements. Some type of
proof of student progress is also mentioned in the majority of the states. Although
the requirements are stated in the laws of many states, the monitoring and
enforcement authority regarding compliance is limited.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE TWO

The second research objective serves the purpose of reviewing and
analyzing relevant judicial decisions of the federal courts and the higher state courts
over the past twenty-five years and the Supreme Court cases since the early
Twentieth Century. As a result of many of these decisions legislative action has
followed. The statutes in each state are examined to identify the impact of these
cases and the changes in the laws that have resulted.
This examination is limited to decisions of the United States Supreme
Court since the early Twentieth Century and other courts at the state and federal
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level over the past twenty-five years.126 The included cases have had the most
significant influences on state legislatures during the past ten years. Of the fifty-one
cases researched, seven have been heard in the United States Supreme Court, eight
in other federal courts, and the remaining thirty-six in the higher levels of the state
courts. The holdings in these cases are included in Appendix B The cases are
described and related to the present statutory language.
The courts have, as the basis for their decisions, considered and balanced
several competing positions: (1) That education is not a fundamental right provided
by the United States Constitution, but that educating children is a legitimate state
purpose.127 (2) That education is important in preparing students for the future.128
(3) That a parent has a right in the choices of the child's education.129 (4) That the

first amendment of the constitution guarantees the free exercise of religion.(5) That
the state has an interest in developing an educated citizenry that will be self
sufficient. BO and (6) That a statute is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not
clearly defined131
126The research did not attempt to analyze every case during the twenty-five year time
frame designated, only those particularly relevant to the subject. This time frame did not apply to
Illinois, the state on which this research--and the recommended legislation--was focused. Several
circuit court cases were cited in the research, but were not included in the grouping that received
more comprehensive examination.
127san Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 137 (1973).
128Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S.Ct. 686, 691 (1954).
129Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
BOBrown v. Board of Education,

347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954).

131pifth and fourteenth amendment of U.S. Constitution. State v. Buckner, 472 So. 2d
1228 (Fla. App. 1985), State v. Newstrom 371 N.W.2d 532 (Minn. 1985).

54
Table V provides data regarding the issues of these cases. Of the twentysix states at the time of this research that have explicit statutory language allowing
home instruction, thirteen have a combined total of twenty court cases construing
the language over the past twenty-five years. These cases have been in the higher
state courts (appellate and supreme) and in the federal court. Of these twenty cases,
twelve were tried as criminal prosecutions and the remaining were civil cases. The
issue of unconstitutional vagueness was considered in twelve of the twenty cases.
In six of the cases from four of the explicit language states, the statutes were found
to be unconstitutionally vague and in six cases from six states, the courts found that
the statutes were not vague.
There were eleven cases in four of the twelve states having "equivalency
language statutes", that was, where home schooling was accepted as an exemption
if it were equivalent to public school education. The courts found the statutes in
three cases to be sufficiently clear, and in the remaining case the determination was
made on other issues. Two of the cases were tried on criminal charges.
There were nine court cases decided in the seven states grouped at the time
of the research in the private school exemption category. None was tried in
criminal court. Vagueness of the statute was charged in two cases and the court
found the statute to be clearly worded and the vagueness charge unfounded.
The issue of vagueness was not raised in any of the four cases from three
"silent statute" states. The holdings were in favor of the state.
As indicated in these fifty-one cases, it was difficult to make
generalizations regarding the home instruction litigation. The cause for this was
that the courts made decisions based on interpretations of state laws. Because of

TABLE V
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KEY FOR NUMERICAL REFERENCE OF ISSUES
1. UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE--The requirement that a criminal statute be
sufficiently definite to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of the
behavior which is prohibited. Under this principle, a law which does not fairly
inform a person of what is commanded or prohibited is unconstitutional as violative
of due process.
2. EQUIVALENCY--Same value, effect, importance and worth, but not necessarily
the same form.
3. PRIVAIB SCHOOL--An exemption to compulsory attendance in a school that is
established, conducted, and primarily supported by a nongovernmental agency.
4. BURDEN OF PROOF---In the law of evidence, the necessity or duty of
affirmatively providing a fact or facts in a dispute on an issue raised between parties
in a cause.
5. QUALIFICATONS--The specific requirements for tutor or parent providing
instruction in a home instruction program.
6 FIRST AMENDMENT--The prohibition of states from passing laws which deny
free exercise of religion or the provision that Congress shall make no law respecting
establishment of religion.
7. FIFTH AMENDMENT--The state may not deprive a person of due process or
equal protection of the law.
8. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT--The right provided which specifically prohibits a
state from dening, "[T]o any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the
laws."
9. TESTING--The statutory requirements regarding testing.
10. MINIMAL STANDARDS-The statutory requirements regarding minimal standards
for instruction.
11. APPROVAL--The authority to approve a home instruction program.

TABLE
Statute
STATE
EQUIVALENT Indiana
Iowa

Maine
New York

Burrow v. State
Murphy v. State
State v. Buckner
Florida
State v. M.M. and S.E.
F. & F. v. DuVal County
Roemhild v. State
Georgia
State v. Budke
Minnesota
State v. Newstrom
Ellis v. O'Hara
Missouri
In re Monnig
State v. Davis
State v. Edgington
New Mexico
North Carolina Delconte v. State
Duro v. District Attorney
State v. Schmidt
Ohio
State v. Whisner
State v. Bowman
Oregon
Grigg v. Commonwealth
Virginia
West Virginia State v. Riddle
State v. Popanz
Wisconsin
Count for EXPLICIT:
12
20
Arkansas

(can't)

CASE
Mazanec v. North Judson-San Pierre School
Johnson v. Charles City Comm. School Bd.
Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton
State v. Trucke
State v. Moorhead
State v. McDonough
Matter of Adam D.
Matter of Andrew "TT"
Matter of Falk
Matter of Franz Children
Blackwelder v. Safnauer

Count for EQUIVALENT:
4
11
EXPLICIT

v

11

1
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-------------------x
x
no
no

x
x
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x
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x
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x
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7

2
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x

x

x

x
x
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x

x
x
x

x
x

x
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x
x
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x
x
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x

x
x
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un
un
un
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x
x
x

x
x

x

x

x

x
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x

x
x

x x
x

x
x

x

x

-------------------20 12

8

14 6
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2
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TABLE V (can't)
Statute
PRIVATE

STATE
Illinois
Illinois
Kentucky
Massachusetts
Michigan
North Dakota

Texas
Count for PRIVATE:

-----

1

2
x
x

3
x
x

4
7
-----------

People v. Levisen
Scoma v. Chicago Board of Education
no
Kentucky State Bd., Etc. v. Rudasill
Care and Protection of Charles
no
Hanson v. Cushman
Sheridan Road Baptist Church v. Department
State v. Patzer
State v. Shaver
Howell v. State

x
x

x
x
x

x
x

5

x
x

x
x x
x x
x x
x
x x
x

6

8

x

x

x x x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

9

1 0 11

x

x
x

x
x

x

---------------

7

9

CASE

9

23

87

67

5

2

1 3

Hill v. State
x
x x
Interest of Sawyer
x
x
x
State v. Lowry
x
x
x
- - - - - _N_e_b_ra_s_ka____S_t_at_e_E_x_R_e_l._D_o_u_.g..la_s_v_._B_i__
g_el_o_w__________
x ____x__x____
x _______
Count for SILENT:
4
4
3
0 0
3 1
3 2
0
2 0
SILENT

Count:

Alabama
Kansas

4

26

44

17 20 28 16 24 26

7 23

5

7 11
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-...]
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the diversity of statutory language, there was no clear cut precedent governing
home instruction litigation.
Equivalency, burden of proof, the definition of private schools, the first,
fifth, and fourteenth amendments, minimal standards, testing requirements,
approval procedures, and qualifications of instructors were other issues that were
also considered in these forty-four cases as indicated in Table V.
Before examining court cases in the states, the Supreme Court cases
relating to compulsory public school attendance and home instruction were
critiqued.

U.S. SUPREME COURT

The United States Supreme Court had not specifically addressed the issue
of home instruction at the time of this research. Yet, its decisions in Pierce,132
Yoder, 133 Meyer,134 and Farrington135 dealt with the states' authority in other areas

of education, shed light upon the home instruction issue in terms of Constitutional
guarantees of religious freedom, due-process and liberty interest.136 The holdings

132Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
133Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
134Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
135Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
136James W. Tobak and Perry A.Zirkel, Home Instruction: An Analysis of Case Law. 8
UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW 14-16 (Fall 1982).

59
in Lemon, 137 Rodriguez,138 and Brownl39 established legal precedent considered in
many of the cases concerning the propriety of home instruction.
As early as 1920 the Court limited the power of the state to regulate
instruction. In Meyer, the court invalidated a Nebraska law prohibiting the teaching
of foreign language to children in the early grades, the rationale being there was no
clear danger to the state.1 40 This was the first successful challenge of a state's right
to regulate education. The court then used the precedent of Meyer in deciding

Pierce two years later. An Oregon statute recognizing only public education was
ruled unconstitutional as unreasonably interfering with parents' rights.141 That
decision held that the exclusive public school attendance requirement interfered with
"[T]he liberty of the parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control."142
The Court made it clear that education was a power of the state and, at the
same time, recognized the parents' right in decisions regarding their child's
education. While looking at the constitutionality of the Oregon statute requiring
public education, the Court ruled, "[T]he fourteenth amendment guaranteed
appellees against the deprivation of property without due process of law consequent

131Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
138san Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
139Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954).
140Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

141268 U.S. 510, 515 (1925).
1421ct. at 534-535.
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upon the unlawful interference by appellants with the free choice of patrons, present
and prospective. "143 While protecting the parent's liberty of choice, the court also
defended the State's authority.
No question is raised concerning the power of the State
reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and
examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all
children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be
of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain
studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and
that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public
welfare.144
Shortly after Pierce, the Supreme Court heard Farrington v. Tokushige145
which involved a Hawaii statute that placed formidable regulations on private
schools. The Justices acknowledged the right of the state to regulate private
schools but held that such regulation cannot be so excessive as to eliminate such
schools or the purposes for which they exist. On this reasoning the Hawaii statute
was invalidated because it unreasonably sought to "assimilate and indoctrinate a
large alien population and to promote Americanism."1 4 6 The court acknowledged,
the right of the state to regulate nonpublic schools but the effect of the regulatory
activity could not be to eliminate them.

I43Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 534.

145273 U.S. 284 (1927).
I46rct.
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Chief Justice Burger's 1972 opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder,147 applying
the protection of the free exercise clause of the first and fourteenth amendment,
determined that the parents' religious interests outweighed the state's interest in the
education of high school aged Amish children. The uniqueness of this decision
was based on:
[A] long history as an identifiable religious sect and a successful
and self-sufficient segment of society, the Amish have
demonstrated sincerity of their religious beliefs, and
interrelationship of beliefs with their mode of life, the vital role
that beliefs and daily conduct play in continuing survival of Old
Order Amish communities, and hazards presented by a state's
enforcement of a compulsory education law generally valid as to
others;

beyond this, they have carried their burden of

demonstrating the adequacy of their alternative mode of
continuing informal vocational education; in light of this, the
state had to show with more particularity how its admittedly
strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely
affected by granting the Amish an exemption.148
The decision was limiting in that it identified that the parents' desire to
remove their children from public school after the eighth grade was based on strong
religious conviction, not philosophical or personal rationale.
The parent's constitutional interest in their children's education and
religious instruction took precedence and overrode the children's constitutional

147406 U.S. 205 (1972).
1481d. at 235.
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rights to a formal education. Later cases 149 attempted to use the Amish exemption,
citing Yoder as a precedent; yet, the majority of the courts accepted the uniqueness
of the Amish religion and the limitations of the Supreme Court decision.

San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,150 decided in
1973, identified that education was not a fundamental right provided by the United
States Constitution but that educating children was a legitimate state purpose.
The Supreme Court decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman expands the
neutrality test developed in prior cases to determine the constitutionality of statutes
involving financial aid to nonpublic schools. This three prong test is now related to
the facts in church/state litigation.151
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second,
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the statute must not foster an
excessive government entanglement with religion.152

149Howell v. State, 723 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. 1986); Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton,
815 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1987); Johnson v. Charles City Comm. Schools Bd., 368 N.W.2d 74
(Iowa 1985); Duro v. District Attorney, 712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct 998,
79 L.Ed.2d 230 (1984); Matter of Franz, 390 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1977); Hanson v. Cushman, 490 F.
Supp. 109, 114-115 (W.D. Mich. 1980); State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980); State v.
Riddle, 168 W. Va. 429, 285 S.E.2d 359 (1981); Burrow v. State, 669 S.W.2d 441 (Ark. 1984);
Scoma v. Chicago Board of Education, 391 F. Supp. 452, 461 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
150411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
151KERN ALEXANDER AND M. DAVID ALEXANDER, THE LAW OF SCHOOLS,
STUDENTS, AND TEACHERS 101 (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, 1984).

152Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971).
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Reference to Brown v. Board of Education153 was included in this
research to highlight the language of the decision relative to the importance of
education in preparing students for the future and the state's interest in developing
an educated citizenry that is self sufficient. The state's compelling interest in the
education of its citizens was considered in numerous cases when the court was
identifying which party had the burden of proof.
These Court decisions have made it clear that the state and the parent both
have a right to be part of the decision regarding a child's education but there are
limits regarding this right. The Yoder Court summarizes this by stating, "Having a
high responsibility for the education of its citizens, a state has the power to impose
reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education." 154

STATE AND FEDERAL COURT CASES AND RELEVANT LAWS

While the Supreme Court established guidelines and parameters applicable
for private and home instruction, the states, acting through the courts and
legislatures, applied these guidelines to matters of litigation and to leglislative
enactment
The remaining forty-four federal and higher level state court cases were
examined in the context of the laws of the specific state. Court cases in each state
must be analyzed in terms of the statutory language--or absence of such language-153347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct 686 (1954).

I54wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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in that state and, further, how that language may have been previously interpreted
by the courts. States were grouped into four major categories with respect to their
particular recognition of home instruction as a permissible alternative to public
school attendance.
A. "Explicit Language" Statute States--States having statutes which
explicitly permit home instruction.
B. "Equivalency Language" Statute States--States having statutes which

simply require attendance in public schools "or their equivalent."
C. "Qualifies as Private School" States--States having statutes which do
not explicitly mention home instruction but do permit private school
attendance, and their courts or state boards of education construe "private
schools" to include home instruction.
D. "Silent Language" Statute States--States having no statutory language
at all beyond a bare compulsory attendance law, leaving the permissibility
of home instruction--and guidelines for it--entirely to the courts, attorney
generals, or the state rules and regulations.
Table I on page 46 indicates the diversity of the home instruction
regulations for all fifty states. Significantly no state--either by statute or court
decision--flatly disallows home instruction. Although the grouping is based on
statutory law at the time of the research, many of the court cases analyzed were
decided under earlier statutes which have been modified. This organization
demonstrates trends and also helps predict how other states having statutes similar
to the one repealed in the decision state might construe their laws.
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"EXPLICIT LANGUAGE" STATUTE STA TES

At the time of the research, twenty-six states had statutory wording that
specifically allowed for home instruction.1 55 One might assume that such clear
legislative mandated language would clarify the home instruction issue to the point
where the vagaries of judicial interpretation would be unnecessary. However,
seemingly unambiguous words--either in the statutes or in the regulations
promulgated thereunder--were susceptible to whatever shadowy nuances that
litigants, lawyers, and judges could read into them.
There was great diversity in the form and the intent of these statutes.
Even among these states considerable variance was found in the requirements for a
home instruction program; consequently, the court decisions within these twentysix states followed no pattern. These states produced a total of nineteen court
decisions within the time frame covered. The allegation of unconstitutional
vagueness was considered eleven times. In five cases15 6 the statutes were found to
be unconstitutionally vague while the language in six 157 was found to be
sufficiently clear.
155 Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Wyoming. Statutory language that explicitly allows for home instruction was normally drafted as
an exemption to the compulsory attendance requirements of a state.
156Roemhild v. State, 308 S.E.2d 154 (Ga. 1983); State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525
(Minn. 1985); State v. Budke, 371 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. 1985); State v. Popanz, 332 N.W.2d 750
(Wis. 1983); Ellis v. O'Hara, 612 F. Supp. 379 (D.C. Mo. 1985), In re Monnig, 638 S.W.2d 782
(Mo. App. 1982).
157state v. Riddle 168 W. Va. 429, 285 S.E.2d 359 (1981); State v. Bowman, 653
P.2d 254 (Or. App. 1982); State v. Buckner, 472 So.2d 1228 (Fla. App. 1985); State v. Schmidt,
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Test of vagueness of a statute is whether language conveys
sufficiently definite warning as to proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and purpose. The statute
must give reasonable notice that a person's conduct is restricted
by the statute.158
Stricter standards regarding vagueness are applied when criminal liability
is charged as compared to a state that finds a parent guilty of a misdemeanor for
non-compliance of the compulsory attendance statutes. "When the state imposes
criminal penalties, ... citizens are constitutionally guaranteed that the offense be
defined in the statute with sufficient clarity to permit them to understand the nature
of the conduct prohibited. "159 These constitutional guarantees were found to be
lacking in the Budke,160 Newstroml6l, Roemi!dl62, Ellisl63 and Popanz 164
decisions in which criminal penalties would have been placed on the parents if the
home instruction statutes had not been determined to be unconstitutionally vague.
The Arkansas, Florida, Ohio, Oregon, and West Virginia statutes which also had
29 Ohio 3d 32, 505 N.E.2d 627 (1987); Grigg v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 224 Va. 356, 297
S.E.2d 799 (1982); Burrow v. State, 669 S.W.2d 441 (Ark. 1984).

l58State v. Buckner, 472 So. 2d at 1229 (Fla. App. 1985). See also, Reynolds v. State,
383 S.2d 228, 229 (Fla. 1980).
159state v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525, 532 (Minn. 1985).
l60state v. Budke, 371 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. 1985).
161State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525 (Minn. 1985).
l62Roemhi/d v. State , 308 S.E.2d 154 (Ga. 1983).
163£//is v. O'Hara, 612 F. Supp. 379 (D.C. Mo. 1985).

164state v. Popanz, 112 Wis. 2d 166, 332 N.W.2d 750 (1983).
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criminal penalties for non-compliance stood the test of clarity in Burrow, 165
Buckner, 166 Schmidt, 167Bowman,168 and Riddle.169

Arkansas

As a result of the Arkansas Supreme Courtl 70 ruling that educating
children at home did not meet the requirements for school attendance set forth in the
compulsory attendance laws, their statutes were amended in 1985 to provide that
parents could educate their children at home.17 1 Additional changes were made in
the regular session of the Arkansas 76th General Assembly to clarify the language.
The statutory language was explicit in terms of the requirements for parents or
guardians desiring to educate their own children at home.172 A 1988 decision by
the Eighth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals tested the new statutory language
requiring the same standardized achievement tests for students taught at home as
that given the students in public schools. It was held by the courts that this form of
165Burrow v. State, 669 S.W.2d 441 (Ark. 1984).
166state v. Buckner, 472 So.2d 1228, 1229 (Fla 1985).

167 State v. Schmidt , 29 Ohio 3d 32, 505 N.E. 2d 627 (1987)
168State v. Bowman, 653 P.2d 254 (Or. App. 1982).
169State v. Riddle, 285 S.E.2d 359 (W. Va. 1981).
170Burrow v. State, 669 S.W.2d 441(Ark.1984).

171Act 42, section 2, 75th General Assembly, First Extraordinary Session, Section 11,
Emergency Clause.
172ARK.STAT. ANN.§ 80-1503.4 -.11 (1987).
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monitoring was "the least restrictive system to assure its goal of adequately
educating its citizens." 173

Florida

Florida's statutes provides flexible provisions to allow parents to teach
their children at home. If the parent is not certified, the parent submits to the district
superintendent a certified teacher's evaluation of the child's progress, or the parent
submits the result of an achievement test administered by a certified teacher.
Prior to 1985 the Florida administrative Ccxie Rule 6A-l-951 stated that a
private tutor must have a valid Florida teacher's certificate. Three different district
courts of appeals in Florida, from the period of 1973 to 1985,174 dealt with the
same basic issue of parents claiming that their tutoring at home constituted a private
school, thus avoiding the requirements established for a private tutor.
The rationale provided by the parents of T.A.J. and E.M.F. for not
enrolling their children in the public school concerned race mixing. The court
determined that the program at home did not comply with the statutory requirements
regarding instruction by a qualified tutor, nor did it qualify as a private or
denominational schooI.175

173Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039 (8th Cir. 1988).

174F. and F. v. Duval County, 273 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1973); State v. M.M. and S.E., 407
So. 2d 987 (Fla. App. 1981); State v. Buckner, 472 So. 2d 1228.
175F. and F. v. Duval County, 273 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1973).
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Parents of M.M. and S.E., knowing that a child cannot be truant if
attending a private school, established a private school in their home.176 The court
stated that the legislature distinguished between private schools and home
instruction with a qualified private tutor. The mother of the children was the tutor,
and the home school did not fit the statutory definition of private schools;
consequently, the court determined that the children were dependent children within
the jurisdiction of the court, and the parents were found guilty.177
Although the Florida statute did not at the time of the M.M.178 decision
regulate the establishment of private schools, the court declared, "Florida parents,
unqualified to be private tutors, cannot proclaim their home to be private schools
and withdraw their offspring from public school."179
The Florida decisions of the courts have been consistent. Thus, as
recently as 1985 in State v. Buckner it was held that "The statute clearly prohibits
an unqualified parent from teaching a child at home under the guise that a private
school has been established "180
Effective July 1, 1985, and subsequent to the M.M. and Buckner cases,
the Florida legislature defined home education and established criteria for home
education programs.181 The new language stated, "A home education program is
I76state v. M. M. and S. E., 407 So. 2d 987, 990 (Fla. App 1981).

1771d. at 991.
178Id.
179Jd. at 990.
180state v. Buckner, 472 So. 2d 1228, 1229 (Fla. 1985).

181FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 228.041 <:West Supp. 1988).
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a sequentially progressive instruction of a student in his or her home by his or her
parent or guardian in order to satisfy the requirements of §232.01."182 The
exemptions under these statutes were clearly written to include private schools and
home education, each with specific limitations.183 Alternate requirements were
provided if the parent was not certified by the state agency.

Georgia

Georgia's compulsory attendance law was amended in 1984 to allow
parents or guardians to teach their children in a home study program that met
specific requirements set forth in the statutes.184 The authority for home schools
was clearly stated: "Every parent, guardian, or other person residing within this
state, having control or charge of any child or children between their seventh and
sixteenth birthdays shall enroll and send such child or children to a public school, a
private school, or a home study program. "185 Anyone found guilty of the
misdemeanor of non-compliance with these requirements listed in the statutes was
subject to a fine of one hundred dollars.186 Enforcement of the statute was vested
in the local superintendent although the superintendent was not given power to

182Jd. § 232.01 contains the compulsory school attendance language.
183FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 228.041(34) §232.01 (West Supp. 1988).
184GA. CODE ANN .. § 20-2-690(c)(l-8) (1987).

1851d
186<JA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690(d) (1987).
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require the parents to produce evidence of their compliance with the law. The only
action the superintendent might take was to request the information and, if
appropriate, initiate legal proceedings.
In 1983 Terry and Vickie Roemhild, parents of three school-aged children

in Georgia, were arrested for failing to enroll their children in either a public or
private school as required by the state statutes. Their choice was based partly on
religious beliefs. After researching the issue, they notified the local school and the
state agency of their decision to provide home instruction for their children.
Lacking the definition of private schools, the Supreme Court of Georgia found that
Georgia's compulsory school attendance law was not sufficiently definite. "[W]e
find OCGA § 20-2-690(A) (Code Ann. § 32-2104) fails to establish minimum
guidelines for the exercise of such judgment, and is, therefore, unconstitutionally
vague. "187 In making their decision, the judges made it clear that they were not
passing judgment on the propriety of home instruction, the power of the legislature
to exclude it, or the power of the legislature to approve it with or without
restriction.

Instead their decision focused upon the application of the "[B]asic

principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if prohibitions are
not clearly defined "188
The action of the court prompted the adoption of new statutory language
in 1984, as well as supporting rules and regulations, to define private schools and

187Roemhild v. State, 308 S.E.2d 154, 159 (Ga. 1983).
188rd. at 157. See also, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 294,
298, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972).
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to establish the requirements for home study programs.189 With the adoption of the
requirements contained in Private Schools and Home Study Programs,190 the
concerns raised by the Supreme Court of Georgia were resolved.

Minnesota

The 1986 Minnesota legislature established a special task force, comprised
of both public and nonpublic representatives, to develop recommendations for a
new compulsory attendance law after a portion of the previous law was declared
unconstitutional. One of the unique features of the legislation, passed in the 1987
legislative session, was that if a nonpublic school or home school was recognized
by an approved accrediting agency, the program was exempt from the statutory
requirements except that of reporting the name, age, and address of each child
receiving instruction.191
During the time frame of twenty-five years designated for review in this
research, two cases questioned the constitutionality of the Minnesota compulsory
attendance statute. The decisions of these cases were the cause of the new
legislation.
Jeanne Newstrom, a Minnesota mother of two school aged children, was
convicted in a trial court of a violation of the state's compulsory attendance law

189GA. CODE ANN.§ 20-2-690 32-9914 (a) (c) (1987).
190GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690.1-8 (1987).
191.MINN. CODE ANN.§ 120.102 (4) (West 1987).

73
because she was educating her children at home and she was not a certified teacher.
The statute required that the teacher's qualifications be "essentially equivalent" to
the minimum standards for teachers of the same grades or subjects. The school's
and the trial court's interpretation of "essentially equivalent" was to require
certification although the statute was silent on the point. The Minnesota Supreme
Court held that the statute which imposed criminal penalties was unconstitutionally
vague. 192
Donald and Kathleen Budke were likewise convicted of violating
Minnesota's compulsory school attendance law. On appeal the conviction was
reversed because the court found that the Budke's first amendment rights had been
infringed. The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the reversal, referring to the

Newstrom decision handed down the same day.193 Having found that the
"essentially equivalent" requirement was void for vagueness, the court never
reached the issue of whether the statute violated the Budke's religious freedom
protected by the first amendment.
Following these two decisions, a temporary home school law was enacted
requiring all home schools in Minnesota to report to their local superintendent the
names, addresses, and ages of all children taught at home. In addition the law
established a twelve-member task force to make recommendations to the legislature
by February 1, 1987, for a permanent home school law. Language of the new law,

192state v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525 (Minn. 1985).
193state v. Budke, 371 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. 1985).
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adopted on May 21, 1987, was explicit regarding definitions and responsibilities.
The section on compulsory instruction states:
The parent of a child is primarily responsible for assuring that
the child acquires knowledge and skills that are essential for
effective citizenship.194
The definition of "school" included public school, nonpublic, churchrelated, or home instruction. If a "school" was accredited by one of the six
recognized accrediting agencies, its only responsibility to the state was to report to
the appropriate school district superintendent the names, addresses, and ages of the
students. Therefore, at the time of this study in Minnesota, parents assuming the
responsibility for their children's education have the legal right to educate them at
home.

Missouri

According to the new language adopted in 1986 a "home school" was
defined in the Missouri statutes as a school that had as its primary purpose the
provision of private or religious-based instruction.195 The parent was required to
maintain specified evidence that the child was receiving regular instruction. In
addition to the description of the purpose, the language included the specific course
requirements, the required number of hours of instruction, and the required student
194MJNN. STAT. ANN.§ 120.101, Subdivision 1 (West 1987).
195Mo. STAT. ANN.§ 167.031(Vernon1988).
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records.

There was no monitoring procedure established to verify that the

requirements were fulfilled. In fact, the statute stated:
For the purpose of minimizing unnecessary investigations due to
reports of truancy, each parent, guardian, or other person
responsible for the child who causes his child to attend regularly
a home school may provide within thirty days after the
establishment of the home school and by September first
annually thereafter to the recorder of deeds of the county where
the child legally resides, or to the chief school officer of the
public school district when the child legally resides, a signed,
written declaration of enrollment stating their intent for the child
to attend a home schooI.196
In Missouri three cases were adjudicated, all involving different legal
issues, but all decided in favor of the parents providing home instruction. In State

v. Davis 197 the coun held that unless the state could prove that the parents failed to
provide their child with proper home instruction, the criminal conviction could not
stand. The state has the burden of proving that the parents violated the statutes and,
since it was a criminal proceeding carrying a jail sentence and fine, the proof had to
be beyond a reasonable doubt. This decision was based on the due-process clause
of the United States Constitution requiring that the defendant be proved guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of every element necessary to constitute the crime. The
dissenting opinion reasoned that the burden of showing home instruction to be

196Mo. STAT. ANN.§ 167.042 (Vernon 1988).
197598 S.W.2d 189 (Mo. App. 1980).
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equivalent should fall on the parents, the rationale being that requiring the state to
make such proof might prevent the state from enforcing the school attendance law.
The parents appealed the decision of In re Monnig that their children were
neglected because they failed to provide the children with an education as required
by law.198 Although the same statute was involved, the proceedings here were
civil, not criminal. No penalties were sought against the parents; rather, it was a
juvenile court proceeding to determine if the children were neglected. On appeal it
was again held that even in a civil suit the state had the entire burden of proof, i.e.,
not only that the parents failed to enroll their children in school, but also that they
failed to provide an equivalent home instruction program. However, because no
criminal sanctions were sought, the burden could have been met on each issue by a
preponderance of the evidence and that it need not be beyond a reasonable doubt as
in Davis. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case because in the
juvenile court, which held against the parents, the state failed to produce evidence
that the home instruction program provided the children was not sufficiently
equivalent to public education.199
The vagueness of the earlier Missouri statute was raised in Ellis v. O'Hara
by the plaintiffs stating,

"[N]either regulations nor guidelines have been

promulgated to assist in the interpretation of this language. "200 The case began in
the same mode as Monnig--a criminal proceeding in the juvenile court against the

198/n re Monnig, 638 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. App. 1982).
199Jd
200£1/is v. O'Hara, 612 F. Supp. 379 (D.C. Mo. 1985).
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parents for neglect. However, the parents brought a separate civil action seeking to
have the compulsory attendance statute declared unconstitutional on the grounds
that "substantially equivalent" requirement was unconstitutionally vague. The
parents prevailed, the court holding that as the legislature provided no guidelines by
which to measure "equivalence," nor had any rules or regulations been adopted to
provide such a measure, "persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application. "201 Since the Missouri statute provided
criminal penalties for educational neglect and affected the exercise of
constitutionally protected rights, a more stringent vagueness test was held to apply.
The court agreed with the parents and found that the parents were not given an
adequate definition of "substantially equivalent" and that the legislature did not
provide minimal guidelines for law enforcement. The court's determination was
based on the facts that the statute did not comply with due process requirements and
was unconstitutionally vague.202 Significantly the court stayed the effective date of
the order invalidating the statute until the then current term of the Missouri
legislature ended, thereby giving the state the opportunity to cure the vagueness
either by statutory amendment or the promulgation of rules and regulations. In the
interim parents were allowed to educate their children at home. A new statute with
explicit wording was adopted and the effective date was June 19, 1986.203

201Jd. at 380.

2021ct. at 381.
203Mo. STAT. ANN.§ 167 031-167.071(Vernon1988).
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New Mexico

In 1985 the New Mexico compulsory school attendance statute was
amended by inserting "home school" in the introductory paragraph: "Any qualified
student and any person who because of his age is eligible to become a qualified
student, as defined by the Public School Finance Act [22-81-1 to 22-8-42 NMSA
1978] until attaining the age of majority shall attend a public school, a private
school, a home school or a state institution. "204 The statute also provided the
following definition: " 'Home school' means the operation by a parent, guardian or
other person having custody of a school-age person of a home study program
which provides a basic academic educational program including but not limited to
reading, language arts, mathematics, social studies and science. "205 The
requirements for a home school were established in NMSA 22-1-2.1.
Prior to the 1985 amendment, the standard used by the New Mexico
courts to review alternatives to the state's earlier compulsory attendance statute was
"[W]hether it bears some rational relation to a legitimate state interest."206 This was
illustrated in State v. Edgington where the higher court held that the disapproval of
home instruction by a parent, guardian, or custodian of a child did not violate equal
protection. Since the court refused to apply the strict scrutiny test to the statute, it

204N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 22-12-2 A (1986).
205N.M. STAT. ANN.. § 22-1-2 U (1986).

206state v. Edgington, 663 P.2d 374, 377 (N.M. App. 1983).

79
fell upon the defendant to show that the statute served "no valid governmental
interest. "207

North Carolina

The General Assembly of North Carolina, in the 1987 session, ratified a
bill to permit home instruction as a means to comply with the compulsory
attendance statutes. Amendments in the language of the compulsory attendance
statutes included the definition of home instruction. Additional language to
implement the new home instruction exemption contained the qualifications for the
instructor, testing and immunization requirements, and the waiver of sanitation and
safety inspection. The Governor's office was named as the responsible agency for
the collection of data regarding home instruction programs.
Prior to 1988 North Carolina's general statutes made no provisions for
home instruction. The statutes defined a nonpublic school as having one or more of
the following characteristics: (1) It was accredited by the State Board of Education;
(2) it was accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools; (3) it

was an active member of the North Carolina Association of Independent Schools;
or (4) it received no funding from the State of North Carolina.208 In 1979 the
North Carolina General Assembly amended the prior law by eliminating any
reference to qualified tutors for nonpublic schools, reporting requirements and
207Jd

208N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 115C-555 (1983).
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approval of curricula. The requirements to comply with attendance, health and
safety standards, and administering tests were included in the amended statutes, but
the term 'school' was not defined.209
In a 1983 U.S. Court of Appeals decision, Dura v. District Attorney, the
parent initiated action against the district attorney in North Carolina alleging that
their religious beliefs were infringed upon by the North Carolina compulsory
attendance laws.210 The lower court, referring to Yoder, found there was no
compelling state interest in preventing parents from educating their children at
home. 2l 1 The Court of Appeals reversed the decision, indicating the court's chief
concern was for the children. The decision stated that "North Carolina has
maintained a compelling interest in compulsory education for the children of the
state. "212 The implications of this appellate decision was the state's interest in
education of its citizens outweighs the religious interest of the parents' desire to
educate their children at home.
In 1985, in the Delconte v. State of North Carolina decision, the North
Carolina Supreme Court interpreted the 1979 amendments to permit greater latitude
for children to be educated at home, thus upholding the parent's right to provide

209J:ct. at 646.

21°'712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 998, 79 L.Ed.2d 230 (1984).
211Ectward Knox Proctor, Delconte v. State: Some Thoughts on Home Education, 64

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW 1316 (1986).
212712 F.2d at 99 (N.C. 1983).
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home instruction.2 13 This decision was similar to Levisen214 in that the home
instruction program provided by the Delcontes was an acceptable exemption to the
compulsory attendance statutes. The decision was based on the fact that since the
parent's home did not receive state funds, it was considered a nonpublic schooJ.215
Reversing the Court of Appeals decision that the Delconte's home did not qualify as
a nonpublic school, the higher court expressed the following interpretation of the
legislative purpose: "Indeed, the evident purpose of these recent statutes is to
loosen, rather than tighten, the standards for nonpublic education in North
Carolina. It would be anomalous to hold that these recent statutes were designed to
prohibit home instruction when the legislature obviously intended them to make it
easier, not harder, for children to be educated in nonpublic school settings. "216
An interesting twist to the Delconte decision involved Duro. The Delconte

decisions at the lower court providing latitude to parental rights relied on Duro's
lower court rulings before Duro's reversal. Fortunately the courts evaded the
problem by calling the home a nonpublic school, thereby avoiding the constitutional
issue, stating:

We do not, of course, purport to decide on this constitutional
issue. We rely, instead, on the familiar canon of statutory

213Delconte v. State, 313 N.C. 384, 329 S.E.2d 636, 646 (1985).
214People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950).

215 At the time this case was heard, one of the requirements to qualify a school as
nonpublic in North Carolina was that it receive no funding from the state.
216329 S.E.2d. 636, 646.
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construction that (w)here one of the two reasonable
constructions will raise a serious constitutional question, the
construction which avoids this question should be adopted.217
The court continues in its reference to Nova University v. Board of
Governors:
The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not
destroy. We have repeatedly held that as between two possible
interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be
unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt
that which will save the act. Even to avoid a serious doubt the
rule is the same.218
The justices stated that it was an issue of public policy as to whether home
instruction should be permitted and the legislature should make the determination
whether it would be good public policy.

Ohio

A parent was able to obtain an exemption from Ohio's compulsory
attendance laws from the district superintendent when the student in question was to
be taught by "a person qualified to teach the branches in which instruction was

217Id. at 647. The constitutional issue was whether the statute can prohibit home
instruction and whether the states prove it has a compelling interest in the issue.
218Nova University v. Board of Governors, 305 N.C. 156, 287 S.E.2d 872 (1982), as
cited in De/conte v. State, 329 S.E.2d 648 (N.C. 1985). Another case dealing with home
instruction, following this traditional approach of avoiding constitutional issues whenever
possible, was State v. Trucke, 410 N.W.2d 242 (Iowa 1987).
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required, and such additional branches, as the advancement and needs of the child
may, in the opinion of such superintendent, require."219
Although the State Board of Education in Ohio had the authority to adopt
rules setting forth the conditions for home education, they did not do so, leaving the
ultimate decision to the local superintendent. The Ohio statute has been in effect
since the late 1970's and has held up to judicial scrutiny.
Citing religious beliefs, Richard and Pamela Schmidt refused to seek the
approval of the local superintendent to educate their daughter Sara at home.
"Appellants claim an impermissible infringement of their religious beliefs because
the approval requirement was not the 'least restrictive means' that Ohio could have
employed to achieve its interest. "220 The court used the three-prong test developed
in Lemon v. Kurtzman221 and found that the statutes did not infringe upon the right
of the parents to exercise their religious beliefs freely.222 The court upheld as
reasonable the Ohio statute which required approval from the local school district
superintendent in order for a student to be excluded from the requirements of
compulsory attendance laws. The issues of vagueness challenges and religious
infringement were raised and rejected in this 1987 Ohio Supreme Court, "[T]hat
219omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3321.04 (Anderson 1985).
220state v. Schmidt, 29 Ohio 3d 32, 505 N.E.2d 628 (1987).

221403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
222Wisconsin v.Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351
N.E.2d 750 (1976). The three-prong test: (1) Are the religious beliefs truly held? (2) Does the
statutory language infringe upon the appellant's constitutional right to the free exercise of religion?
(3) If both (1) and (2) have been satisfied by the appellant, has the state demonstrated that its
compelling interest in the education of its citizens cannot reasonably be achieved by means that
would impose a lesser infringement upon appellant's right to the free exercise of religion?
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parents must seek the approval of the local superintendent for their home education
program in order to obtain excuse from compulsory attendance laws reasonably
furthers the state's interest in the education of its citizens and does not infringe upon
free exercise of religion. "223
The dissenting opinions, however, questioned giving the superintendent
"the unbridled discretion to determine if a home-schooling teacher is qualified." The
justices stated that the statute should be considered void for vagueness because of
this requirement.224 The United States Supreme Court declined to review this Ohio
Supreme Court holding, thus allowing the decision to stand, tacitly upholding the
requirement of seeking prior approval.225
An earlier decision found that the state's required minimum standards for
the operation of all schools, including nonpublic schools, was an infringement on
the first amendment free exercise of religion guarantees.226 The only reference to
this case in Schmidt was the use of the three-prong test. These two decisions,
made eleven years apart, indicate the confusion that may arise if the specific issues
of the case are not considered

223state v. Schmidt, 505 N.E.2d 627, 631-32 (Ohio 1987).
224state v. Schmidt, Dissenting opinions of Locher and Brogann, J. J., 505 N.E.2d 627,
630 (Ohio 1987).
225state v. Schmidt, Dissenting opinions of Locher and Brogann, J. J., 505 N.E.2d 627,
630 (Ohio 1987).
226state v. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750, 751 (Ohio 1976).
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Oregon

An equivalent education by a parent or a private tutor is an acceptable
exemption to public school attendance in Oregon: "In the following cases, children
shall not be required to attend public full-time schools: ... Children being taught for
a period equivalent to that required of children attending public schools by a parent
or private teacher the courses of study usually taught in grades one through twelve
in the public school. "22 7 The specific means to implement an acceptable home
instruction program are listed in §581-21-026 of the Oregon Administrative Rules.
Included in the rules are options for evaluating the child's progress and a
requirement of notification to the superintendent of the intent to educate a child at
home.228
Oregon's statute was interpreted in State v. Bowman.229 Kay Bowman
had applied for and received approval to teach her children at home in one Oregon
community, but found when moving to another community within the state that the
requirements to receive approval from the superintendent in the new community
were more comprehensive.

She continued to educate her children at home

notwithstanding that her approval to do so was revoked. Criminal prosecution
followed, and Mrs. Bowm:m defended herself by asserting that the exemption
provisions were unconstitutionally vague and improperly delegated legislative

2270R. REV. STAT.§ 339.030 (5) 339.035 (2) (3) (b) (1987).
228581-21-026 of the Oregon Administrative Rules.
229653 P.2d 254 (Or. App. 1982).

86
power to the local superintendent. The courts disagreed and affirmed the lower
court decision that Mrs. Bowman acted with criminal negligence. The defendant
did not enroll or register the child in school as required and criminal prosecution
resulted.230

Pennsylvania

In the closing hours of the 1988 legislative session action was taken to
rectify the order of the federal district court in the Jeffrey231 case. The court
declared the previous compulsory attendance language to be unconstitutionally
vague because the statute did not define a properly qualified "private tutor." The
court ordered that either the Secretary of Education promulgate rules and regulations
or the legislature enact legislation remedying the vagueness of the statute. In
addition the legislative imitative, established explicit language to govern ?ome
instruction. Prior to the beginning of a home instruction program, the parents are to
provide affidavits to the local superintendent assuring their intent to comply with the
requirements of the statutes. The affidavit is to indicate that the parent or legal
guardian is the supervisor of the program and has as a minimum a high school
diploma.
Although there was no higher court opinion for the time frame of this
research, according to HOME SCHOOL COURT REPORT federal civil action, similar

230rd
231Jeffrey v. O'Donnell, No. CV 86-1560 (D.C.M.D. Penn. August 1988.)
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to the Jeffrey case, has been taken against approximately eleven local
superintendents whose home policies allegedly either infringed on parents'
constitutional rights or prohibited them from exercising those rights altogether. 232
Prior to Jeffrey, each approval agency established its own criteria for
determining the acceptability of such a program. As a result of Act 169,233 if the
superintendent believes that appropriate education is not taking place, the supervisor
of the program may be asked to provide the portfolio of the child's work and the
evaluation.

Virginia

The 1984 Virginia General Assembly amended the compulsory attendance
language in the code to provide for home instruction as an alternative to compulsory
school attendance and expanded the choices that parents had in providing an
acceptable home education program.234 A new section was enacted setting forth the
requirements for such a program. Of the four alternatives presented for a home
instruction program to be an acceptable alternative, the most liberal required that the
parent "provides a program of study or curriculum which, in the judgment of the
division superintendent, includes the standards of learning objectives adopted by

232Pennsylvania Under Fire, 3:1 HOME SCHOOL COURT REPORT 2 (Washington Jan.Feb. 1987).
233PA. CONS. STAT.§ 13-1327.1.
234VA. CODE ANN.§ 22.1-254.1 (1988).
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the Board of Education for language arts and mathematics and provides evidence
that the parent is able to provide an adequate education for the child."
The preceding amended statute resulted from Grigg v. The

Commonwealth of Virginia.235 In 1982 Robert and Vicki Grigg contended they
had established a private school and cited People v Levisen,236 but the Virginia
court stated, "Unlike our school attendance law, however, the Illinois statute did
not provide for home instruction as a separate category of exemption in addition to
attendance at a private school. "237 Thus, the court reasoned that while home
instruction could qualify as a private school where there was no other statutory
authority for home instruction, it could not qualify where a statute expressly
provides for home instruction. The Griggs did not meet the qualifications for a
tutor or a teacher prescribed in the statute.
The Griggs also attacked the statute for vagueness. The court rejected the
argument, stating that this attack diverted the attention of the court from the heart of
the case; namely, the statutory language dealing with home instruction. The court
acknowledged the interest of the parents to be sincere but legally insufficient.238
Also since the court found the case to be civil in nature, it held that a stricter
standard of proof than was necessary was applied at the trial court level.
235224 Va 356, 297 S.E.2d 799, 801 (1982).
236nie Illinois Supreme Court determined that the term "private school" in the context of
People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950), includes home schooling if the teacher is
competent, the required subjects are taught, and the student receives an education at least equivalent

to public schooling.
231Grigg v. Commonwealth of Virginia; 224 Va. 356, 297 S.E.2d 799, 801-02 (1982).

2381d. at 805.
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West Virginia

On July 1, 1987, the West Virginia compulsory education laws were
amended to provide additional stipulations to the process of approval and dueprocess procedures for the home instruction exemption. The statute established the
options available to qualify to provide home instruction and the procedures required
to evaluate student progress.

The Supreme Court of Appeals in West Virginia in 1981 ruled against
Bobby and Esther Riddle, who refused to send their children to school for religious
reasons.239 When criminally prosecuted for failing to send their children to school,
they claimed they had been deprived of their first and fourteenth amendment rights.
The court pointed out the difference between this case and Yoder.240 Although the
Riddle's religious beliefs were sincerely held, as in Yoder, an "inappropriate
vehicle for presentation of their first amendment claim"241 was utilized. The West
Virginia statute allowed for home education and provided for an approval process.
The Riddles chose not to utilize the process. The court stated:

"[I]t is not

appropriate for a person entirely to disregard the statute, await criminal prosecution,
and then assert a first amendment defense. "242

239State v. Riddle, 285 S.E.2d 359 (W. Va. 1981).
240Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
241state v. Riddle, 285 SE.2d 359, 362 (W. Va. 1981).
2421ct. at 364.
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Wisconsin

In 1983 the Wisconsin statute was amended to provide that a "home-based

private educational program," meeting specified criteria, may be substituted for
attendance in a public or private schooI.243 The new language defines a "'[H]omebased private educational program' as a program of educational instruction provided
to a child by the child's parent or guardian or by a person designated by the parent
or guardian. An instructional program provided to more than one family unit does
not constitute a home-based private educational program."244
The statutory change was a result of the decision reached in State v.

Popanz. In this 1983 decision the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the
compulsory attendance statute was void for vagueness due to the lack of a definition
of "private school."245 The earlier statute was found to be "singularly silent on
what constitutes a private school."246 The court's opinion also stated, "In any event
the legislature or its delegated agent should define the phrase 'private school';
citizens or the courts should not have to guess at its meaning. "247 Violation of
Wisconsin's compulsory attendance statute is a criminal offense, and therefore strict
standards are established for clarity. "A criminal statute must be sufficiently

243Wis. STAT.§ 118.15 (4) (Supplement 1987).
244Wis. STAT.§ 118.15 (Supplement 1987).
245state v. Popanz, 112 Wis. 2d 166, 332 N.W.2d 750, 756 (Wisc. 1983).

24 6Jd. at 750.
247Id. at 755.
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definite to give person of ordinary intelligence who seeks to avoid its penalties fair
notice of conduct required or prohibited. "248

Other States249

The remaining thirteen states with explicit statutes have had no litigation of
substance regarding home instruction during the past twenty-five years.
Accredited home correspondence programs are provided by the State
Department of Education in Alaska or through the respective local districts. 250 This
statutory provision is responsive to the unusual geography of the state.
The requirements for approval of an exemption to compulsory attendance
in Arizona are set forth in the Arizona statute. 25 l There is a clear distinction made in
the definition of "home instruction" and "private school." "For the purpose of this
paragraph, private school means a nonpublic institution other than the child's home
where instruction is imparted "252 The requirements for home instruction are more
explicit, including curriculum and conditions for accountability. The county school
superintendent is given the power to approve regularly organized private schools
and home instruction programs.
248Jd. at 750.

249 Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Rhode Island, South
Carolina. Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wyoming.
250ALASKA STAT.§ 14-30.010 (1984).
251ARJZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 15-802 (B)(l) (Supp. 1987).
252ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 15-802 (B)(2) (Supp. 1987).
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Passed in April of 1988, the Colorado statute on home instruction declares
that the choice of education is a primary right of parents and home-based education
is a legitimate alternative to classroom instruction. " 'Nonpublic home-based
educational program' means the sequential program of instruction for the education
of a child which takes place in a home, which is provided by the child's parent or
by an adult relative of the child designated by the parent, and which is not under the
supervision and control of a school district. This educational program is not
intended to be and does not qualify as a private and non-profit school."253
The definition of a school in the Louisiana statutes for compulsory
attendance purposes included the home study exemption. The language states:
"Solely for purposes of compulsory attendance in a nonpublic school, a child who
participates in a home study program approved by the Board of Elementary and
Secondary Education shall be considered in attendance at a day school; a home
study program shall be approved if it offers a sustained curriculum of quality at
least equal to that offered by public schools at the same grade level. "254
Legitimate home instruction programs in Mississippi are "[T]hose not
operated or instituted for the purpose of avoiding or circumventing the compulsory
attendance law."255
The definition of a "home school" in the Montana statutes is simply stated
as the instruction by a parent of his child, stepchild, or ward in his residence.256 To
253coLO. REV. STAT. Section 1Article33 tit. 22 22-33-104.5 (Supp. 1987).
254LA. REV. STAT. Ann.§ 17-236 (West Supp. 1982).
255Miss. CODE ANN.§ 37-13-91(20)(i) (Supp. 1987).
256MONT. CODE ANN.§ 20-5-102 (1985).
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qualify in Montana for exemption from compulsory attendance, a home school must
notify the county superintendent of schools of their intent. 257
The school committee in a Rhode Island community where a child resides
had the authority to approve a course of "at-home instruction." The requirements
set forth in the Rhode Island statutes are the same for a private school as they are
for a program of instruction provided at home. Any decisions made by the school
committee may be appealed to the State Board ofEducation.258
The South Carolina school board in the district where the student resides
has the authority to approve a home instruction program, provided the requirements
for approval are met.259 This explicit language is a result of the 1988 South
Carolina legislature amending the 1976 statutes.
In Tennessee a home school that is associated with an organization that
conducts church-related schools is exempt from the requirements of the section of
the statutes on home schools.260 Other "home schools" must provide notice to the
local superintendent and fulfill other specified requirements.261
The Utah Code stipulates that :
[O]n an annual basis, a minor may receive a full release from
attending a public, regularly established private, or part-time
257MONT. CODE ANN.§ 20-5-109 (5) (1985).
258R.J. GEN. LAWS§ 16-19-1(Supp.1987).
259s.c. CODE ANN. § 59-65-40 (Law Co-op 1988).
26°'J'ENN. CODE ANN.§ 49-6-3050 (a) (2) (Supp. 1987).
261rd
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school or class if:

. . . the minor is taught at home in the

branches prescribed by law for the same length of time as
minors are required by law to be taught in district schools.262
The local board is charged with the responsibility of approving home
instruction programs and making every effort to resolve attendance problems.263
A home study program is defined in the Vermont statutes as "[A]n
educational program offered through home study which provides a minimum
course o f stud y . . . 264
11

An approved program of home instruction is an

exemption to the compulsory attendance laws.265 The law specifies the particular
information that must be provided with the enrollment notice to the State
Department of Education. A child must be enrolled in a public or private school
until the home study program is approved by the State Board or its designee.266
The requirements for the exemption of home instruction in Washington
are explicitly stated as "Instruction shall be home-based if it consists of planned and
supervised instructional and related educational activities, including a curriculum
and instruction in the basic skills of occupational education, science, mathematics,
language, social studies, history, health, reading, writing, spelling, and the
development of an appreciation of art and music, provided for a number of hours
equivalent to the total annual program hours per grade level established for
262UTAH CODE ANN.§ 53-24-1.3 (b) (ii) (Supp. 1987).
263Jnformal Opinion No. 83-20, Attorney General Utah, June 8, 1983. Local School
Board Authority Regarding Home Instruction, at 13.
264vT. STAT. ANN. tit 16 § 1 16 11 (21) (Supp. 1987).
265vT. STAT. ANN. tit 16 § 1121 (2) (Supp. 1987).
266vT. STAT. ANN .. tit 16 § 166b (Supp. 1987).
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approved private schools under RCW §§ 28A.02.201and28A.02.240 ... "267 The
parents instructing their children are to be supervised by a certified person. 268 The
statute clearly indicated that the parents "shall be subject only to those minimum
state laws and regulations which are necessary to insure that a sufficient basic
educational opportunity is provided to the children receiving such instruction."269
Wyoming statutes have been amended(1985) to add language referring to
home instruction.
A home-based educational program means a program of
educational instruction provided to a child by the child's parents
or legal guardian or by a person designated by the parent or legal
guardian. An instructional program provided to more than one
family unit does not constitute a home-based educational
program. "270
The curriculum requirements provide that there is no requrement to
include any material that is in conflict with religious doctrimes. "Basic academic
educational program is one that provides a sequentially progressive curriculum of
fundemental instruction in reading, writing, mathematics, civics, history, literature
and science. "271 The home-based educational program must be submitted to the

267WASH. REV. CODE§ 28A.27.010 (4) (Supp. 1987).
268Jd

269WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.27.320 (Supp. 1987).
270wYo. STAT.§ 21-4-101 (v) (1985).
271WYO. STAT.§ 21-4-101 (vi) (1985).
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local district each year to show that it is in compliance with the requirements of the
statute. 272

SUMMARY OF STATUTES AND CASES FOR "EXPLICIT LANGUAGE"
STATES

Reviewing the cases in states that currently have explicit language
allowing home instruction demonstrated the difficulty of predicting the results of the
specific cases in the state or federal courts. However, there was clearly a trend for
courts and legislatures to extend more tolerance for parents wishing to educate their
children at home. Wisconsin, Georgia, Missouri, Pennsylvania and Minnesota
courts found the statutes of their states void for vagueness. Georgia passed a new
home school law in 1984 after the 1982 Roemhilcf273 decision in which the state's
compulsory attendance statute was struck down as "impermissibly vague" and in
violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The 1981
Popanz274 decision was followed by the passage of explicit home school legislation

in Wisconsin. The lack of definition of "private school" caused the court to find the
prior Wisconsin statute to be void for vagueness. In 1985 the legislatures in
Minnesota and Missouri passed explicit legislation following the "void for
vagueness" decisions in Newstrom,275 Budke,276 and Ellis.277 New Mexico's
272wyo, STAT.§ 21-4-102 (b) (1985).

273Roemhild v. State, 308 S.E.2d 154 (Ga. 1983)
274state v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525 (Minn. 1985).
275state v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525 (Minn. 1985).
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home school requirements became effective in 1985, following the 1983
Edgington278 decision against the parents.

The Jeffrey279 court set aside the

previous statute because its vagueness. The legislature in the closing hours of the
1988 session established very specific language governing home instruction. West
Virginia passed new home school laws in 1987 as a result of lobbying efforts, not
to correct any decisions by the courts. Ohio has protected its current statutory

language that was found reasonable and upheld in the Schmidt 280case. The courts
in North Carolina agreed that home instruction was a form of private school
because of the definition of nonpublic schools in the statutes. The justices agreed
that it was the responsibility of the legislature to determine if home instruction was
good public policy. The legislators in North Carolina accepted the direction of the
courts and adopted explicit language legislation after the Delconte281 and Duro282
decisions.
These decisions indicate that the courts have been reluctant to evaluate
home instruction and are willing to act only upon the compliance with the present

277El/is v. O'Hara, 612 F. Supp. 379 (D.C. Mo. 1985).
278state v. Edgington, 663 P.2d 375, 377 (N.M. App. 1983).
279Jeffrey v. O'Donnell, No. CV-86-1560 (D.C.M.D. Penn. August 24, 1988).
280state v. Schmidt, 505 N.E.2d 627 (Ohio 1987).
281Delconte v. State, 329 S.E.2d 636, (N.C. 1985).
282Duro v. District Attorney, 712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 998,
79 L.Ed.2d 230 (1984).
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laws. The legislature in numerous states has taken action to clarify the standards as
a result of such decisions.
The explicit language in the other states in this group was quite varied.
States such as Minnesota, Virginia, Colorado, and Louisiana indicate only that
home instruction was an exemption from the compulsory attendance requirement,
and in other statutes the language included details regarding the specific
requirements for a program to be an acceptable alternative to public schools.283 The
other major difference between the states was the approval process. In Utah the
local school board or its designee had that authority of approval. In Vermont the
process was directed to the State Board of Education; and in Georgia there was no
language indicating who was responsible for the approval process. In Montana
only notification to the proper authority was required. The varied language and
requirements of the statutes in this grouping of states had no rational basis.

"EQUIVALENCY LANGUAGE" STATUTE STATES

Equivalent instruction language was included in the statutes of twelve
states.284 The implication in these states was that home instruction was an
acceptable alternative to the required attendance in public schools if the program
was equivalent. Parents and school administrators were confronted with the

283 An example of this is Missouri.
284connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Nevada, New
Jersey, New York, South Dakota.
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problem of knowing and agreeing upon the criteria that should be utilized to
determine equivalency.

Connecticut

Parents of children over seven and under sixteen were required by the
Connecticut General Statutes to cause these children "[T]o attend a public school
regularly or to show that the child is elsewhere receiving equivalent instruction in
the studies taught in public schools. "285 The State Board of Education adopted a
policy in 1976 which states "[W]hen a parent wishes to educate a child at home, the
board of education of the district in which the child resides will determine whether
the instruction is equivalent to that offered by the public schools, and the Secretary
of the State Board of Education will review and approve the decision." The State
Board developed suggested procedures to assist and direct local boards and
parents. 286
No higher level court decision was identified in Connecticut during this
research's designated time frame of twenty-five years. State v. Corcoran281 was
mentioned to identify the direction taken in lower courts in matters such as this.
The Superior Court case was heard in 1982 as a result of parents, members of the

285coNN. GEN. STAT. § 10-184 (1986).
286connecticut State Department of Education, Suggested Procedures Concerning
Requests from Parents to Educate Their Child at Home, August 24, 1982.
287 State v. Corcoran, CRlS-068413 Superior Court, G.A.15 Hartford/New Britain,
Conn. (April 27, 1982).
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Seventh Day Adventist faith, who applied for permission to educate their son Noah
at home. The parents felt that their sincerely held religious belief would be violated
if they were to enroll Noah in public school. The judge stated that the parties were
in conflict over a philosophical principal and that further criminal sanctions were
unlikely to deter future reoccurrences. His recommendation was to decriminalize
the proceedings and for the defendants to be given an opportunity to disprove the
Board's charge that they were not providing an equivalent education to their son,
Noah.

Indiana

Indiana law required parents to provide an education equivalent to that
given in public schools.288

Failure to do so was a class B misdemeanor. In

Indiana a 1984 memorandum from the prosecuting attorney defined the term
"equivalent instruction." The intent of this definition was to clarify for the staff of
the prosecuting attorney's office what should constitute compliance with the
compulsory attendance statute.
Instruction is 'equivalent' to public school instruction and
therefore constitutes compliance with the Indiana compulsory
attendance statute when it is provided as part of a written
instructional plan which includes:

2881ND. CODE ANN. §20-8.1-3-34 (West 1987).
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1. Student performance objectives including development of
reading, writing and computation skills;

2. The method to achieve the performance objectives;

3. The time period ( 1 calendar year or less) in which the performance
objectives are to be accomplished and a schedule for achieving each
objective;

4. The method of evaluation to be utilized to determine progress toward
the objectives and to summarize and periodically report the results of
the evaluation; ·

5. The adult responsible for discipline and super-vision of the children
and achievement of each instructional objective; and

6. The instruction is provided in a school day of reasonable length and
results in significant progress toward the performance objectives
stated.289
The Indiana Supreme Court State v. Peterman had, in 1904, ruled that a
teacher employed by the parent to teach their child all subjects taught in public
schools during regular school hours was acceptable. "We do not think that the
number of persons, whether one or many, make a place where instruction is
imparted any less or more a schooI."290 A more recent decision in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Indiana found that plaintiffs home education
program was sufficient to constitute instruction equivalent to that given in the public
schools.291
289steven Goldsmith, Memorandum from the Office of the Prosecuting Attorney of
Marion County Indiana. February 17, 1984.
290State v. Peterman, 32 Ind. App. 665, 70 N.E. 550, 551 (1904).
291Mazanec v. North Judson-San Pierre School Corp. 798 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1986).
Evidence was produced that the original prosecution of the Mazmiecs was because they continued to
frustrate state officials in gathering evidence of the equivalency of the program, not that they were
incapable of meeting the requirements of the law. At the time of the litigation, the children were
being educated in Illinois for reasons apart from the case.
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Iowa

Equivalent instruction standards were defined in the Iowa statutes.292 The
purpose of these standards was, "[T]o give guidance to parents, guardians, local
school boards, and teachers providing private instruction outside the traditional
school setting with respect to equivalent instruction for children of compulsory
school age."293 The controversial standard was the requirement of the equivalent
instruction being provided by a certified instructor.
The Iowa Supreme Court in 1981 found that use of the terms "equivalent
instruction" and "certified teacher" did not render the Iowa compulsory attendance
statute unconstitutionally vague.29 4 Finding the other issues presented by the
defendants without merit, the court went on to affirm that Norman and Linda
Moorhead were guilty of a misdemeanor for violating the law since neither of the
Moorheads were certified teachers.
In a 1987 supreme court decision, State v. Trucke,295 reference was made

to precedent set forth in two cases,296 which held the undefined term "equivalent
instruction" unconstitutionally vague when applied to persons who seek to operate a
2921owA CODE ANN. § 299 (West 1988).
2931d.

294state v. Moorhead, 308 N.W.2d 60 (Iowa 1981).
295state v. Trucke, 410 N.W.2d 242 (Iowa 1987).
296Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 815 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1987); Johnson v.
Charles City Comm. Schools Bd., 368 N.W.2d 74 (Iowa 1985).
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religious school for their own and other people's children. Fellowship was
remanded to District Court, where the court held that the statute was no longer
unconstitutionally vague as the state regulations were amended to define "equivalent
instruction. "29 7 Iowa promulgated regulations entitled "Equivalent Instruction
Standards," which became effective in 1986. The purpose of the standards was "to
give guidance to parents, guardians, local school boards, and teachers providing
private instruction outside the traditional school setting with respect to equivalent
instruction for children of compulsory school age. "298 The certification requirement
for the instructor was still included in the law. In the spring of 1988 the legislative
session placed a moratorium for one year on any action against parents educating
their children at home if they fulfilled the registration requirement.

Maine

One acceptable alternative to attendance at a public day school was "(1) ..
if the person obtains equivalent instruction in a private school or in any other
manner arranged for by the school board and if the equivalent instruction is
approved by the commissioner."299 Effective November 1, 1988, the Rules for

Equivalent Instruction Through Home Instruction defined the approval procedures

291Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 678 F.Supp. 213, 214 (S.D.Iowa 1988).
298Equivalent Instruction Standards, Chapter 63, at 1.
299ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 5001-A 3. A (1) (1987).
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for home instruction programs that would fulfill the equivalency requirement of the
statutes.
In State v. McDonough, 300 the parents claimed the denial of their
guaranteed fourteenth amendment rights provided by the United States Constitution
as the basis in defense of their civil statutory violation of the compulsory attendance
statutes in Maine. The Maine statute provided that home education was the
equivalent instruction if approved by the commissioner and if denied, an appeal
process was available. The court's defense of the state's position asserted:
In short, where the state has provided a reasonable procedure
whereby the defendants may vindicate their asserted right to
educate their children at home, they may not ignore that
procedure and then appeal to this court claiming that their right
has been denied.301

New York

The Regulations supporting the statute governing instruction in New York
were amended July 1988. Prior to this, guidelines had been prepared by the state
educational agency to assist public school officials and parents to recognize what
constitutes equivalent instruction in New York.302 The amended regulations were
more specific in establishing procedures to assist school authorities in fulfilling their
300srate v. McDonough, 468 A.2d 977 (Me. 1983).
3011d. at 980.
302Joan Arnold, Guidelines on Home Instruction, September 1985.
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responsibility under statute. The local superintendent, acting as an agent for the
school board, generally evaluated the equivalency of a program to decide if it was a
legitimate exception to the compulsory attendance requirements.303
If parents did not receive approval of the local superintendent or the

school board, there was an appeal process established. During the appeal period
the parents were required to send their children to public school. If parents refused
to send their children to school when their home instruction program was not
approved, the public school authorities could refer the matter to family court as a
matter of educational neglect on the part of the parents.304
At least five major court cases in such child protective proceedings have
been heard in New York during the twenty-five year period designated for this
research. 305 In one case the appellant, Barbara Franz, removed her three children
from school and was convicted of neglect in the Family Court, Queens County,
New York. Mrs. Franz pleaded that the compulsory features of the Education Law
were unconstitutional and impinged upon the fundamental guarantee of privacy.
The Supreme Court, Appellate Division upheld the conviction.306 The court held
303N.Y. EDUC. LAW§ 3204 (1986). Instruction given to a minor elsewhere than at a
public school shall be at least substantially equivalent to the instruction given to minors of like
age and attainments at the public schools of the city or district where the minor resides. The local
board of education has the responsibility under law to assure that every pupil in its district is
provided with an appropriate educational program that is substantially equivalent to that provided
in the public schools of the district of residence.

3041d
305Matter of Adam D., 505 N.Y.S.2d 809 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1986); Matter of Falk, 110
Misc. 2d 104, 441 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1981); Matter of Lash, 92 Misc. 2d 643, 401 N.Y.S.2d 124
(1977); Matter of Franz, 55 A.D.2d 424, 390 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1977); Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689
F. Supp. 106 (N.D.N.Y. 1988).
306Matter of Franz, 390 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1977).

106
the statutory requirements that minors attend public school was constitutional and it
was appropriate to determine what was a permissible replacement for public school
education.
The child protection proceedings regarding Adam D. were to determine
"[W]hat, if any, Family Court intervention is necessary to enable the State in
carrying out its role as parens patriae to insure that Adam D. receives an adequate
instruction?"307 Adam D.'s educational best interest was the focus of the hearing.
When Adam was interviewed, he stated that he didn't mind learning at home, but he
thought he might prefer going to school with friends.308 The court found that
Adam's best educational interest required that he be placed under the supervision of
the court. The terms and conditions of the supervision were listed in the opinion.
These two cases point out the court's reluctance to define "substantially
equivalent." That evaluation belongs to those with the "expertise to evaluate the
teacher, the curriculum, and the student--through standardized testing. "309
In Blackwelder v. Safnauer evidence was presented that the parents

refused on site visits of the home instruction program they were providing their

307Matter of Adam D., 505 N.Y.S.2d 809, 810 (N.Y. Fam. Ct 1986).
308supreme Court Justice Douglas in Wisconsin v. Yoder. in his dissenting opinion,
expressed concern for the rights of students regarding decisions on education. Also see Debra
Mc Vicker, The Interest of the Child in the Home Eduction Question: Wisconsin v. Yoder Reexamined, 17 INDIANA LAW REV. 728 (Summer 1985), focused on a child being deprived of the
standard the state legislature has deemed necessary for a quality education.

309Matter of Adam D., 1986, 505 N.Y.S.2d 809, 813 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1986). It should
be noted that standardized testing was not required under the 1985 guidelines, only that the parent
should submit a plan for evaluation of the pupil's progress. The 1988 amended Regulations
requires an annual assessment to include the results of a commercially published norm-referenced
achievement test
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children.3 10

The parents' claims regarding privacy, due-process, and the

establishment clause were unfounded and the statute and regulations were found not
to be vague. the day after the judgement was entered , the New York Board of
Regents adopted regulations to implement§ 3204.311 Prior to the adoption of these
regulations, local schol districts implemented § 3204 using advisory guidelines
issued by the state Education Department which were developed in 1985. Appeals
made to the District Court and to the U.S. Appealate Court were rejected.312

Other States

Nevada provides specific exemptions from compulsory attendance if the
child receives equivalent instruction. Although the statutory language does not use
the terms "home instruction" or "home education," it does require that the parents
instructing their child at home be qualified for a teaching certificate for the grade
level to be taught or the parents should consult with a person who possesses a
teaching certificate.313 The term "consultation" is clarified in the statute. In
addition the language indicates what should be included in the request for a child to

31DB/ackwe/der v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 113 (N.D.N.Y. 1988)

3118 A N.Y.C.R.R. 100.10
312s/ackwe/der v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 113 (N.D.N.Y. 1988), motion for
reconsideration denied, August 15, 1988: U.S.C. OF Appeals for Second Circuit, dismissed Jan.
23, 1989.

313NEV. REV. STAT.§ 392.015 (2) (Michie 1980).
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be excused from compulsory attendance on the "[G]rounds that the child will be
given equivalent instruction outside the school. ... "314
One of the six exceptions to Hawaii's compulsory attendance
requirements is, "Where the child is enrolled in an appropriate alternative
educational program as approved by the superintendent in accordance with the plans
and policies of the department of education."3 15 The policies and plans of the
Department of Education are set forth in the form of regulations. The State Board
of Education amended the regulations in July of 1988. The new regulation defines
home schooling, listed the educational objectives and subjects that are to be
addressed, and also lists the testing and reporting requirements. These regulations
are less stringent than the previous ones in that there is no longer an educational
qualification for parents who are educating their own children at home.316
Idaho's statute is mute regarding home instruction. Parents are to cause
their children to be instructed in subjects commonly taught in the public schools in
the state of Idaho. The only additional language that provides any guidance states:
Unless the child is otherwise comparably instructed, as may be
determined by the board of trustees of the school district in
which the child resides, the parent or guardian shall cause the
child to attend a public, private or parochial school during a

314NEV. REV. STAT.§ 392.025 (1) (Michie 1980).
315HAw. REV. STAT.§ 298-9 (6) (1985).
316Hawaii Compulsory Attendance Exception, Regulations, 4140.1.1(July1988).

109

period in each year equal to that in which the public schools are
in session ... 317
In Delaware, the compulsory attendance requirement does not apply:

[I]f it can be shown, and witnessed by written endorsement, to
the satisfaction of the superintendent of the school districts, to
the satisfaction of an official designated by the State Board of
Education, and by a written examination, that a child is
elsewhere receiving regular and thorough instruction in the
subjects prescribed for the public schools of the State, in a
manner suitable to children of the same age and stage of
advancement.318
The local school district has the authority to monitor and regulate home
instruction according to the requirements of the statutes.
General regulations for home instruction are promulgated under the
authority of the Education Article of the State of Maryland in July of 1987.319 The
new Bylaw eliminates the requirement that anyone teaching at home either be
certified by the state or be a college graduate with expertise in teaching.
The goal for educating public school students in New Jersey is to provide
them with a "thorough and efficient" education. Students receiving an education in
a setting other than public schools are to receive instruction equivalent to that
provided in public schools for children of the similar grades. Parents bear the
burden of introducing evidence that there is compliance with the equivalency
317IDAHO CODE§ 33-202 (1981).
318oEL. CODE ANN. tit 14, § 2703 (a) (Supp. 1986).
319Bylaw Comar 13A. 10.01-05 (1987).
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language, but the ultimate burden of proving lack of equivalency rests with the state
or local district. 320
The South Dakota statutes excuse children from compulsory attendance if
"[P]rovided with competent alternative instruction for an equivalent period of time
as in public schools." The State Board of Education has promulgated regulations to
support the statutory language.

SUMMARY OF STATUTES AND CASES IN STATES WTIH "EOUNALENCY
LANGUAGE"

The courts in New York are reluctant to define "equivalency"; yet they do
not find the statute and the state regulations to be unconstitutionally vague. The
legal and political issues in Iowa at the time of this research involve the issue of
certification, not equivalency. Indiana has guidance from the prosecuting attorney
as to the interpretation of equivalency that will be used at the judicial level. Maine's
equivalency statute has been upheld in court as a reasonable procedure. New
Jersey and Delaware use the terms "thorough and efficient" education for all
schools. This research considered states with the "thorough and efficient"
language in the equivalent grouping.
The phrase "equivalent elsewhere" provides latitude as well as confusion
to many parents and school administrators. The questions that continue to be raised
are who and what determines and/or approves the equivalency and what are the
320state of New Jersey, Department of Education, Commonly Asked Questions Relating
to Home Schooling, March 10, 1982.
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due-process provisions to question the approval or lack of same. States such as
Hawaii, New York, and Maine have promulgated regulations or guidelines to
govern the approval authority in the determination that a student is receiving an
equivalent education as required by the statute.

HOME INSTRUCTION QUALIFIES AS A PRIVATE SCHOOL

Court interpretation, language in the statutes, and general practice have
allowed home instruction to qualify as a private school, thereby falling within that
exemption to the compulsory attendance laws.321 Webster's New World Dictionary
defines "private" as not open to, or controlled by, the public.322 Pierce v. Society

of Sisters,323 protects the property interest of the private school. The 1925
Supreme Court ruling holds that the Oregon statute requiring public school
attendance interferes with the parents' liberty to bring up their children as provided
by the fourteenth amendment. Pertinent court cases referring to private schools as
well as home instruction are included in this analysis of private school states.

321nlinois, Michigan, California, Kentucky, Massachusetts, North Dakota, Texas.
322oAVID B. GURALNIK, Editor, WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE
AMERICAN LANGUAGE 453 (New York: Popular Library 1973).
323268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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California

In California there have been no identifiable court cases during the twentyfive years designated for this study. Home schooling is not specifically addressed
in the California statutes.

A memo from the California State Department of

Education identifies three options which are available to parents who wanted to
teach their children at home. 324
One alternative available to parents is to enroll the students in a private
school. The law does not establish minimum standards for private schools,
requiring only that private schools file a Private School Affidavit with the State
Department of Education. 325 Private tutoring by a certified teacher or Independent
Study through the public school are the other two options.326

lliinois

There is no statutory language in lliinois regarding home instruction. One
exemption, to the compulsory attendance statute provides:
Any child attending a private or parochial school where children
are taught the branches of education taught to children of
corresponding age and grade in the public schools, and where
324L. Fred Femandex, Non-Public Schools Unit, California State Department of
Education, undated memo.
325CALIFORNIAEDUCATIONCODE § 48222 (1987).
326CALIFORNIA EDUCATION CODE§ 48224 (1987).
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the instruction of the child in the branches of education is in the
English language.327
A 1950 Illinois supreme court decision People v. Levisen,328 established
the precedent in the state to allow parents to educate their children at home. The
Levisen's home school was considered by the supreme court to be a private school.
A mother with strong religious convictions taught the same subjects at
home to her third grade daughter as were taught in the public school. The
stipulations accepted by all included the child had regular hours for study and five
hours of instruction. In addition it was stipulated that she showed proficiency
comparable with an average third grade student. Mrs. Levisen and her husband
believed their child should not be educated in competition with other children. They
argued:
[A] school, in the ordinary meaning of the word, is a place
where instruction is imparted to the young, that the number of
persons being taught does not determine whether the place is a
school, and that by receiving instruction in her home in the
manner shown by the evidence the child was attending a private
schooI.329
The Illinois Supreme Court in 1950 ruled in Levisen that the "[O]bject of
section 26-1 of the School Code, requiring children to attend school, is that all
327m. Rev. Stat. ch. 122 § 26-1 (1987).
328404 Ill. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950). This case did not occur in the twenty-five year
time frame established for this research. It was included because of the precedent it established in
Illinois. Moreover, it was a case often used by parents in other states to establish their homes as
private schools.
3291d. at 576-77.
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children shall be educated, not that they shall be educated in any particular manner
or place. "330 The court placed the burden upon the parents by stating:
Those who prefer this method as a substitute for attendance at
the public school have the burden of showing that they have in
good faith provided an adequate course of instruction in the
prescribed branches of learning. No parent can be said to have a
right to deprive his child of educational advantages at least
commensurate with the standards prescribed for the public
schools, and any failure to provide such benefits is a matter of
great concern to the courts.331
The Levisen court held that the parents sustained their burden by proving
that their home instruction was adequate to qualify as a private school. Having thus
found that the parents were not in violation of the Illinois compulsory attendance
law, it was unnecessary for the court to consider their secondary argument that the
statute was unconstitutional.
In a more recent case, Scoma v. Chi.cago Board of Education,332 a federal
court was directly confronted with the question of whether the Illinois compulsory
attendance law was unconstitutional. In Scoma the parents contended that the
statute abridged their constitutional right to educate their children "as they see fit"
and "in accordance with their determination of what best serves the family's interest
and welfare." The parents sought pre-approval for their program, but the court

3301d. at 577.
331 Id. at 578.
332391 F. Supp. 452, 461 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
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found there was no precedence for such approval. The court observed that the

Yoder decision, cited by the parents, did not apply because Yoder involved a claim
of religious freedom. The Scomas were not asserting a religious right but only "a
personal or philosophical choice" which was not within the bounds of
Constitutional protection. "Thus the state need not demonstrate a 'compelling
interest'; it must act only 'reasonably' in requiring children to attend school. "333
Since the state met this lesser burden, the court held the Illinois compulsory
attendance law to be constitutional as applied to the Scomas.334 The court, referring
to Levisen, emphasized that the burden of proof rest with the parent to show that a
plan of home instruction qualifies as a private school.

Scoma and Levisen have been quoted in legal settings throughout the
country. In many courts the justices have rejected the reference, as the language in
the statutes in other states was not comparable nor were the stipulations in the case.

Kentucky

There is no language in the Kentucky statutes referring to home
instruction. The exemptions to public school attendance includes private schools.
As a result of the 1984 amendments to the Revised Statutes, the Department of
Education is no longer authorized by statute to approve private, parochial, or church
schools.
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In Kentucky the board of education of the district in which the child
resides has the authority to exempt from attendance every child of compulsory
attendance age "who is enrolled in regular attendance in a private, parochial, or
church regular day school. "335
The court in Kentucky State Bd. Etc. v. Rudasiif336 has held that the state
may not require a teacher in a nonpublic school to be certified under statute. The
case also states that no parent may be compelled to send his/her child to any school
to which he/she may be conscientiously opposed. "If the legislature wishes to
monitor work of private and parochial schools in accomplishing the constitutional
purpose of compulsory education, it may do so by an appropriate standardized
achievement testing program. "337

Massachusetts

The compulsory attendance statute of Massachusetts delegates school
committees in local communities to approve private schools.338 The advisory
opinion of the Department of Education legal counsel interprets the statute to allow
for home education if the local official approved of the program.339
335KY. REV. STAT. §159.30(b) (Michie/Bobbs Merrill 1987).
336589 S.W.2d 877, 884 (Ky. 1979).
3371d

338MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 24.
339Massachusetts Department of Education, Memorandum of the Department of
Education General Counsel Re: Advisory Opinion on Home Eduction, January 4, 1980.
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An unpublished opinion in Perchemildes v. Frizz/e340 has been cited
nationally as a case in which the court established criteria to determine if a home
education program was equivalent to the public school. The case produced a great
deal of publicity, yet "its judicial acceptance has been markedly limited. "341 A more
recent opinion, Care and Protection of Charles,342 condoned home education if the
program were approved locally. The court validated the constitutionality of the
statute and remanded the case to the lower court for the judge to assist the parties to
come to agreement regarding Charles' educational program. Both the lower court
and the Supreme Judicial Court found Charles to be in need of care and protection.
The Supreme Judicial Court provided the following direction: "However, because
we remand this case to the lower court, we offer some guidance on the extent to
which approval of a home school proposal may be conditioned on certain
requirement without infringing on the liberty interests of the parents under the
fourteenth amendment. "343 The decision provided direction regarding curriculum,
length of program, competency of the parent to teach their children, subject matter,
and processes to evaluate the progress of the children.

340Perchemlides v. Frizzle Civil No. 16641 (Hampshire Superior Court, Mass. Nov.
13, 1978).

341 Tobak and Zirkel, supra note 136, at 27.

342care and Protection of Charles, 504 N.E.2d 592, 600 (Mass 1987).

118
Michigan

The Nonpublic School Act of Michigan says, "A private, denominational
or parochial school within the meaning of this act shall be any school other than a
public school giving instruction to children below the age of 16 years .... "344 One
of the exemptions to the compulsory attendance requirements is,
A child who is attending regularly and is being taught in a state
approved nonpublic school, which teaches subjects comparable
to those taught in the public schools to children of corresponding
age and grade, as determined by the course of study for the
public schools of the district within which the nonpublic schools
is located 345
Michigan is one of the few states that has a statutory requirement
regarding the qualifications of a teacher of a private, denominational or parochial
school. The statute was adopted in the early 1920's and has withstood court
scrutiny.
No person shall teach or give instruction in any of the regular or
elementary grade studies in any private, denominational or
parochial school within this state who does not hold a certificate
such as would qualify him or her to teach in like grades of the
public school in the state. 346

344MicH. COMP. LAWS.ANN.§ 388.552 (West 1988).
345MicH. COMP. LAWS.ANN.§ 80.1561(West1988).
346MicH. COMP. LAW ANN.§ 388.553 (West 1988).

119
Non-certificated parents claimed the right to educate their children at
home, free from the certification requirements in Hanson v. Cushman. The United
States District Court determined that, "[S]tate need not demonstrate a 'compelling
interest' but only that it acted 'reasonably' in requiring children to attend school and
that children be taught only by certified teachers. "347
The parents and clergy of the Sheridan Road Baptist Church and the First
Baptist Church of Bridgeport brought action against the Department of Education,
seeking a declaration that the requirements of the nonpublic statute requiring state
certification was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals found the certification
requirements "[V]iolated neither the Free Exercise nor the Establishment Clauses of
the first amendment of the United States Constitution. "348 In an equal division, the
Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, based
on their judgment that the goal of the state requirement of certification prevented
children from being exposed to unqualified teachers.349 The judges who did not
concur indicated that the state had the burden to show that the exemption would :
"[U]nduly impair its interest in compulsory education and that enforcing the
requirement was the least intrusive means by which to accomplish the objective."
The dissenting judges stated that the state failed to meet that burden. 350

347490 F. Supp. 109, 114-115 (W.D. Mich. 1980).

348sheridan Road Baptist Church v. Department of Education, 426 Mich. 462, 396
N.W.2d 373 (1986), cert.denied, 107 S.Ct. 2183, 95 L.Ed.2d 839 (1987).
3491ct.

350Jd.
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North Dakota

North Dakota is one of two states that enforces certification requirements
for the instructors in private schools. The compulsory attendance statute addresses
the requirements of public and private schools. The State Board document
describing the policies and procedures adopted by the Department of Public
Instruction includes home instruction with the criteria for private schools.351 The
requirement was questioned in the Supreme Court of North Dakota case, State v.
Shaver,352 by a group of parents, none of whom were certified to teach. These

parents were convicted of violating the compulsory attendance statute. The parents
held that seeking certification would violate their religious convictions. The state
supreme court upheld the lower court decision, holding that, "Teacher certification
appears to us to be among the least personally intrusive methods now available to
satisfy the state's prime interest in seeing that its children are taught by capable
persons. "35 3

Texas

Texas Education Code describes the course of study for children in
attendance at a private or parochial schools. There is no specific language referring
351North Dakota Statutory Requirements for Funding of Public Schools and the
Approval of Private and Parochial Schools, 5 August 1987.
352state v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980).
353state v. Patzer, 382 N.W.2d 639 (N.D. 1986).
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to home instruction. Language in the statutes does not provide the adequate
direction to avoid litigation. Two cases have resulted in conflicting positions.
The Court of Appeals of Texas in 1986 held that the parents failed to
demonstrate that the compulsory school attendance laws substantially burdened
their exercise of religious beliefs, and consequently the State did not need to prove
its compelling interest.354 As a rule the courts, if possible, avoided dealing with the
issue of whether their statutes violated the constitution when they denied the parents
their right to teach their children at home. 355
The following year a class action suit in the Tarrant County 17th Judicial
Court resulted in a favorable decision for home schoolers.356 The interpretation of
this case was that home schools could legally operate as private schools in Texas.
There were no specific guidelines for these programs, and it was at the local
superintendent's discretion to determine if the program was a legitimate program.

SUMMARY OF COURT CASES AND STATUTES STA TES IN WHICH HOME
INSTRUCTION QUALIFIES AS A PRIVATE SCHOOL

Although the intent of this research was to examine only cases at the
United States Supreme Court level and the higher courts at the state and federal
354nowe/I v. State, 723 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. 1986).
355T.ML Case Notes, 24 JOURNAL OFFAMIL Y LAW 552 (1985-86).
356Leeper v. Arlington Independent School District, No. 17-88761-85 Tarrant County,
Texas 17th Judicial Ct., Apr. 13, 1987 as reported in C. KLICKA, HOME SCHOOLING IN THE
UNITED STATES: A STATUTORY ANALYSIS 47 (Great Falls, Va.: Home School Legal Defense
Association 1988).
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level over the past twenty-five years, an exception was made in presenting the 1950

Levisen35 7 decision from Illinois and lower court decisions in Texas and
Massachusetts. Litigation in the states that allowed home instruction programs to
qualify as private schools provided greater flexibility to the parents. Illinois was an
example of this flexibility. Unless there was blatant educational neglect, the
educational program provided to the child was without restriction.
The Perchemildes decision in Massachusetts stated that once the right to
home instruction was recognized by state law, the parents had the constitutional
right to be given:
[A] high level of procedural due-process protection from
arbitrary, capricious, or even malicious conduct on the part of
the authorities who were authorized to evaluate and decide on the
equivalence of a given program.358
The issue decided was the procedural means to determine the propriety of
a home instruction program. The later case of Care and Protection of Charles
validated the local school district's authority to approve a home instruction
program. The 1987 lower court decision in Texas has established the direction that
home instruction be considered a private school. There were no rules to provide
guidance to the administrators in approval of such programs.
The statutory language in North Dakota and Michigan required
certification of the instructor of a private school or an acceptable alternative.
357People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950).
358Perchemlides v. Frizzle Civil No. 16641 (Hampshire County, Mass. Superior Court,
Nov. 13, 1978).
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Kentucky and California had no language requirement for home instruction. Home
instruction programs have generally been accepted in these two states by the
authorities to be private schools.

"SILENT STATUTE" STATES

The last grouping of states was those having no statutory language at all
beyond a bare compulsory attendance law, leaving the permissibility of home
instruction--and guidelines for it--entirely to the courts, the state rules and
regulations, or, if neither of the previous were available, to an individual school's
discretion. 359

RULES AND REGULATIONS PROMULGATED BY STATE BOARDS OF
EDUCATION

Although the statutes are silent regarding home instruction or equivalency,
in two states rules and regulations have been promulgated to establish procedures to
be used by the appropriate agency in determining if a home instruction program is
an acceptable exemption to the specific compulsory education requirements. 360 No

359New Hampshire, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, Alabama.
360New Hampshire, Nebraska. These states were placed in the "silent statute" grouping
rather than "explicit language" or "equivalent language" groupings because the rules and
regulations do not have the same impact as does specific language in the statute that directly refers
to home instruction or equivalent instruction.
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cases have been identified in the twenty-five years designated for this research in
these two states.

Nebraska

The powers and duties of the Nebraska State Board of Education as
established in the statutes, includes, "(c) establish rules and regulations which
govern standards and procedures for the approval and legal operation of all schools
in the state and for the accreditation of all schools requesting state accreditation. "361
Title 92, Nebraska Administrative Code, contains three sections for school system
approval and curriculum. Rule 13, effective date August, 1984, applies to schools
operated by parents and religious "monitors" who indicate to the Department of
Education that their deeply and sincerely held religious beliefs do not permit them to
comply with the approval or accreditation standards. The school is considered an
"exempt school" which is defined as, "[A] school which has elected not to meet
approval or accreditation requirements and has complied with the state law and
regulations relating to such exemptions."362 Rule 13 covers any private religious
school, whether operated at home, in a school building, or in a church. Rule 14,
effective June, 1986, includes the regulation and procedures for approving public
schools; and Rule 15, effective February, 1985, establishes the regulations and
procedures for accreditation of public and nonpublic schools.
361NEB. REV. STAT.§ 79-328 (c) (1987).
362Title 92, Nebraska Department of Education, Ch. 13, at 1 (1984).
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The parents of Dawn Bigelow were enjoined from operating a school that
was in violation with the compulsory attendance laws. The state regulations
provided for approval and required reports and inspection. The court agreed
Dawn's parents could supplement her education, but could not cause her to be
truant.363

New Hampshire

Home instruction regulations were developed in New Hampshire in 1984.
The authority to do so was under the provisions of RSA 193:3364 and adopted by
the procedures of RSA 541-A.365 The recommended standards for a home
instruction program were stated in the "[F]orm of competencies which the required
instruction should be reasonably expected to develop in all citizens regardless of
where they receive their education. "366 The parents were encouraged to seek
assistance from the local districts and the state agency in the development and/or
selection of materials.

363srate ex rel. Douglas v. Bigelow, 334 N.W.2d 444, 447 (Neb. 1983).
364Brendan Stocklin-Enright, New Hampshire's Home Schooling Quandary, 2
VERMONT LAW REVIEW, 278 (1983). Stocklin-Enright questioned the use of this statutory
authority since it was intended to provide for the reassignment of students.
365N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. EDUC. 315, Regulations and Procedures for the Approval of
Home Education Programs, Section ED 315.01 (1984).
3661d. Appendix A (1984).
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NO RULES AND REGULATIONS PROMULGATED BY STATE BOARDS OF
EDUCATION

There was no authority for home instruction in the remaining four
states.367 The legislature had provided no language in the statutes; the state boards
of education had developed no regulations; and only in Kansas had the court
recently provided any guidance.

Alabama

The Alabama statutes made no specific reference to home instruction.
Children might be instructed by a private tutor who holds a certificate issued by the
State Superintendent of Instruction, or they might attend a private school.368 Jerry
Hill and Kenneth Downing were charged and convicted in separate actions at the
trial level for failing to cause their children to receive an education that would be an

acceptable form of compulsory attendance. The parents contended their religious
freedoms were violated by the Compulsory School Attendance Law. The cases
were consolidated on appeal. The judgments were affmned. 369

367Alabama, Kansas, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania.
368ALA. CODE§ 16-28-1, 16-28-5 (1987). Requirements for a private school are listed
in the statute, including the requirement of teacher certification.

369mu and Downing v. State, 410 So. 2d 431 (Ala. App. 1981).
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Kansas

There was no language available in the Kansas statutes to provide for
home instruction:
Home instruction was entirely proper at one time in the history
of our state (Gen.Stat.1901, § 6420); but a later act of legislature
deleted the home instruction proviso as a reason for not
attending school (Laws 1903, ch. 423, Gen. Stat.1909,

§

7736, et. seq.). The present truancy act (G.S. 1949, 72-4801)
still omits the home instruction proviso.370
Since 1919 the legislative directive has been to establish minimum course
requirements for all schools. There are two alternatives to satisfy the Kansas
compulsory education statutes, attendance in public schools or attendance at "a
private, denominational or parochial school taught by a competent instructor for a
period of time substantially equivalent to the period of time public school is
maintained... "371 Subsection (e) of the compulsory school attendance section
provides a special provision applicable to Amish. Approval may be granted for a
regularly supervised program of instruction to a recognized church or religious
denomination that objects to a regular high school education.
In 1983 the Supreme Court of Kansas took the stand that the compulsory

attendance laws of Kansas had a rational relationship to the legitimate state purpose
of educating its children and that the home education program provided to the
310state v. Lowry, 383 P.2d 962, 963-64 (Kan. 1963).

371KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 72-1111 (1980).
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Sawyer children did not satisfy the compulsory attendance laws.372 The Sawyer
children were identified as "children in need of care" because they did not attend
school. The parents had organized their own private schooI.373 The Kansas
statutes stated:
[A] private, denominational or parochial school taught by a
competent instructor for a period of time which is substantially
equivalent to the period of time public school is maintained in the
school district in which the private, denominational or parochial
school is located.374
The court found, in agreement with the trial court, that Longview School
was the Sawyer's home, not an accredited private school. In addition it was stated
that:
The standard of review, to be applied then, is whether the state's
system had some rational relationship to a legitimate state
purpose. . . The Kansas system of compulsory school
attendance embodied at K.S.A. 72-1111, which allows
alternatives to public school, had a rational relationship to the
legitimate State purpose of educating its children.375
The case notes of the statutes indicated that Sawyer determined that home
instruction did not meet compulsory attendance requirements in Kansas.

372/nterest of Sawyer, 672 P.2d 1093 (1983).
3731d. at 1094.
374KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 72-1111(2) (Supp. 1982).

375/nterest of Sawyer, 672 P.2d 1093, 1098.
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An earlier 1963 case, State v. Lowry,376 found the parents guilty of
violating the truancy act. The parents claimed their method of educating their
children was a private school. The court disagreed, finding that in order to be
classified as a private school the courses of instruction must include those required
by statute and the children must be taught by a competent instructor for the
prescribed time as required in the statute.377

Oklahoma

The compulsory attendance statute of Oklahoma provides that it is
unlawful for a parent of a school aged child "[T]o neglect or refuse to cause or
compel such child to attend and comply with the rules of some public, private or
other school, unless other means of education are provided for the full term the
schools of the district are in session. "378

SUMMARY OF STATUTES AND CASES IN STATES WITH "SILENT
STATUTES"

Of this grouping of states with no statutory reference to home instruction,
three state educational agencies had developed rules and regulations to provide

3763g3 P.2d 962 (Kan. 1963).
377Id.

at 965.

3780KLA. STAT. ANN. tit 70, § 10-105(A) (1979).
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direction to families and school administrators.379 The states with no language,
either through the statutes or rules and regulations, provided an atmosphere of
uncertainty for the parents regarding their rights and for the schools regarding their
responsibility. This uncertainty invited inconsistent interpretations.

SUMMARY OF COURT CASES AND STATE STATUTES

Every state had a form of compulsory attendance statute requiring that all
children of a prescribed age must attend a public or private school. These questions
were raised in states where there was no reference to home instruction in the statute:
Does home instruction meet the requirements of the compulsory education statute?
And if so, under what circumstances? As the justices in North Carolina stated, it
was an issue of public policy as to whether home instruction should be permitted
and the legislature should make that determination. 380
The courts have looked for a balanced approach when weighing the state's
legitimate interest and the parents' legitimate freedom of choice. The majority of the
decisions during the twenty-five year period specified for this research were
concerned with the issue of whether the home instruction program was a legitimate
exemption under the compulsory attendance law in the designated state. In addition
to the exemption issue, some home school parents claimed their state statutes to be

379These states with statutes with no reference to home instruction statutes were referred
to in this research as states with "silent statutes," even if there were rules and regulations
promulgated by the state boards of education.

380Delconte v. State, 313 N.C. 384, 329 S.E.2d 636, 646 (1985).
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unconstitutionally vague although courts have generally resisted deciding the cases
on a constitutional issue such as this. The burden of proof issue was also a concern
in a number of cases though this question was most often resolved on the subtleties
of the particular statutory language.
The monitoring and approval process varies throughout the country.
Some states do not require any supervision or approval; however, at the opposite
extreme, two states go so far as to require the parents to be certified. This
inconsistency adds to the confusion, particularly for families in our mobile society
moving from state to state.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE TIIREE

The Third Research Objective served the purpose of tracing the
development of home instruction in seven states.381

SPECIFIC CASE STUDIES

In order to trace the development of home instruction legislation for the

Third Research Objective, telephone interviews were conducted with administrative
personnel in seven state educational agencies. It was intended that these in-depth
interviews would verify and amplify information derived from the earlier written
survey. These interviews were based on fourteen open-ended questions. The
3811owa, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, New York, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin.
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responses to these questions led to a summary of the development of home
instruction in these seven states, the political forces if any that brought about
change, and the current status of home instruction, and, finally, recommendations
for attributes of a model home instruction statute or rules and regulations. In
identifying the seven states for the in-depth interviewing, the historical background
of the home instruction laws was considered in order to identify diversity among
these states. The Objective was to study the process in the development of the
various statutes and the political influences effecting that development.
As a result of verifying the information from the original survey, it was
found there had been legislative changes in North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and
Iowa. The name and citation of the statutes in Minnesota had been changed because
of new codification in that state. Another change identified was action taken by the
New York Board of Regents to promulgate regulations to establish procedures to
assist local school authorities to determine whether a home instruction program was
essentially equivalent.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE HOME INSTRUCTION STATUTES

One of the important segments of the interviews of the personnel of the
seven state departments of education was to identify any series of events that led to
modification in the laws of the state. Recent changes have been made in the
procedures to evaluate a home instruction program in New York, North Carolina,
Iowa, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota.
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There has been an increase of federal and state litigation throughout the
country challenging home instruction statutes. In New York the courts upheld the
statutes, but the suits raised critical issues such as the discretion of the local
superintendents in approving programs and the means to measure the skills of the
students educated at home. The State Board and other lobbying groups, including
the state school board association and various parent groups, were looking for
regulations that had the force of law--not merely the guidelines previously in effect-that would clarify the standards in determining if a program were substantially
equivalent. The regulations adopted by the Board of Regents July 1, 1988, were a
compromise to protect the rights of all who work with home instruction. The
perception of the interviewed attorney for the State Board was, "It seems to be
working at this point. I mean there are bumps and bruises along the way that we
need to work out, but, for the most part, it is doing what we intended it to do. "382
Another attorney for the State Board identified the unresolved issues the Board of
Regents was planning to address if the regulations were to be amended. These
issues included provisions for handicapped children, procedures to allow the local
school district and parents to agree on alternate methods of assessing student
growth, and listing which services provided by the state to the private schools
should also be provided to home programs.
In 1979 the North Carolina General Assembly passed regulations that
radically deregulated the operation of all nonpublic schools and transferred the
supervisory authority from the State Board of Education to the Governor's office.
382Attomey, New York State Board of Education.
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Many parents taught their children at home after this new monitoring authority was
established. A subsequent attorney general's opinion stated that a home program
was not a school within the meaning of the Compulsory Attendance Law. A court
decision at the federal level then concluded that the state's interest was of sufficient
magnitude to override the parents' religious interest.383 At approximately the same
time, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the state statute did not prohibit
home instruction as an alternate means of complying with the compulsory
attendance statute. The court reasoned that North Carolina could regulate home
instruction, prohibit it, or permit it; but the present statute did not contain language
to do any of these. As a result of these decisions, together with the transfer of the
authority from the State Board, there were virtually no provisions to meaningfully
enforce the compulsory attendance law. The court urged the legislature to act. In
addition the North Carolina State Board of Education saw the obvious need to
clarify the regulations for home instruction. Legislative action resulted in the 1988
session. The State Board's initial proposal was for the home instruction teachers to
be college graduates. Results of the final legislation included (1) a de(inition of
home schools; (2) the requirement that the teachers have at least a high school
diploma or its equivalent; and (3) language that established an annual achievement
test be administered. Still unresolved were the issues of (1) the acceptable level of
test scores; (2) specificity of the courses taught and at which grade level; and (3) a
monitoring system to validate that the children were receiving an adequate
education. The representative from the State Board reported that for the first time
383Duro v. District Attorney, 712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct 998,
79 LEd2d 230 (1984).
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the state has put some real requirements on the public school systems; for example,
they mandated the length of school day and a basic curriculum. "If we try to get a
basic education throughout the state, one that equalizes opportunities for all
students, then it ought to be the same for kids in home schools as well as regular
schools. "384
For several years prior to 1985, Minnesota educators sought the
imposition of regulation for private instruction. Then in that year the Minnesota
Supreme Court held in the Newstrom and Budke cases that the compulsory
education law was unconstitutionally vague regarding the requirements of staff
qualifications. 385 As a result, the legislature called for the establishment of a task
force composed of six representatives of private education and six representatives
from public education to develop recommendations for a new compulsory
instruction law. Compromise legislation provided nonpublic schools with the
option of going through approved accrediting agencies or following the explicit
standards established in the statute.
In 1983 the General Assembly in Wisconsin established criteria for
defining private schools and home-based private educational programs. The
impetus for this action was the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruling in State v.
Popanz386 that the lack of definition of "private school" caused the statute to be

unconstitutionally void for vagueness. The statute, enacted after the Popanz ruling,
384Staff member, North Carolina Department of Public Instruction.

385state v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525 (Minn. 1985); State v. Budke, 371 N.W.2d 533
(Minn. 1985).
386332 N.W.2d 750 (Wis. 1983).
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clearly established the difference between a home-based private educational
program and a private school. The administrator of a home-based program or
private school must make a statement of enrollment to the public school in his or her
jurisdiction. There were criteria established for private schools, including a
sequentially progressive curriculum in six content areas.

There were no

administrative rules to monitor or implement the legislation nor an approval process
at the local level. However, an option which was rarely used was available under§
118.167 for approval of a private school by the state superintendent.387
Pennsylvania's 1988 legislature adopted explicit language in the statutes
as a result of a federal district court declaring the previous language was
unconstitutionally vague. Prior to this change, the Pennsylvania compulsory
education laws had not been amended since 1949. The 1949 statute required daily
instruction in English language by a qualified private tutor.388 The regulations
promulgated by the State Board did not define the qualifications for the private
tutor, but did set forth the required courses for the student and the minimum amount
of instructional time.

The superintendent's approval of the tutor was to be

acceptable evidence of the tutor's ability to teach the program, and the parents were
required to furnish written assurance that the instructional requirements were
met.389 Based on the interview, the best features of the earlier legislation were the
local control over the approval and the parental responsibility to consider the

387WJs. STAT.§ 118.167 (1984).
388PA. STAT. ANN. tit.24 § 13-1326 (1988).
389chapter 11, Regulations of State Board of Education of Pennsylvania, § 11.31 (b).
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qualifications of the tutor as well as the quality of the educational program. The
disadvantage cited was that the state agency had no knowledge of the student's
progress. According to the interviewee, the recent unreported federal district court
case, Jeffrey v. O'Donne//, 390 held the statute to be unconstitutionally vague, absent
the definition of "private tutor." The court ordered that either the State Board must
develop new regulations or the legislature must adopt a new statute. At the time of
this research, a bill had just been adopted by the Pennsylvania legislature spelling
out the required courses, hours of instruction, notification procedure, and
immunization requirements,. It also provided that a private tutor may be a parent if
he or she has at least a high school diploma and four more years of education than
the student.

In 1983 the Montana statutes were changed to allow home instruction to
be an exception to compulsory attendance.

Prior to that time there was no

accountability for the education of children taught at home.

The county

superintendents, as elected officials not directly attached to local districts, proposed
legislation to include periodic testing of students educated at home. The 1983
legislation was a compromise between strong language proposed by the county
superintendents and looser requirements advanced by private and home school
parents who were opposed to the recommended restrictions.
Iowa was one of the three states which required that instruction in any
educational program be provided by a certified teacher. 391 Rules and regulations

390No. CV-86-1560, (D.C.M.D. Penn. August 24, 1988).
391JOWA CODE ANN.§ 299.l (West 1988).
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were promulgated in 1986 to define more clearly the requirements of the statute.
The court cases have upheld the compulsory attendance statute, but the legislature,
after approximately five years of intense lobbying on the part of parents, took action
in the spring of 1988 to make some changes in the statutory language. In addition
an interim study committee made up of representatives and senators was established
to conduct a comprehensive study of the existing compulsory education law. The
Iowa statute set forth specific criteria for compliance and for criminal prosecution of
the parents who violated the statute. However, as a result of the 1988 legislative
action, prosecution may now be deferred as long as the parent meets the
requirement of reporting that his or child is receiving home instruction.392 One of
the tasks of the study committee was to determine if the deferred prosecution should
continue beyond the June 30, 1989 deadline.

POLffiCAL FORCES

The political forces that brought about changes in the seven states targeted
for the interviews included strong parent groups, particularly those with national
leadership and a religious base. Others including parent advocacy groups, teacher
unions, National Parent Teachers Association, National Association of School
Boards, state organizations such as the County Superintendents in Montana, and
the state departments of education have become visible in the state capitols to lobby
for their point of view.
392rowA CODE ANN.§ 1. § 279.10 (1987).
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Teacher qualifications seemed to be the issue throughout the country that
coalesced supporters of home instruction even if they had disparate religious and/or
philosophical perspectives. If parents were educating their children at home for
philosophical or religious reasons, they were equally as concerned that teacher
certification or a baccalaureate degree not be a requirement of the state home
instruction laws.
The consensus of the interviewees regarding local and national trends for
home education was that it was evident that there has been an increase in the
number of parents educating their children at home--particularly those who were
doing it for religious reasons. One of the interviewees believed this to be a cyclical
movement, declining within the next ten years.
Many states have legislated outcome based on accountability or
performance objectives in the public school system. The interviewees questioned if
the same accountability would be required for all children, even those in private
schools and those educated at home.
Further perceptions of the interviewees indicated that the status of home
education throughout the country depended a great deal on the elections of state
legislators and the lobbying efforts of teachers unions. These two activities could
reverse the present trend of home instruction legislation favoring the parents.

CURRENT STATUS

The following is a sampling of the responses regarding the unique
characteristics of home instruction in their states:

140

--North Carolina is becoming a haven for people who want to educate
their children at home because of the liberal nature of their statute.
--New York regulations are in place, providing a consistent procedure to
implement the Education Laws.
--Montana statute provides that no direct or indirect appropriation of
payment from any public funds or monies are to be used for any
sectarian purpose.
--Montana has home study programs under public supervision in isolated
areas of the state.
--Minnesota's statute establishes an accrediting procedure for nonpublic
schools; and if a school is accredited by one of the recognized
accrediting agencies, the only information submitted to the local
superintendent is name, age, and address of the child of compulsory
school age.
--Iowa's new statute has placed a moratorium on the prosecution of any
parent who has reported his program appropriately to the local
superintendent but is not complying with the other requirements of the
law.
--Wisconsin's compulsory age for school attendance is extended to
eighteen year olds. There is a strong possibility some families may
choose to establish a home-based program for older students who do
not fit into the traditional public school setting.
--The statutes in Pennsylvania at the time of the research have just been
amended regarding home instruction. A bill provides for parents to file
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an affidavit giving assurances they are complying with the requirements
of the statute.
To identify the current status of home instruction in each individual state,
the interviewees were asked to list the best and the most troublesome features of the
authority for home instruction in their state. The respondent from Montana
identified the best features as (1) the requirement to keep attendance and
immunization records and (2) inclusion of the requirement to have school for one
hundred and eighty days. Troublesome features included (1) the lack of required
qualifications of the person providing the instruction and (2) a concern regarding
the misconception that students can apply and automatically be accepted to the state
colleges, as was the case with graduates from accredited high schools, after
completing a home instruction program with no high school diploma.

The

interviewee summarized his concern in the statement, "We have cases where people
who didn't even get out of eighth grade are teaching their children at home. "393
Clarification of the responsibilities of the parties involved in home-based
programs in Wisconsin was viewed as a positive feature of the current Wisconsin
statute. A troublesome feature was school census language which did not require
the parent or private school administrator to indicate the name, address, or birth date
of the students. Consequently it was impossible to collect accurate information
regarding all students within the compulsory age group. In addition there was no
authority to follow up if a complaint was presented regarding a home-based
program.
393Legal Department Staff, Montana Office of Public Instruction.
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In Pennsylvania the language allows for review after one year by the local

superintendent and consequently contains some elements of local control.
The individual interviewed in Minnesota stated:
What this compromise language does is enable the state to assure
that we do have an educated citizenry in that people are going to
schools that meet certain minimum qualifications for being a
school. It ensures first of all that children are in something
called a school and that that school meets certain minimum
qualifications. The statute spells out those qualifications much
more explicitly than the old law did.394
Local districts and the nonpublic schools identified record-keeping as one
of the troublesome features of the new legislation in Minnesota.

The large

nonpublic schools that enroll students from throughout the state found it
cumbersome to report the required pupil accounting information. After the first
year of the implementation of the new laws, computerized systems were developed
to assist in the process. Another weakness was the omission of some subjects in
the minimal curriculum requirements, an example being the omission of economics
from the social studies curriculum. The concern raised was that once the statute
was explicit (i.e. social studies includes history, geography, and government), it
eliminated other areas that might come under the rubric of that curriculum area. The
qualifications for teachers included the option of successful completion of a teacher
competency examination, yet such an exam had not been defined in the law.

394Assistant Director, Office of Governmental Relations, Minnesota Department of
Education.
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The clarification in the 1988 Iowa statutory language of a required one
hundred twenty days of school attendance fulfilled by thirty days per quarter,
eliminated the problem of having to wait the one-hundred and twenty days to
determine if the statutory requirements were being met.

It was the prior

requirement of the one hundred and twenty days that caused the Trucke395 case to
be remanded and the conviction dismissed.
Troublesome language included (1) the lack of a definition of what
constitutes a lesson plan in the reporting requirement; (2) the compliance and
reporting of the immunization requirements;396 (3) the requirement that parents
instructing their children at home are mandated child abuse reporters; (4) the
removal of the imprisonment and fine penalties from the criminal prosecution of
parents found guilty of not meeting the requirements of the compulsory attendance
laws §299 leaving only unpaid community service as the penalty;397 and (5) the
requirement to file an affidavit as to the physical or mental condition of the child
who was unable to attend schooI.398

395srate v. Trucke, 410 N.W.2d (Iowa 1987).

396It is questionable if an immunization requirement is as much in the state's interest in a
program at home, as it would be in a public setting.
397rowA CODE ANN.§ 299.1(1987).
398rowA CODE ANN.§ 299.5(1987). There is no requirement that the affidavit be given
by a physician.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MODEL LEGISLATION

Each of the interviewees was asked, "If you were to write model
legislation regarding home instruction, what would be the components of such
legislation?" There was consensus that the child's interest should be considered
and the options not be limited for the child. One interviewee stated, "I think
legislation should strike a balance and that is what this whole thing is about, the
balance between the interest in the state in assuring an educated citizenry and
maintaining private control, private education, and parental responsibility."
Opinion was divided regarding the benefit of simple statutory language
supported by extensive regulations or comprehensive statutory language that would
stand alone. The positive side of regulations was the flexibility in modifying any
necessary changes that are identified. One respondent indicated that if the
requirements were not in the statutes they would not be taken seriously. Another
stated:
That is more a philosophical issue than a practical issue. I think
that perhaps the general authority for home instruction should be
statutory but that the specific mode of implementing it probably
should be regulatory because I think that the education agency of
any state is a better place to determine how to implement that
kind of program. It probably should be initially the legislature's
judgment whether home instruction should be allowed It would
ultimately make the most sense if the particular aspects of
implementation be by regulation.

There are obviously

particularly sensitive issues that the legislatures will want to deal
with. In most cases regulations make the most sense because
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the state education department is going to be aware of how the
schools are structured, what kinds of relationships normally
exists between the superintendents, the pupils, and how best to
actually institute the program."
A concern raised was that educational judgments should be made by
educators, not legislators.

The clear consensus of the interviews was that

requirements, whether in the statutes or regulations, should not be overly
restrictive. It was also agreed that the laws should allow for parents to provide an
alternative to public education and the state's responsibility to develop an educated
citizenry should not be compromised
The interviews indicated that the following issues should be considered in
the development of home instruction legislation. Measuring the child's progress by
testing or by some alternate method was considered to be important. There was
consensus that there should be some stipulation regarding the amount of instruction
required.

A concern was raised regarding the establishment of a set number of

days or hours since a parent could provide instruction for five minutes and consider
that one full day of the required number of days. It was an accepted premise that a
comparable length of a normal school day to the required public school day was not
necessary, for a parent could do more in a shorter period of time. There was a
strong feeling that a specified number of hours per year should be required and that
those hours should be fewer for home education than for public school.
One state department official summarized his thoughts regarding model
legislation to include (1) clarification of specific pupil accounting information
assuring accountability of all students; (2) specific time lines as to when the
program should be registered; (3) limitations as to when in the school year a parent
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may use the private school/home-based instruction exemption; (4) a means of
accountability to measure the child's progress; and (5) a procedure to follow if a
complaint was filed. He also stated that there needs to be cooperation between the
state department and the strong advocacy groups if the interests of all groups are to
be satisfied.
The interviews with the representatives of the seven state departments of
eduction verified and amplified information from the surveys. More importantly,
the interviews provided a means to gain deeper insight into the variety of political
ramifications involved in the issue of home instruction.

ADDffiONAL DATA

Since 1980 over thirty states have adopted home instruction legislation or
have clarified the requirements for such a program. The majority of these changes
are considered by the research to be more favorable for the parents. To obtain
additional insight into this home instruction movement, the Chief State School
Officers were asked on the survey that was sent to them about their perception of
the home instruction statute in their state. The following choices were provided to
describe the statute: restrictive, limiting, flexible, adequate, unenforceable, needs
revision, and other. 399 As indicated in Table VI several respondents checked more
than one description. Forty-two per cent (n-17) of those who responded found the
present laws to be flexible, yet another thirty per cent (n-12) felt the present laws
399 As indicated in Table VI only twenty-three states responded to the question regarding
perception of the statute.
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needed revision. None felt the law to be restrictive; one responded that the statute
was limiting; five felt the laws to be adequate; two found that the law was
unenforceable; and the remaining three responded "other."
Several coalitions have formed to lobby in opposition to home instruction
requirements that were favorable to parents. Professional educational groups,
including National School Board Association, National Association of State
Boards, Association of Curriculum and Supervision, National Parent Teachers
Association, and the National Education Association have either adopted
resolutions, have issued position papers or have researched the issue. Essentially
their concerns are the growing number of children educated at home and the
effectiveness of the lobbying efforts of the parent groups. According to the
responses to the survey, in seventeen states there has been active political and/or
lobbying activities; many of these activities have resulted in the passage of flexible
home school legislation. Table VII lists the specific lobbying groups identified by
the respondents to the survey.

TABLE YI
PERCEPTION OF LAW
Restrictive

State
Alabama
Alaska
Ariz.on a
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Veleware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
lllinios
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisana
Mame
Maryland
Massachuettes
Michigan
MUIIleSOta
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North lJakota
Uhio
VKiahoma
Oregon
PeilT!Sy!varua
Khode Island
:south Carolina
South lJakota
Tennesse
lexas
Utah
Vermont
Vrrgmia
Washington
West Y rrgmia
w isconsin

Totals

Flexible

Limiting

Mequate
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TABLE VII

STATEWIDE LOBBYING EFFORTS

Identified Groups
Alaska

Parents of Centralized Correspondence Study

illinois

Ad Hoc Committee for Home Education Legal and
Legislative Matters

Iowa

Parent groups

Louisiana

Citizens for Home Education

Maryland

Walkersville Christian Fellowship Satellite School
System, Maryland Home Education Association, Alliance
for Organic Learning

Mississippi

Home School Association

Missouri

Families for Home Education

New Mexico

Home School Association

Tennessee

Home Education Association

Texas

Texas Home School Coalition

Utah

Home School Association

Virginia

Home Educators Association of Virginia

Wisconsin

Wisconsin Parents Association
Informal Groups

Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada,
Oregon, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming, Virginia

CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SUMMARY

The dictionary definition of a school is broad, and the courts and the
legislatures differ among themselves as to the proper organization to provide
instruction. The state has a compelling interest in assuring that children are
provided a minimum level of instruction while parents have the right and
responsibility to provide for their children's education and to determine the suitable
forum for their education.
Every state at the time of the research had a form of compulsory
attendance statute requiring children of a prescribed age to attend a public or private
school. The question raised in states where there was no statutory reference to
home instruction was "does home instruction come under the requirements of the
compulsory education statute?"
Parents, school administrators, and the public were understandably
confused about their rights and responsibilities. This confusion lead to ill will,
resentment, and ignorance.
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Parents were becoming a vocal force, working either through litigation or
through lobbying efforts, to liberalize the statutes. Litigation efforts were becoming
better organized, and parents were receiving more sophisticated legal consul to
avoid prosecution and possible arrest.
Was the compulsory attendance requirement met by home education, and
if so under what conditions? Yes, home instruction was an acceptable alternative to
compulsory education and the conditions to fulfill that choice were identified in each
state. The courts have continued to uphold legislation that clearly prescribed the
requirements and provided for proper monitoring to insure children received an
adequate education.
The necessity of continuing to search for better and clearer answers to the
questions in this study is the right and obligation of all involved in the education of
the children of this country.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The research objectives of this study covered general areas of both
statutory and case law of the fifty states related to home instruction plus an in-depth
study of seven states. The specific language of the objectives was as follows:
The First Research Objective was to review and analyze the compulsory
education/home instruction statutes and rules and regulations in the fifty states with
particular scrutiny to the means by which these laws recognized and permitted home
instruction. Data for this analysis were gathered from several sources:
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--The statutes and regulations themselves, with an examination of the
legislative history in proper cases
--Surveys submitted to the chief school officers in each state, and
--Interviews with educators at the university level and in state departments
of education, and representatives of professional organizations.
The Second Research Objective was to review and analyze the relevant
judicial decisions of the federal courts and the higher state courts over the past
twenty-five years and the Supreme Court cases since the early Twentieth Century.
This analysis described trends and identified those issues which were most often
addressed by the courts' attention:
--Inherent parental rights regarding education,
--Interest of the state regarding education,
--Religious freedom (United States Constitution, first amendment),
--Requirements of non-vagueness in criminal statutes (United States
Constitution, fourteenth amendment),
--Burden of proof,
--Equivalency of home instruction, and
--Qualifications of instructor.
The cases were then examined in the context of the statutes and rules and
regulations in the respective states to determine what if any legislative action had
followed the court action.
The Third Research Objective was to trace in seven specific states,
through further interviews, the development of home instruction legislation. The
intent was for these interviews to amplify and verify the information obtained from
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the written surveys. Specific attention in these case studies was directed to the
political or lobbying efforts, if any, that influenced such legislation and to identify
the most desirable elements of model legislation and/or administrative procedures.

PROCEDURES

This study was primarily descriptive in nature using appropriate qualitative
methods to obtain data. The three methods used were survey, interview, and legal
research. This methodology, the presentation that included tabular data and
narrative documentation, disclosed historical development, current practice, and
future trends.
The compulsory education and/or home instruction statutes in the fifty states
were researched and categorized.

These statutes and supporting laws were

identified by independent research and through the information obtained from the
survey sent to the fifty chief state school officers.
Cases at the federal and state level were studied primarily for their
interpretation of statutory language regarding both the state's interest and the
parents' rights. Court decisions involving home instruction and the compulsory
education statutes and administrative rules and regulations from the states were
analyzed, compared, and contrasted. Particular attention was given to Illinois court
decisions to determine if an Illinois "public policy" was identifiable. Such a policy
was established by the Illinois supreme court in the Levisen decision.
Follow up telephone interviews were conducted with designated
personnel in seven state education departments. The purpose of the interviews was
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to validate the already collected data and to gather information regarding the political
forces that affected the legislative process.
As a result of the research, recommendations were made for the
development of legislation in the states in which there was no explicit authority for
home instruction. The recommendation included elements that should be in statutes
or regulations for home instruction.

CONCLUSIONS

The central question raised in this research was this: Is the compulsory
attendance requirement met by home instruction, and if so under what conditions?
The following conclusions demonstrate that this requirement is satisfied under a
variety of circumstances. These circumstances vary throughout the fifty states. In
some cases home instruction is permitted by specific statutory enactment while in
other cases it is permitted by court decisions. Additionally in a limited number of
jurisdictions home instruction is practiced by default, that is, with neither legislative
nor judicial sanction.
1. Parents may choose educational alternatives for their children. but the
state has a right to regulate these choices within certain limits. Parents believe it is
their right and responsibility to provide for their children's education and to decide
what is the proper forum for that instruction. However, the state has a compelling
interest in assuring that children are provided a minimum level of instruction. The
amount of litigation and the extensive lobbying efforts over the past twenty-five
years is evidence of this dichotomy. The research has confirmed that the parents
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have judicially protected rights in this area. The dual roles of the state and the
parents are not free from conflict.
2. State and federal courts generally agreed that home instruction is a
public policy issue that should be decided by the particular state. The Supreme
Court has ruled that education is the responsibility of the state.

Where such a

public policy was found to exist, the state legislature may recognize it through
appropriate legislation.
3. All fifty states have compulsory attendance statutes which provide for
private school attendance but do not necessarily allow home instruction as an
exemption to the compulsory attendance statute. Over fifty years ago the Supreme
Court established both the propriety of private schools as an acceptable alternative
to public schools and that the state could not deny this choice because of the Equal
Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment. However, other federal court and
state court decisions have held that the denial of home instruction as an alternative to
public education does not violate the Constitution.
4. Most court cases have rejected religious claims as reasons for parents to
provide their children with home instruction. The only Supreme Court decision
dealing with home instruction recognized the firm and long established religious
beliefs of the Amish. It was believed by most authorities that only where the
religious interest is of such unique strength will it receive sufficient constitutional
recognition to qualify as an exemption to the compulsory attendance statute.
5. Sincerity of beliefs and quality of a program are not enough if the
parents do not comply with the statutes. The courts will not accept programs that
violate the requirements of the state laws or that deprive children of their rights to an
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adequate education. The role of the courts is to interpret and enforce the laws of the
states, not to evaluate the value of a home instruction program or the religious
convictions of the parents.
6. Home instruction will not gualify as a private school if the compulsory
attendance statute clearly establishes separate reguirements for home instruction and
private schools. To avoid the specific requirements of home instruction, parents
often call their program a "private school." Courts have found this tactic to be
unacceptable if home instruction is defined and provided for in the statutes.
7. The number of states that have statutory authority or regulations for
home instruction has increased in the 1980s. Most of these legislative actions have
been a reaction to court decisions and lobbying efforts. At the time of the research,
twenty-six states have explicit statutory language to allow for home instruction.
The statutory or case law in seven states allows for home instruction to fulfill the
private school exemption of compulsory attendance. In twelve states, home
instruction is an acceptable exemption if the program is equivalent, comparable, or
regular and thorough. In five states there is no statutory authority or case law to
provide for home instruction as is the condition in the other forty-three states.
Three of these five states with "silent statutes" rules and regulations have been
promulgated to establish procedures to be used by the appropriate agency in
determining if a home instruction program is an acceptable exemption to a specific
compulsory attendance requirement. In the four remaining states, there is no
direction to determine the acceptability of such a program.
8. The state's utilization of its authority to regulate education by
monitoring and approval of home instruction programs varies throughout the
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country. The approval process happens when the parents indicated their intent to
educate the child at home. Monitoring activities include home visitation, testing,
and other means of evaluating the student's progress. The compelling interest of
the state in adequate education for its citizens has met the constitutional test for
allowing governmental regulations.

The state's authority to regulate home

instruction, either through monitoring or approval, is a point of contention between
the state and the parents. The issue raised in many court cases is how much
regulatory control the state has over the education of the children. An analysis of
the cases showed that if the procedural requirements for approval of a home
instruction program are reasonable and clear and there are due-process
opportunities, the state's interest persists over the parents.
9. The burden of proof is on the parents to show that they are providing
their children with a proper education and are following the reguirements of the
state laws. The burden of proof for verification of non-attendance is on the state.
Tobak and Zirkel describe in their writings the importance of this conclusion of the
sharing of the burden of proof stating; "[T]he balanced approach considers both the
state's interest in education and the parent's freedom to choose. In addition, and
perhaps most importantly, it permits a greater focus on the best interests of the
individual child. "400
In analyzing statutes and judicial decisions, three principles must be kept
in mind: (1) regulating education is the responsibility of the respective states; (2)
each state should determine whether its public policy should permit home
400roBAK AND ZIRKEL, supra note 136, at 6-10.
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instruction; and (3) it is up to the legislature of each state to codify that public policy
into proper legislation. In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
the United States Supreme Court held that education is not a fundamental right
provided for in the United States Constitution; but educating children is a legitimate
state function, to be carried out in compliance with constitutional safeguards.401
The legislature in each state must determine if home instruction tends to be injurious
to the public or against the public good. If not, then it is proper public policy. The
courts have continued to recognize that if home instruction is proper public policy,
it is the legislature's responsibility to provide for this form of education in the laws
of the state.

RECOMMEND ATIONS

A structure for alternatives to public education, particularly that of home
instruction, is imperative.402 The more clearly the structure is defined the less likely
litigation will happen. A structure does not necessarily imply state control.
Ambiguity in the statutes and other laws in the states have resulted in litigation and
unnecessary expense and frustration. In states where there is no explicit authority
for home instruction, legislation is needed and that legislation should be a balance to

401san Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
402Nanette Barrett has developed a suggested "Home Education Act" for the American
Legislative Exchange Council. The act would exempt students from compulsory attendance if he
or she was provided a program at home. The student's skills would be assessed annually. Nancy
Barrett, EDUCATION SOURCE BOOK: nm STATE LEGISLATORS' GUIDE FOR REFORM 11
(Washington: American Legislative Exchange Council 1985).
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protect the interest of the state and the parents' rights. Home instruction should be
a specific exemption identified in the compulsory attendance statute. It should not
be included under the private school exemption, nor should implied equivalency
language be used. The legislation may take the form of explicit comprehensive
language in the statutes or explicit language in the statutes to provide authority to the
state board of education to develop regulations regarding home instruction. At a
minimum statutes and/or regulations should not be overly restrictive. The laws
should be flexible but clearly stated. There should be options for compliance. The
law should include
--clearly stated definition of terms including home instruction, private
schools, instruction, course of study, and equivalency;
--an accounting procedure to identify all students of compulsory
attendance age;
--a procedure to file statement of intent;
--options to evaluate the competency of the instructor;
--a statement of minimum academic standards;
--a minimum number of hours of instruction per year or a clearly stated
definition of a school day;
--provisions for support to the parent by a certified teacher or an
accredited institution;
--accountability procedure for identifying the student's progress;
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--a monitoring procedure to verify if the child is receiving an adequate
education;403
-a clearly established authority for enforcement of the laws;
-due process procedure; and
-a means to protect the child from educational neglect.
Parents in an increasingly mobile society who choose to educate their
children at home should not be subjected to different standards, tests, and criteria
simply because their address changes.

A child's education should not be a

function of geography. A uniform home instruction law adopted by all states
would solve that problem and reduce the uncertainty about home instruction.
Indeed at least one expert, attorney David A. Splitt, has written:
Differences in home schooling legislation from state to state
reflect our long standing tradition of local control of public
education. But, they also give home schoolers and their lawyers
plenty of opportunity to haggle over the wording of state laws
that basically are constitutionally sound. Some uniformity in
home schooling laws might reduce the legal wrangling simply
by giving more weight to legal language that already has been
tested in courts ...
It would help if someone went a step further and recommended a
uniform home schooling law based on state statutes that have
passed judicial muster. A uniform policy might look like a spot
of tarnish on the holy grail of local control, but it would go a

4030riginal approval of a home instruction program was purposefully excluded from the
list Monitoring was to verify compliance.
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long way toward reducing confusion and litigation over home
schooling.404
In many states public school administrators and parents are uncertain of

their legal rights and responsibilities regarding home instruction because of
ambiguity in laws or recent decisions in courts. School administrators grope for
guidance in their dealings with families who are interested in educating their
children in the non-traditional setting of home instruction.
Schools and their administrators and parents should be aware of their
rights and responsibilities. Cooperation between the two would be in the best
interest of the students. The desirable end goal of education should be agreed to by
all parties. That goal should be stated broadly in terms of the ultimate product, the
student.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY

1. This study has concentrated on the laws of the states and the rights of

the parents. Future study should explore the rights of children and their input into
the means by which they are educated. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion
in Yoder, stated: "These children are 'persons' within the meaning of the Bill of
Rights"405 and "On this important and vital matter of education, I think the children
should be entitled to be heard "406
404David Splitt, School Law, EXECUTIVE EDUCATOR 8 (Dec. 1988).
405wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972).

406Id. at 244.
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2. According to the results of the survey, thirteen states have laws
establishing the requirements for home instruction for special education students.407
Future study should research these laws and their relationship to the federal and
state legislation protecting the rights of handicapped students. As a part of this
future study, a definitive position should be found regarding the responsibilities of
the public school if the parents of a handicapped student choose the alternative of
home instruction.
3. A follow-up study looking at the court decisions in the late 1980s, as
related to the statutes and regulations enacted in the late 1970's and 1980's, would
be profitable to determine if requirements of new laws are less arbitrary and vague
in the minds of the courts.
4. As more states develop outcome-based accountability or performance
objectives for the public school students, future study could seek to identify the
educational outcome requirements placed on nonpublic educational alternatives.

407 Arizona, Arkansas, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, Vermont, Wyoming.
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APPENDIX A

STATUTES
STATE
Alabama

STATUTORY COMPILATION
Code of Alabama

YEAR
COMPULSORY
1g57 §16-28-3

HOME INSTRUCTION
§16-28-5 (certified private tutor)

Alaska

Alaska Statutes Supplement

1g55 §14.30.010

§14.30.010(b)(11) (private)
§14.45.1000
§14.45.14 (religious or other private)

Arizona

Arizona Revise'1 Statutes Annotated
Supplement

1g57 §15-802(A)

§ 15-802(8)( 1)

(explicit)

Arkansas

Arkansas Statutes Annotated Supplement

1g57 §80-1503.6

§80-1503.4-8

(explicit)

California

Deering's Annotated California Code

1g57 §48200

§48224 (private tutor) §51745 (independent study
with public school curriculum)

Colorado

Colorado Revised Statutes Supplement

1g57 §22-33-104

§22-33-104.5

Connecticut

General Statutes of Connecticut

1g55 § 10-184

§10-184 (elsewhere equivalent)

Deleware

Delaware Code Annotated Supplement

1g55 §tit 14,
§2702-2704

§tit. 14, §2703(a) (regular and thorough
instruction)

Florida

Florida Statutes Annotated (West
Supplement)

1g55 §232.01

§228.041 (34) §232.02(4) (explicit)

Georgia

Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Michie)

1g57 §20-2-6go. 1

§20-2-6go(c)

Hawaii

Hawaii Revised Statutes

1g55 §2g8.g(b)

§2g8.g(6) (appropriate alternative programs)

Idaho

Idaho Code

1 g51 §33-202

§33-11 g (accreditation) and §33-202 (comparable
instruction)

Illinois

Illinois Revised Statutes

1g88 ch. 122, para. 26-1

ch. 122, para. 26-1 (school age exemptions)

REGULATIONS

State Bd. Guidelines

(explicit)

State Bd. Regulations

(explicit)

Dept. of Education Regs. 4140.2
revised 1ga5

STATUTES (con't)
YEAR
COMPULSORY
1987 §20-8.1-3-17

HOME INSTRUCTION
§20-8.2-3-34 (equivalent)

STATE
Indiana

STATUTORY COMPILATION
West's Annoted Indiana Code

Iowa

Iowa Code Annotated (West)

1988 §299.1

Kansas

Kansas Statutes Annotated

1980 §72-1111 (a)

Kentucky

Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated,
Official Edition (Michie/Bobbs Merrill)

1987 §159.010

§159.30 (b) (exemptions)

Louisiana

West's Louisiana Revised Statutes
Annotated Supplement

1988 §17:221(A)

§17:236 (explicit)

Maine

Maine Revised Statutes Supplement

1987 tit 20-A
§5001-A

tit. 20-A

Maryland

Annotated Code of Maryland

1985 §7-301(A)

§7-301(A) (regular and thorough)

Massachusetts

Annotated Laws of Massachusetts (Law
Co-op)

1978 ch. 76, §1

ch. 76, §1 (thoroughness and efficiency)

Michigan

Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated (West)

1988 §380.1561

§380.1561(3)(a)

Minnesota

Minnesota Statutes Annotated (West)
Supplement

1988 §120.101

§ 120. 101 subdivisions 4-9 (explicit)

Mississippi

Mississippi Code Annotated (Supp)

1987 §37-13-91

§37-13-91 (2)(i),(3)(c)(iv)

Missouri

Vernon's Annotated Missouri Statutes
Supplement

1988 § 167.031

§167.031.2, §167.042 (explicit)

Montana

Montana Code Annotated

1985 §167.031.2

§167.031.2(2)1 (explicit)

§299.1 (equivalent exception)

§5001-A (3)(A)(1) (equivalent)

(explicit)

REGULATIONS

State Bd. Regulations

Chapter 130

Bylaw ComarTitle 13A.10.01

STATUTES (con't)
STATE
Nebraska

STATUTORY COMPILATION
Revised Statutes of Nebraska

HOME INSTRUCTION
§79-328(c) (exemptions)

REGULATIONS
Title 92, Nebraska
Administrative Code, Ch13,14, 15

Nevada

Nevada Revised Statutes Annotated
(Michie)

1986 §392

New Hampshire

New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated
Supplement

1987 §193:1

§193:1 (exemptions)

N.H. Code of N.H. Code of
Administrative Rules Ed.
315.01(d)

New Jersey

New Jersey Statutes Annotated (West)

1968 §18A:38-25

§18A:38-25 (equivalent)

New Mexico

New Mexico Statutes Annotated

1986 §22-1-12-2

§22-1-12-2,

New York

Consolidated Laws Service

1985 §3201, 3204, 3205,
3210,

§3204(1) (equivalent)

North Carolina

General Statutes of North Carolina
Supplement

1985 §115 C-378

§115 C-563-565 (explicit)

North Dakota

North Dakota Century Code Supplement

1985 § 15-34. 1-01

§15-34.1-03 (same length of time and approval)

Ohio

Ohio Revised Code Annotated (Anderson)

1985 §3321.03

§3321.04(2) (explicit)

Oklahoma

Oklahoma Statutes Annotated (West)
Supplement

1988 § tit 70, § 10-105(A) § tit 70, § 10-105(A) (exemptions)

Oregon

Oregon Revised Statutes

1987 §339.010

§339.030(5)

Administrative Rules
581-21-026

Pennsylvania

Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated
Supplement

1988 tit.24
§13-1327

tit.24 §13-1327 (private tutor)

Chapter 11 of Regulations of
State Board of Education of
Pennsylvania 11.31

Rhode Island

General Laws of Rhode Island Supplement

1987 §16-19-1

§16-1g-1,

State Bd. Regulations

YEAR
COMPULSORY
1985 §79-201

§22-1-2(U)

§16-19-2

(explicit)

State Procedure

Official Compilation of Codes,
Rules & Regulations of the State
of New York tit. x 8, § 100.10

(explicit)

STATUTES
YEAR
COMPULSORY
1988 §13-27-1

(can't)

STATE
Soth Dakota

STATUTORY COMPILATION
South Dakota Codified Laws Annotated
Supplement

HOME INSTRUCTION
§13-27-3 (equivalent)

South Carolina

Code of Laws of South Carolina 1976
Annotated (Law Co-op) Supplement

1987 §59-65-20

§16-1g-40(A)

Tennessee

Tennessee Code Annotated Supplement

1987 §49-6-3001

§49-6-3001 (B),

Texas

Texas Education Code Annotated (Vernon)

1987 §21.032

§21.033(a)(1)

Utah

Utah Code Annotated Supplement

1987 §53-24-1

§53-24-1.3( 1)(b)(ii)

Vermont

Vermont Statutes Annotated Supplement

1987 tit. 16, § 1121

tit. 16, §166b (explicit)

Virginia

Code of Virginia Annotated Supplement

1988 § 22.1-254

§22.1-254.1

Washington

Washington Revised Code Supplement

1988 § 28A.27.010

§§28A.27.010(4)(a), 27.310, 27.320 (explicit)

West Virginia

West Virginia Code Supplement

1988 § 18-8-1

§18-8-1 (a)

Wisconsin

Wisconisn Statutes Supplement

1987 § 118.15.

§118.15.01(1 r)

Wyoming

Wyoming Statutes

1 986 § 21-4-102

§21-4-101

(explicit)

§49-6-3050

(explicit)

(explicit)

(explicit)

(explicit)

(explicit)

REGULATIONS

State Bd. Regulations
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CASE LISTINGS
CITATION
STATE

CASE

LEVEL

Blackwelder v. Safnauer

689 F.Supp. 106 (N.D.N.Y.
New York
1988), app. dismissed (1989,
CA 2).

U.S.District Court, Northern
District New York

Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka

347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S.Ct.
686, 98 L.Ed.873 (1954)

United States Supreme Court

Burrow v. State

669 S.W.2d 441 (Ark. 1984)

Arkansas

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Care and Protection of
Charles

504 N.E.2d 592 (Mass. 1987)

Massachusetts

Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts

Delconte v. State

329 S.E.2d 636 (N.C. 1985)

North Carolina

Supreme Court of North
Carolina

Duro v. District Attorney

712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied 104 S.Ct. 998,
( 1984)

North Carolina

United States Court of
Appeals, 4th Circuit

Ellis v. O'Hara

612 F.Supp 379 (D.C.Mo.
1985)

Missouri

U.S. District Court, E.D.
Missouri, E.O.

F. & F. v. DuVal County

273 So.2d 15 (Fla. 1973)

Florida

District Court of Appeal of
Florida, First District

Farrington v. Tokushige

273

Fellowship Baptist
Church v. Benton

815 F.2d 485 (8th Cir.
Iowa
1987), remanded to 678
F.Supp. 213 (S.D. Iowa 1988)

us

284

United States Supreme Court

United States Court of
Appeals, Eighth Circuit

.......
-.J
\0

CASE LISTINGS (can't)
CASE
Grigg v. Commonwealth

CITATION
297 S.E.2d 799 (Va.1982)

STATE
Virginia

LEVEL
Supreme Court of Virginia

Hanson v. Cushman

490 F.Supp. 109 (1980)

Michigan

U.S. District Court, W. D.
Michigan, S.D.

Hill v. State

Ala.Cr.App., 410 So.2d 431

Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals of
Alabama

Howell v. State

723 S.W.2d 755
(Tex.App.-Texarkana)

Texas

Court of Appeals of Texas,
Texarkana

In re Mennig

638 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. App.
1982)

Missouri

Missouri Court of Appeals,
Western District

Interest of Sawyer

672 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1983)

Kansas

Supreme Court Kansas

Johnson v. Charles City
Comm. School Bd.

368 N.W.20 74 (Iowa 1985)

Iowa

Supreme Court of Iowa

Kentucky

Supreme Court of Kentucky

Kentucky State Bd., Etc. v. 589 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979)
Rudasill
Lemon v. Kurtzman

403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105

Matter of Adam D.

505 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Fam.Ct.
1986)

United States Supreme Court

New York

Family Court, Schoharie
County

I-'
CX>
0

CASE LISTINGS (can't)
LEVEL

CASE
Matter of Andrew "TT"

CITATION
504 N.Y.S.2d 326 (A.O. 2
Dept. 1986)

STATE
New York

Matter of Falk

110 Misc. 2d 104, 441 N.Y.
S.2d 785 (1981)

New York

United States District Court

Matter of Franz Children

390 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1977)

New York

Supreme Court, Apellate
Division, Second Department

Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, Third Department

Mazanec v. North
798 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1986) Indiana
Judson-San Pierre School
Corporation

United States Court of
Appeals, Seventh Circuit

Meyer v. Nebraska

262 US 390

United States Supreme Court

Murphy v. State

852 F.2d 1039 ( 1988)

Arkansas

U.S. Court of Appeals for
Eighth Circuit

People v. Levisen

404 Ill. 574 (1950)

Illinois

Supreme Court of Illinois

Pierce v. Society of
Sisters

268

Roemhild v. State

308 S.E.2d 154 (Ga.1983)

San Antonio School
District v. Rodriguez

411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278

us

510

United States Supreme Court

Georgia

Supreme Court of Georgia

United States Supreme Court

,_.
00
,_.

CASE LISTINGS (can't)
CASE
Scoma v. Chicago Board
of Education

CITATION
391 F. Supp. 452 (1974)

Sheridan Road Baptist
Church v. Department of
Education

STATE
Illinois

LEVEL
United States District Court,
N.D. Illinois, E.D.

426 Mich. 462, 396 N.W. 2d
373 (1986), cert. denied,
107 S.Ct. 2183 (1987)

Michigan

Michigan Supreme Court

State Ex Rel. Douglas v.
Bigelow

334 N.W.2d 444 (Neb. 1983)

Nebraska

Supreme Court of Nebraska

State v. Bowman

Or.App., 653 P.2d 254 (1982) Oregon

Court of Appeals of Oregon

State v. Buckner

472 So.2d 1228 (Fla.App.2
Dist. 1985)

District Court of Appeal of
Florida, Second District

State v. Budke

371 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. 1985) Minnesota

Supreme Court of Minnesota

State v. Davis

Mo.App., 598 S.W.2d 189
(1980)

Missouri Court of Appeals,
Southern District

State v. Edgington

663 P.2d 374 (N.M.App. 1983) New Mexico

Court of Appeals of New
Mexico

State v. Lowry

383 P .2d 962 (Kan. 1983)

Kansas

Supreme Court of Kansas

State v. M.M. and S.E.

Fla.App., 407 So.2d 987
( 1982)

Florida

District Court of Appeal of
Florida, Fourth District

Florida

Missouri

......
00
N

CASE LISTINGS (can't)
CASE
State v. McDonough

CITATION
468 A.2d 977 (Me. 1983)

STATE

Maine

LEVEL
Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine

State v. Moorhead

308 N.W.2D 60 (Iowa 1981)

Iowa

Supreme Court of Iowa

State v. Newstrom

371 N.W.2d 525 (Minn. 1985)

Minnesota

Supreme Court of Minnesota

State v. Patzer

382 N.W. 2d 631

North Dakota

Supreme Court of North
Dakota

State v. Popanz

332 N.W.2d 750 (Wis. 1983)

Wisconsin

Supreme Court of Wisconsin

State v. Riddle

285 S.E. 2d 359 (W.Va. 1981) West Virginia

Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia

State v. Schmidt

505 N.E.2d 627 (Ohio 1987),
cert. denied 108 S.Ct. 327

Ohio

Supreme Court of Ohio

State v. Shaver

N.D., 294 N.W.2d 883
(N.D.1980)

North Dakota

Supreme Court of North
Dakota

State v. Trucke

410 N.W.2d 242 (Iowa 1987) Iowa

State v. Whisner

351 N.E.2d 750

Ohio

Iowa State Supreme Court

Supreme Court of Ohio

1--'
00

w

CASE LISTINGS (con't)
CASE
State v. Yoder

CITATION
406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526
( 1972)

STATE

LEVEL
United States Supreme Court

CASE HOLDINGS
CASE
Blackwelder v.
Safnauer

HOLDING
There Is no constitutional violation by setting minimum standards of instruction as required by the Education Law.
Compulsory education statute is not unconstitutionally vague.

Brown v. Board of Required all public schools to desegrate.
Education of
Topeka
Burrow v. State

The language of the statute was clear and there was no1 st amendment violation.

Care and
Protection of
Charles

Remanded to lower court, pre-approval of curriculum, teacher competence, textbook adequacy and pupil progress
appropriate. Did not violate parents constitutional rights.

Delconte v. State

Amendments to compulsory attendance statutes were to loosen standards for nonpublic eduction. Case did not deal
with constitutional issue. Without clear legislative intent court would not hold that home instruction is prohibited by
statute.

Duro v. District
Attorney

States compelling interest overrides parents religious interest.

Ellis v. O'Hara

Limited holding on vagueness issue. Stayed order until legislature enacted new statutes.

F. & F. v. DuVal
County

Mother doesn't qualify as tutor and program not a parochial or denominational school.

......
00
lJl

CASE HOLDINGS (con't)
HOLDING

CASE

Farrington v.
Tokushige

Limited state's authority to excessively regulate private schools which set limitations on state power.

Fellowship
Baptist Church v.
Benton

Certification requirement and denial of "Amish exemption" upheld. Remanded to lower court for definition of
"equivalent instruction."

Grigg v.
Commonwealth

Unapproved home instruction does not constitute a private school.
not vague.

Hanson v.
Cushman

Statute requmng certification is constitutional, rejected that parents had a fundamental non-religious right in the
choice of education for their children.

Hill v. State

No merits on freedom of religion claim.

Howell v. State

Sincerely held religious convictions are not 1st amendment defense. Howells failed to show reversible error.

In re Monnig

Essentially equivalent qualification was unconstitutionally vague. Juvenile court bears the burden of proof to show
equivalency.

Interest of
Sawyer

Home school not private school as defined in statute, state standards are appropriate and have rational relationship to
state purpose. Education is not a fundamental right.

Requirement of qualified tutors is acceptable and

......
CXl
O'I

CASE HOLDINGS (con't)
CASE
Johnson v.
Charles City
Comm. School Bd.

HOLDING
Upheld reporting and teacher certification requirements. Remand to district court for definition of equivalent
instruction.

Kentucky State
Bd., Etc. v.
Rudasill

Appropriate monitoring of private schools such as testing is acceptable, requiring certification or determining
appropriate textbooks is not acceptable.

Lemon v.
Kurtzman

Developed three-prong test to determine state's neutral position when Church/State cases are litigated.

Matter of Adam D. Upheld the local schools responsibility to determine the equivalency of the home instruction program.

Matter of Andrew
"TT"

Parents, found guilty of neglect, failed to provide school officials with proof that the instruction the children received
at home met equivalency requirement.

Matter of Falk

Parents met burden of proof that they were providing instruction that is substantially equivalent.

Matter of Franz
Children

Statute Is constitutional. One and one-half hours per day of instruction is not substantially equivalent.

Mazanec v. North
Judson-San
Pierre School
Corporation

Plantiffs denied relief in civil rights claim because they frustrated attempts to verify compliance with law.

CASE HOLDINGS (con't)
HOLDING
CASE
Meyer v. Nebraska Invalidated state law prohibiting teaching of a modern language other than English to students.

Murphy v. State

Courts upheld law that students taught at home take same standardized test as public school students as it established
the least restrictive system to assure its goal of adequately educating its citizens.

People v. Levisen

Statute does not determine the manner and place a child should be educated. Parents have burden of showing an
adequate course of instruction is provided. This particular prograr,n is a private school.

Pierce v. Society
of Sisters

State statute recognizing only public education interfered with parents liberties.
regulate, inspect, supervise and examine all schools.

The state did not have the power to

Roemhild v. State Statute was unconstitutionally vague in lack of defining "private school."

San Antonio
School District v.
Rodriguez

Education is not a fundamental constitutional right protected by Equal Protection. Education is the responsibility of the
state.

Scoma v. Chicago
Board of
Education

Statute is not vague, burden of proof is on the parents.
was commensurate with public school standards.

Sheridan Road
Baptist Church v.
Department of
Education

Certification requirement upheld, does not alone violate Establishment Clause.

Home instruction could qualify as public school as long as it

I-'
CX>
CX>

CASE HOLDINGS (con't)
CASE
State Ex Rel.
Douglas v.
Bigelow

HOLDING
Non-certified parent is enjoined from operating a school in violation of law.

State v. Bowman

Statute is not unconstitutionally vague and approval authority was acceptable.

State v. Buckner

Clear prohibition of unqualified parent from teaching a child at home under guise of private school. Remanded for
determination if private school was established.

State v. Budke

Essentially equivalent qualification was unconstitutionally vague.

State v. Davis

State failed to prove parents didn't provide equivalent education. Urged legislature to make necessary changes in the
law.

State v. Edgington Statute rationally related to state interest in compulsory attendance and does not violate the 14th amendment Equal
Protection Clause.

State v. Lowry

Parents claim they operated a private school. Court found It did not meet statutory requirements.

State v. M.M. and
S.E.

Private school not established because mother was not a qualified tutor as required by the statute.

.......
00
l.O

CASE HOLDINGS (can't)
CASE
State v.
McDonough

HOLDING
Parents refused to submit plan. 14th amendment claim unfound.

State v. Moorhead Equivalency and curriculum requirements are clear. Free exercise burden on party challenging.

State v.
Newstrom

Essentially equivalent qualification was unconstitutionally vague for purpose of imposing criminal penalties.

State v. Patzer

Teacher certification is the least personally intrusive method to satisfy state's prime interest.

State v. Popanz

Term "private schools" in compulsory attendance statute is vague and thus is unconstitutional
prosecutions involving private schools.

State v. Riddle

1st and 14th amendment violations denied. Sincerity, dedication and competency are excuse for non-compliance with
statute. Statute not vague, instead considered flexible.

State v. Schmidt

Statute is not vague, it reasonably furthers the state's interest in education of its citizens, requirement to seek local
superintendent approval is appropriate and doesn't infringe on free exercise of religion.

State v. Shaver

Minimal requirements for state approval are in best interest of state.

as applied to

I-'
l.O
0

CASE HOLDINGS (can't)
CASE
State v. Trucke

HOLDING
Reversed because conviction based on crimes not yet committed (120 day attendance requirement).

State v. Whisner

Minimum stanQards for private schools were too restrictive. Required state to show compelling interest.

State v. Yoder

Court placed burden of proof on state to show compelling interest. Narrow ruling applied to Amish due to strong
religious conviction.
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WILLIAM L. THOMPSON
Regional Superintendent of Schools
County Building A904, Waukegan, Illinois 60065

Telephone (312) 360-6313

June 25, 1987

!FIRSTNAME! !LASTNAME!
!ADDRESS!
!CITYSTZIP!
Dear !FIRSTNAME!:
Thanks so much for the information you have provided me regarding
home instruction. It seems as if I am becoming acquainted via the
phone and mail with an interesting group of people in state agencies
and in a variety of other educational positions that are all
concerned with home instruction.
I am finalizing my survey for the chief state school officers and
would appreciate your input before I send it out. My primary goal in
distributing the survey is to obtain any information that will not be
readily available through normal research. An example of this is
information regarding rules and regs developed to implement the
statutes. It seems as if the statutes are secondary in terms of
local and state administration. Another example of information I
hope to obtain is the process states used to develop and influence
legislation.
As I have begun my research I have come across several charts
documenting state statutes, but I am fearful they are no longer
accurate. One of my final goals is to develop an up to date chart
such as this from an unbiased perspective.
My last favor to ask of you is do you have any idea how I can be
certain my survey is acted on in the state agencies. I know they
receive so many of these. Chris Phipo from the Education commission
of the States recommended I identify 2 or 3 chief state school
officers to endorse the research project and to cosign the cover
letter. Do you think your chief would consider doing this?
Thanks in advance for your cooperation. I am enclosing a stamped
return envelope for your convenience. I'd appreciate your input by
July 15th if possible.
Sincerely,

Sybil Yastrow
Assistant Superintendent
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LAKE COUNTY

Regional Superintendent
of Schools
18 North County • A904 • Waukegan, Illinois 60085-4362
312-360-6313

Sybil Yastrow
Regional Superintendent

Edward Gonwa
Assistant Regional Superintendent

MAILED TO CHIEF SCHOOL OFFICERS

October 30, 1987

As you are aware, there is a growing trend throughout the country of parents educating
their children at home. As the Regional Superintendent of Lake County, Illinois, I have watched
the numbers increase in our county. Illinois has no statutory provisions for home instruction. The
confusion as to the rights and responsibilities of both the parents and school administrators has
become more evident each year.
It is my intent to research this issue. The purpose of the research is to examine home
instruction from a national perspective in terms of the applicable statutory and case law, as well as
rules and regulations. Based on this analysis, I will propose model criteria for home instruction
legislation and regulations. The goal is to provide information to local districts, state agencies and
lawmakers in Illinois to assist them in the development of policies, rules and regulations and laws
relating to home instruction.
Ted Sanders, the Superintendent of Illinois State Board of Education, has lent his support
to this research as indicated in the enclosed letter. I would appreciate your support by completing

the enclosed questionnaire. The law books cannot provide all of the information. I am certain the
most meaningful information I can obtain will be from state educational agencies that deal with the
situations on a regular basis.
Thank you in advance for your cooperation. Please feel free to call me collect if you have
any questions.
Sincerely,

Sybil Yastrow
Regional Superintendent of Schools
Lake County
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Illinois
State Board of
Education
100 North First Street
Springfield. Illinois 62777-0001
2171782-4321

Thomas Lav Burroughs. Chairman
lllm0ts Stare Board of Educa110n

Ted Sanders
State Su(JfJrmtendent of Educat10n

September 25, 1987

Ms. Sybil Yastrow
Regional Superintendent of Schools
County Building A904
Waukegan, Illinois 60085-4362
Dear Sybi 1,
I am happy to cooperate with you in obtaining information you need in
preparing your doctoral dissertation.
The topic you have chosen to examine on home instruction is an important
and timely one. I hope my collegues will give their cooperation in
completing the survey to assist you in this important endeavor.
Best personal wishes on your project.

\]J~J
Te't¥J;/~

State Superintendent of Education

Southern lllinots Regional Offtce
F•rst Bank and Trust Bu1k11ng

Su1te214.123South 10th Street
Mt

V~mon,

lllino.s 62864-4013

618/242-1676
An Eoual ()poonumty!Aff1rmat11,e Action EmDIOY'H'

Telecommun1cat1ons Device for the Deaf fTOOI

2171782-1900

State of Illinois Center

Suite 14-300
100 West RandolPh
Ch.cago. IU1nois 60601-3405

3121917-2220

I IOME INSJ'ROCrtON SURYEX
I.

2.

Ooes your stale have a compulsory allendance/cJucation statute'!
Yes
No
Ir yes, please send a copy of slalllle.

n· YOU 1ms1•0NIJEIJ l'OSITIVEI. y TO Jon 4 - l'IWCEEIJ.
IF NOT, !'I.EASE GO TO# 11.

5.

Ones your stale have a slalulory rcqujremenl for reporling all students coVL'fed by
compulsory allendance/cJucalion?
Yes
No

Ooes lhe slalule referring lo home instruction in your slate fall under :uiy of the three following
categories:

I.

Spccificall y prov ides for home instruction.
Yes
No

2.

Allows for home instruction if the home qualifies as a private school.
Yes
No

3.

Allows for home instruction, by implication, with statutory language
(e.g. "equivalent education elsewhere.")
Yes
No

4.

Other(pleasespccify)_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

If yes, please send a copy of the slalule.
If yes, lo whom is the reporting done7
If yes, docs it require that all students in all educational settings be included in the data?
Public School

Yes

No

Non-puplicSchool

Yes

No

llome Instruction

Yes

No

If no, is there a stale educational department procedure used lo gather these data?
Yes
No

6.

Has your agency developed any rules, regulations and/or procedures lo implement the home inslrUctinn
stalules?
Yes
No
Jr yes, please send a copy.

7.

Are you awue of any political or legislative activities thal resuhed in the passage of home school
legislation (forexunple: lobbying groups)?
Yes
No
Please describe.

8.

Who ha.• lbe aulhorily to regulate home instruction in your slate?
(Select as many as appropriate)
Stale agency__
Intermediate Agency _ _
Otlicr(plea•espccify)_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

(If yes, please send a copy of the procedures).

J.

Ones your stale have spccilic slalulory language referring lo home instruction?
Yes
No
If yes, please send a copy of the statute and answer the following.
The slalule is: (mark as many as appropriate)
restrictive

limiting _ _
unenforceable

4.

nexible
adequate _ _
needs revision

other_ _

Ones your slate have a slalule dealing with non public (private) schools which include home
instruction as a form of non public school?
Yes
No

Local School Oistricl

I-'
l.O

-.J

9.

10.

Whal is source of this authority? (Select as many as appropriate)
Stalule
Rules & Regulations-~
Other (please specify)_ _
Docs your agency monitor home instruction programs?

Yes

14.

Does your agency provide support lo ll1e local educational agency administrators for dealing with the
home instruction of sludenl<"!
No - Yes - If yourresponse was yes, please describe (i.e., seminars, guidelines, rc1m1ing forms).

15.

Are there any specific requirements in your stale regarding special education students (as defined in
Public Law 94-142) who are educated al home?
Yes
No - -

No

Docs your agency monitor non public schools?
Yes
No
If your response was yes lo eillicr of above, describe the monitoring procc.<s (i.e., all reponing forms,
testing, on site monitoring, other).

11.

Please list the most important coun cases (federal or state) in your state dealing with home instruction?
(any descriptor will be sufficient)

--

.,.

Would you like a compilation of data gained from this survey?

Yes

--

No

--

State
Person completing survey
Position
Address

12.

13.

Is there any pending litigation in the slate or federal courts in your slate relating lo home instruction?
Yes
No

Ha.< your allomey general or state educ.tional agency legal dcpanmenl provided legal opinions regardin1
home instruction?
Yes
No
U your response was yes, please include copies or describe.

City

Zip

Phone
AnydoclUJIDlls(statutes, rules and regulatiotu, court cases, task force reports) to support this survey
would~ appreciaud. If there are any tluplicati'1g or postage costs plea<e ;,,dude with the material.v a bill for
~imbUTSl!ntenl.

PLEASE Rlo:TURN TO:

SYAIL YASTROW
REGIONALSUf'r.OFSCllCX>LS
ROOM A904 COUNTY BUILDING
18 N.COUNTY STREET
WAllKEGAN, ILLINOIS 61Nl85

APPENDIXD
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CONTACTS FOR CASE STUDY INTERVIEWS

STAIB

CONTACT

CA1EGORYOF
HOME
INSTRUCTION
AUTIIORTIY

Iowa

Kathy Collins Legal Consultant
Department of Public Instruction

Equivalent

Minnesota

Barry Sullivan Government Relations
Department of Education

Explicit

Montana

Bob Stockton, Executive Assistant
to Legal Services, Office Of Public Instruction

Explicit

New York

Carl Friedman, Bureau of Pupil Support Services;
Richard Troutwein, David Steever,
Legal Departtnent;
The State Education Deparnnent

Equivalent

North Carolina

Kay Oney, North Carolina Department of
Public Instruction

Explicit

Pennsylvania

Joe Bard, Department of Education

Explicit

Wisconsin

Marvin Berg, Consultant Department
of Public Instruction

Explicit

QUESTIONS FOR PHONE SURVEY
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November, 1988
The purpose of the phone survey to five state offices of education is to gain a clearer
insight into the statutory authority and its development in the area of home instruction.
Verify information from original survey:
1.

The year of the most recent change in the compulsory education statutes in your
state.
Pertinent information from the statute.

2.

Cite authority if any for home instruction in state.
Pertinent information from the statute. Verify grouping.

3.

Important court cases over the past 20 years.

Questions:
1.

Is your state unique in terms of home instruction, i.e., strong language, large
population with religious sentiment directed to home instruction, court precedent?

2.

Best features in statutory language.

3.

Most troublesome languange.

4.

Are there any state funds available to support any part of the home school
statutory language, i.e., state aid to districts for students, testing, monitoring,
etc.?

5.

Chronological sequence of changes in legislations.

6.

Describe the outside forces if there were any that precipitated these changes.

7.

Predict any trends in your state regarding home instruction.

8.

What would be the forces that would cause these?

9.

Predict any national trends regarding home instruction.

10.

What would be the forces that would cause these?

11.

If you were to write the model legislation regarding home instruction, what would
be the components of it?

APPROVAL SHEET
The dissertation submitted by Sybil Yastrow has been read and
approved by the following committee:
Dr. Max A. Bailey, Director
Associate Professor, Educational Leadership and Policy Studies,
Loyola University of Chicago
Dr. L. Arthur Safer
Associate Professor, Educational Leadership and Policy Studies,
Associate Dean, School of Education
Loyola University of Chicago
Dr. Philip M. Carlin
Associate Professor, Educational Leadership and Policy Studies,
Loyola University of Chicago
The final copies have been examined by the director of the
dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the
fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that
the dissertation is now given final approval by the Committee
with reference to content and form.
The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

·..

j l
.
'/}.(.i

Date

1
I " . ,.-'

'

I . I '." L· I ). ;, ~. .,. ·->·~r--+---------'

j

.

Director's Signature

'

.~

